Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2025
Abstract
Natural theology is the philosophical practice of demonstrating the existence of God by means of rational argumentation unaided by faith or divine revelation. Its ultimate aim is not merely to prove but to provide epistemic justification (or warrant) to belief in God. However, philosophers are in general agreement that the enterprise does not satisfactorily establish its desired conclusion. Nevertheless, Alvin Plantinga espouses his reformed epistemology in which theistic belief can acquire warrant by being properly basic in a theist’s noetic structure. Given this, he contends that the failure of the project is inconsequential to the reasonableness of the religious worldview. It is because natural theology is neither necessary nor sufficient for the warrant of theistic belief. In contrast, I argue that Plantinga’s reformed objection to natural theology is inadequate since it only addresses the classical function of the project, thus failing to emphasize equally its other essential roles. More so, his reformed objection overlooks the development and evolution of the project, which allows it to escape from the traditional atheological critiques of both Hume and Kant. For this reason, Plantinga’s objection may not work anymore on newer versions of the enterprise. Indeed, there is nothing inherent in Plantinga’s reformed epistemology that undermines natural theology per se, but only a picture of it laden with evidentialist assumptions.
Recommended Citation
Lismoras, R. M. (2025). The insufficiency of Plantinga’s Reformed objection to natural theology. UNITAS, 98(2), 109–129. https://archium.ateneo.edu/
