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**Manila and Maluku: Trade and Warfare
in the Eastern Archipelago 1580 – 1640**

JOHN VILLIERS

The union of the Portuguese and Spanish crowns in 1580 gave to Philip II and I an empire that stretched from Brazil to Mozambique and from Goa to the Moluccas and it was this that made possible the realisation of some of the imperial ambitions of the latter part of his reign. The Portuguese empire at that time was still primarily an Asian empire and most of its wealth was derived from its possessions in the Estado da India. Since the Portuguese lacked the resources necessary to pay for the spices that were the principal commodity they purchased in Asia, they came increasingly to rely on supplies of silver from the mines of New Spain with which to maintain their share of the lucrative spice trade.

Manila was the remotest outpost of this vast empire, administratively subject to the viceregal government in Mexico, dependent upon subsidies from New Spain for its economic survival, and only indirectly linked to Europe through the trans-Pacific galleon trade. The Philippine Islands offered few incentives for the exploitation of local resources; they produced no pepper or spices and were too thinly populated to make the development of mines or plantations an economic proposition. In 1606 the population was estimated at 580,000, as against a population of 11 million in Mexico a hundred years earlier before the demographic disaster of the sixteenth century.¹ Nevertheless, Manila was well placed to serve Spain as

This article was originally a paper presented at the Ninth Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia held in Manila in November 1983.

1. See Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C. de Jesus, eds., *Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press,

an entrepôt for goods traded in the South China Sea and the Indonesian archipelago, and, before the Spanish conquest, had already begun to fulfil this role and to achieve thereby a measure of economic importance and political development.² It was this that led the Spanish to select Manila in preference to Cebu or Panay as the center and first city of their Philippine colony and, during the sixty years that the two crowns were united, to try to make it the commercial hub of this far-flung Luso-Spanish Asian empire and the main entrepôt for all trade in the maritime area between Malacca and Japan. They were eventually to be thwarted in their endeavour by the Dutch, but in the twenty years between 1580 and the arrival of the Dutch in the Indonesian archipelago at the end of the century, Manila became not only the sole entrepôt for the export of Chinese silks and other luxury goods to Mexico and thence to Europe, but also an alternative to Malacca and Makassar for the Moluccan spice trade and the base from which the Spanish made their bid for control of the Moluccas.³

TREATY OF TOMAR, 1581

By the terms of the agreement reached at Tomar in 1581 after the union of the two crowns, the Spanish and Portuguese empires were kept separate and each continued to be administered by its own officials. All trade between the Spanish and the Portuguese in their overseas possessions was prohibited. The office of Secretary of State for the Estado da India at first continued to

1982) p. 6; and J.L. Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses 1565-1700* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959), pp. 3-14.

2. See Robert R. Reed, *Colonial Manila: The Context of Hispanic Urbanism and Process of Morphogenesis* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 1-10.

3. Navarrete and others record that many Spanish merchants from Manila frequented Makassar, and we know that Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo, who was the leading Portuguese merchant in Makassar until the expulsion of the Portuguese in 1667, traded with the Spanish resident at Makassar, Pedro de la Mata. We hear of him sending a ship to Macao via Manila in 1649 with a cargo made up chiefly of Indian textiles, with which to acquire gold, preserved ginger, china-root and other Chinese goods. The sultan of Gowa, Karaeng Pattingalloang and de la Mata himself invested in this cargo and, when the ship foundered with all hands, Vieira and his associates were said to have lost over 60,000 rials. See C. R. Boxer, *Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo: a Portuguese Merchant-Adventurer in South East Asia, 1624-1667*, ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967) p. 7. See also note 25 below.

operate as a separate agency in Lisbon, and the Casa da India retained control over the sale and distribution of Asian goods. But Philip II was as anxious to centralise his government in Portugal as in the rest of his dominions and to keep as tight a control as possible over the finances of his Portuguese possessions overseas. By a decree of 20 November 1591 he abolished the old Portuguese financial offices and created a new Council of Finance composed of men chosen by himself. The Casa da India and the spice trade were placed under the jurisdiction of this Council, which soon became the most important of all the institutions of Portuguese metropolitan and overseas government. Before long Spanish merchants based in the Philippines began to take advantage of the new situation created by these administrative changes in Lisbon and Madrid and to encroach upon Portuguese trading activities in Macao, Japan and the Indonesian archipelago.⁴

At least in theory, the Portuguese retained under the new system their share of the westward trade in goods going to India and Europe, while the Spanish concentrated on developing the new trans-Pacific galleon trade. The Manila galleon carried mostly Chinese silks and porcelain to New Spain, but also spices and other goods from the Indonesian archipelago; and Indian textiles brought to Manila, chiefly in Portuguese ships.⁵ Moreover, it was evident that, in defiance of the prohibition of trade between the Spanish and Portuguese empires, there were commercial advantages to be gained from the sale in Manila of Moluccan cloves and Indian goods destined for other markets, thereby bypassing Malacca, which was already beginning to feel the adverse effects of Dutch competition and Acehnese hostility and to lose its position as the leading entrepôt in Southeast Asia. After the Portuguese had been expelled from Tidore in 1605, Portuguese merchants began to come increasingly to Makassar and Manila to purchase cloves, which they shipped to Malacca and thence to India and Europe. Some cloves would also be sent to other parts "convenient to Manila and the Moluccas."⁶ ●

4. See Donald F. Lach, *Asia in the Making of Europe*, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), vol. I, p. 135.

5. See Ernest S. Dodge, *Islands and Empires. Western Impact on the Pacific and East Asia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976), p. 235.

6. For a description of the Malacca-Manila trade see Antonio Bocarro, *Livro das plantas de todas as fortalezas, cidades e povoações do Estado da Índia Oriental*, in A.E. de Braganca Pereira, ed., *Arquivo Portugues Oriental, Tomo IV; Historia Administrativa, vol. II. 1600-1699* (Bastora: Tipografia Rangel, 1938), pp. 21-31.

Antonio de Morga in a famous passage in his *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas* published in Mexico in 1609, gave an account of this carrying trade. "Some Portuguese ships come every year to Manila from the Moluccas with the southwest monsoon," he wrote, "the goods they bring are cloves, cinnamon, pepper, black and Caffre slaves, cotton cloths of all sorts, fine muslins, *caniqui*, fine stiff cotton stuff (*bofeta*), gauze (*caza*), *rambutis* and other sorts of stuffs very fine and costly, amber and ivory, embroidered stuff of aloes, ornamental coverings for beds, hangings and rich coverlets of Bengal, Cochin, and other countries, many gilt things and curiosities, jewels of diamonds; rubies, sapphires, topazes, balashes, and other fine stones, set and separate; many pendant jewels for headdresses and rarities from India, wine, raisins and almonds, delicate preserves, and other fruits brought from Portugal and prepared in Goa, carpets, and small carpets of silk and fine wools from Persia and Turkey, writing cases, drawing-room chairs and other furniture daintily gilt, made in Macao, needlework on white stuffs and silk of combined colours, chain lace and royal point lace, and other works of much delicacy and perfection. All these things are purchased in Manila, and paid for in *reales* and in gold, and these ships return in January with the northeast winds, which are their fixed monsoon; and for Maluco they take away provisions of rice, wine, crockery, and other baubles which are in request there, and to Malacca only gold or money, excepting a few particular gewgaws and rarities from Spain, and emeralds: the king's duties are not levied on these ships."⁷

From Borneo came smaller vessels, belonging to natives of that island; they brought very fine palm mats, slaves, sago, camphor, "tibors and large and small jars, glazed black, very fine, of much durability and use." They did not usually bring any Borneo diamonds, because the "Portuguese of Malacca barter for them in that part." Borneo goods were bought more by the Filipinos than by the Spanish. In return, the traders from Borneo would take rice, wine, cotton wrappers "and other baubles of the islands which are wanting in Borneo."⁸

7. Hon. H.E.J. Stanley, *The Philippine Islands, Moluccas, Siam, Cambodia, Japan and China at the Close of the Sixteenth Century by Antonio de Morga* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1868), pp. 341-42.

8. Stanley, *Antonio de Morga*, p. 342-43. Navarrete states that many Filipino slaves were sold in the Indonesian islands. "At the court of the island of Borneo", he writes,

Occasionally ships from Siam and Cambodia would call at Manila bringing benzoin, pepper, ivory, cotton cloth, rubies and sapphires, badly cut and set, slaves, rhinoceros horn, hide, hoofs and teeth and "other trinkets."

The Spanish paid for these goods chiefly in gold but also with island produce — cotton cloth, *medriñaques*, and white and yellow wax in cakes.⁹

THE TERNATE EXPEDITION, 1606

The most important commodity in this Indonesian trade based on Manila was cloves, and the Portuguese loss of Ternate to Sultan Baab Ullah in 1575 followed by the union of the two crowns five years later, gave to the Spanish government in the Philippines the opportunity they had long sought to gain a fortified base in the Moluccas from which they could participate directly in the clove trade. A series of expeditions was sent to Ternate from Manila, but all were unsuccessful until on 1 April 1606 a force under the command of the governor of Manila, D. Pedro Bravo de Acuña took the island.

According to Morga, Acuña's force had sailed from Iloilo in "five ships, four galleys with poop lanterns, three galliots, four champans, three funeas, two English launches, two brigantines, a flat-bottomed boat for the artillery, and thirteen tall frigates of lofty bulwarks" and was composed of 1,300 Spaniards, regular soldiers, captains and officers, mercenaries and adventurers, and a number of Portuguese officers and soldiers, including the captain-general of Tidore, who had been in command on the island when the Dutch seized it in 1605 and had come from Malacca in order to join Acuña's expedition. There was also a contingent of Tagalog and Pampangan soldiers, "who came at their own expense with

"which is very near to Macassar, there are above 4000 Indians of Manila in slavery, which is also a great pity. Indians of Manila may be found in every island of that archipelago, being either slaves or runaways and in all places wheresoever I was, from China as far as Suratte I met with natives of Manila and its lesser islands . . . there is not a ship that sails from Manila, whether it belongs to Siam, to Camboxa or the Portugueses, but it carries Indians away out of those islands." J. S. Cummins, ed., *The Travels and Controversies of Friar Domingo Navarrete 1618-1686* vol. 1 (Cambridge: Hakluyt Society, 1962), p. 123.

9. Stanley, *Antonio de Morga*, p. 343.

their officers and arms to serve."¹⁰

After some debate, Acuña decided that Ternate should be placed under Spanish and not Portuguese control. A Spaniard, Juan de Esquivel, was made captain of the fortress, and a *cedula real* of 29 October 1607 declared that Ternate should be under the jurisdiction of the governor of Manila. The *cedula* stated that "all the Moluccas should be, as today they are, in the charge of the governor of the Philippines," because "it was not thought desirable that they should again be made subject to the king of Portugal or to his viceroy of India, which is so distant from them."¹¹ It was also decided to leave the trade in cloves to India in the hands of the Portuguese on the grounds that, if they were deprived of the profits of this trade, the whole *Estado da India* would be so weakened that it might perish altogether. "It is thus sufficiently proved," wrote Grau y Monfalcon, procurator-general of the Philippines, in 1637, "that the Philippines contributed to the restoration of all the forts in the Orient; and that in their preservation was and still is involved that of the Moluccas and consequently of all India."¹²

From the outset the Spanish on Ternate were harassed by the Dutch, who, having driven the Portuguese out of Ambon and Tidore in 1605, now proceeded to build a series of fortresses on Ternate, Tidore, Moti and Makian. Against these the Spanish could boast two fortresses on Ternate, Rosario in the town of Ternate and Don Gil on the south coast near Lake Laguna, and two on Tidore, one south of the town of Tidore and the other near Marieko. An interesting report on the Moluccas written in Portuguese in Malacca in 1619 describes these fortresses and the difficulties encountered by the Spanish in maintaining them. The fortress of Rosario had six bastions, fortified with twenty

10. Morga's account of the Spanish conquest of Ternate is in Stanley, *Antonio de Morga*, pp. 249-58. Another almost contemporary account of the conquest is in Artur Viegas, ed., *Padre Fernão Guerreiro, Relação anual das coisas que fizeram os Padres da Companhia de Jesus nas suas missões . . . nos anos de 1600 a 1609*, 3 vols. (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade, 1931), pp. 308-12. Guerreiro gives a total of 37 vessels (*embarcações*) in the fleet and says the Portuguese armed contingent amounted to 100 men.

11. Quoted in Hubert Jacobs S.J., "The *Discurso Politico del Gobierno Maluco* of Fr. Francisco Combes and its historical impact," *Philippine Studies*, (1981): 310-11.

12. Juan Grau y Monfalcon, *Memorial Informatario al Rey*, Madrid, 1637. In H.H. Blair and J.N. Robertson, eds., *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*, 55 vols. (Mandaluyong, Rizal: Cachos Hermanos Inc. 1973), vol. XXX, pp. 36-37.

“very fine” pieces of bronze artillery, and there dwelt about 300 Spanish residents, both *casados* and soldiers. Outside the main citadel were other bastions where 150 Pampangans, “natives of Manila, valiant men of war,” and a hundred or so Ternatan Christians lived. The report estimates that in the city of Ternate at that time there were about 2,000 Christians, whose spiritual needs were catered for by a parish church and three monastic houses of Franciscans, Augustinians and Jesuits. There was also a hospital for the sick and wounded. In the lesser stronghold of Don Gil, which had three bastions and four pieces of artillery, there were only sixty soldiers under a captain. Don Gil was dangerously near the principal Dutch stronghold on Ternate, the fortress of Malaio, which also had only three bastions but possessed thirty-five pieces of bronze artillery and was greatly superior to Don Gil, being constructed of stone and lime and accessible only from the land, and that with great difficulty. The Dutch had about 200 men in Malaio and a contingent of some 150 Japanese and a few Chinese (*sengles*), “who come in *somas* [small Japanese vessels] and boats that sail from China to Manila with gold and silk for sale by force of arms.” The other Dutch strongholds on Ternate were at Toloko, which had a good, strong bastion with twenty men and four pieces of artillery, and Takome, which had thirty men and six large pieces of artillery. The Dutch were able to inflict considerable damage on the Spanish from Takome, as it was very near Rosario and in view of the Spanish ships.

The fortresses on Tidore, both Dutch and Spanish, were smaller. The Spanish maintained about 150 men on Tidore and had about thirty pieces of artillery. There was a church on the island with a vicar, and another small building (*casinha*) where a Jesuit said Mass.

The sultan of Tidore (*amigo nosso*) had his own fortress. This lacked artillery but, as it was built on an eminence, it could be easily defended with stones. He could bring into the field 2000 musketeers and a further 2000 soldiers armed with swords known as *campilões carrascas*, which the writer of the 1619 report describes as terrible weapons and which the Tidorese were very skilful in using. All these men went about proudly, secure in the knowledge that the Spanish, because of their lack of a fleet and the paucity of their armed forces, could never subdue them.

The writer of the 1619 report paints a grim picture of the life

led by the Spanish in these fortresses. He records that during the dry season, which was the hottest time of year and the period when the clove trees bore fruit, many Spaniards died of beriberi, "for lack of food and the wherewithal for their sustenance." When the writer was himself in the Moluccas, however, there had been no shortage of food, because abundant rice was being imported from Malabar, brought by the Portuguese in galliots and the Spanish in frigates, of which six or seven would sail in a year.

As for the cloves, which were harvested only in Ternate, Tidore and Moti, the Dutch evidently took the great bulk of these. According to the 1619 report, they dared not harvest the cloves themselves for fear of the Spanish, and the Spanish likewise for fear of the Dutch. Consequently, the local inhabitants (*Indios naturales*) would go out and beat down the cloves with poles, but were often killed by the Dutch while doing this, beheaded and their corpses left. This happened not only in the mountains but immediately below the bastions of the Spanish fortress. The Spaniards tried to reciprocate in kind and for every head brought to them by one of their *Indios* would give a prize of a piece of cloth or ten patacas. They also made frequent attempts to ambush the Dutch; between one and two hundred men would hide at night in the forest so that, when the Dutch went out in the morning to cut wood for their houses and fortifications, a surprise attack could be made on them.¹³

Acuña's plan after the capture of Ternate had been to unite Tidore and Ternate under the sultan of Tidore, but the Tidorese rulers did all they could to sabotage the Spanish alliance and pursued a policy of "treason based on self-interest."¹⁴ Even before 1606 the Jesuits working in the Moluccas had found the sultan of Tidore a dangerous friend. "He will only have us as long as he needs us", wrote Fr. Pero Nunes in 1588. "He is strengthening his forces in order to afflict us more . . . and the injuries he does us every day make us more like his slaves than his friends."¹⁵ The Dutch

13. *Relação breve da ilha de Ternate, Tydore e mais ilhas Malucas, aonde temos fortalezas, e presidios, e das forças, naos e fortalezas, que o enemigo olandes tem por aquelas partes*, Malacca, 28 November 1619. In *Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa* (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos. 1962), vol. II, pp. 49-55.

14. Jacobs, "Discurso Politico", p. 321.

15. Nunes to Rodrigues, Tidore, 5 March 1588, in Hubert Jacobs, S.J., ed., *Documenta Malucensia II (1577-1606)* (Rome: Jesuit Historical Institute, 1980), p. 237.

also seem to have suffered from Tidorese perfidy; "the king acts friendly towards the Dutch but he cannot be trusted; he is only out for his own advantage."¹⁶

But for the most part both Tidore and Ternate sided openly with the Dutch. At first, the traditional hostility between them ensured they both remain loyal to Spain, but it was not long before they united with the Dutch to oppose Spanish rule and even went so far as to assist the Dutch in their programme of wholesale destruction of the clove trees, which they had initiated in order to concentrate the whole of the clove production of eastern Indonesia in Ambon.¹⁷ Ngora Malamo, who reigned in Tidore from 1626, joined forces with the Dutch to drive the Spanish out of the Moluccas and, when the Spanish commander of Ternate, Pedro de Heredia, deposed him, took refuge in the Dutch fortress on Ternate. His son, Saidi, who succeeded to the sultanate in 1639-40, was even more ill-disposed. The Spanish would only recognize him as king on condition that he promise to give military assistance to the Spanish forces when asked to do so, that he sell cloves only to the Spanish and that he permit his subjects to be converted to Christianity. So far from observing any of these conditions, Saidi issued a proclamation forbidding anyone to sell cloves to the Spanish on pain of death.¹⁸ Instead, he would sell cloves to them at a price fixed by himself, or to the Dutch in Ternate, or ship them to Makassar, where already by 1620 there was a flourishing trade in "smuggled" cloves.¹⁹

In order to maintain their precarious foothold in the Moluccas in the face of this relentless hostility, frequent expeditions (*socorros*) had to be sent from Manila to quell unrest in the islands and to try to secure a regular supply of cloves. These *socorros*, which it was estimated cost as much as 100,000 ducats a year,

16. W. Ph. Coolhaas, ed., *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs en Raden aan de Heren XVII de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, 6 vols. ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), vol. II, p. 25.

17. Jacobs, "Discurso Politico," p. 333.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 327.

19. See John Villiers, "Makassar and the Portuguese Connection," in *East of Malacca: Three Essays on the Portuguese in the Indonesian Archipelago in the Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries* (Bangkok: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1986).

used up a quite disproportionate amount of the funds sent to the Philippines from New Spain, without resulting in the Spanish gaining any greater share of the clove trade.²⁰ As numerous Spanish commentators pointed out, the Philippines depended for their survival on the annual fleet from New Spain, which seldom brought enough supplies or trained soldiers for the needs of Manila, let alone for the Moluccas. Spain kept no fleets in the Pacific and the shipyards of New Spain found it difficult enough to keep the Philippine colony supplied with the four galleons needed for the voyage to Acapulco and back, without having to provide vessels for the socorros to the Moluccas, as well as for the China trade, which was already the mainstay of the Philippine economy, and for the defence of Manila. The Dutch on the other hand had plenty of ships with which they could waylay and destroy the Spanish socorros on the way to the Moluccas.²¹

In addition to attacks from the Dutch, the socorros had to contend with an unprecedented series of disasters, outbreaks of beriberi and other diseases, mutiny and shipwrecks. Those few that did reach Ternate were seldom able to acquire any cloves, because of the increasing Dutch control of the trade, the refusal of the Ternatans and Tidorese to do business with them, and the increasing quantity of cloves not purchased by the Dutch that were finding their way to Makassar. As early as 1615 the Spanish had a commercial agent in Makassar and were actively trading in spices and other commodities in competition with the many Asian and European merchants already long established there.²²

20. Jacobs, "Discurso Politico," p. 321.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 325.

22. See Anthony Reid, "A great seventeenth century Indonesian family: Matoaya and Patingalloang of Makassar," *Masyarakat Indonesia* VIII, 1 (June 1981), p. 10. However, the accounts of the Manila *almojarifazgo*, published by Pierre Chauu in *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques*, (Paris: SEVPEN, 1960), pp. 148-65, do not record any vessels from Indonesia entering the port of Manila between 1579 and 1627. In 1627 a ship from Makassar, described as a galliot, arrived at Manila, and another from Ternate. In 1634 there was another ship from Makassar and in 1636 a third, described as belonging to a *sangle cristiano* (Chinese Christian). The next year a vessel from Ternate called. Between 1641 and 1655, 21 ships came to Manila and one to Iloilo from Makassar, the ship of 1646, evidently a royal ship, paying customs dues at 3%. In 1651 there were no fewer than five vessels from Makassar, and between 1656 and 1667, the year in which all non-Dutch European traders, were expelled from Makassar, a further nineteen vessels from Makassar are recorded entering the port of Manila. During the same period the *almojarifazgo* accounts first make reference to the arrival of ships from Java and Sumatra.

EXPEDITION OF 1615 AND DUTCH BLOCKADES

In 1615, Acuña's successor as governor of Manila, D. Juan de Silva conceived a bold plan to drive the Dutch out of the spice islands once and for all in cooperation with the Portuguese. He assembled a powerful force of ten galleons, with 150 pieces of artillery (which, however, for lack of skilled founders, were poorly made), and sent a request to the viceroy of India for ten more galleons and six galleys. This request was taken by D. Cristobal de Azqueta, accompanied by forty Spaniards, who set off for Goa but were never seen again. Accordingly, a second request was sent by means of the Jesuit Father Juan de Ribera, who obtained a force of four galleons and four galliots and a few poorly disciplined men. But the Portuguese fleet left Goa so far ahead of time that they had to wait at Malacca for the monsoon and D. Juan de Silva's arrival, and the entire fleet was destroyed in a series of Acehnese and Dutch attacks. Meanwhile, Silva left Manila with his ten galleons, "the best that had ever been on that sea," and reached Malacca, but died soon after his arrival, and his fleet, now leaderless, returned to Manila without having accomplished anything.²³ In 1617, however, the Spanish redeemed themselves by defeating a VOC fleet under Jan Dirckszoon Lam after a fierce battle in Manila Bay.²⁴

The expedition of 1615 was the last attempt by the Portuguese to regain their position in the Moluccas and thereafter they played little part in the struggle for the spice trade, though individual Portuguese merchants continued to be actively engaged in the trade in Manila and Makassar as well as in Malacca.²⁵ The competition was now between the Dutch and the Spanish, with the former rapidly gaining the upper hand, for mastery of the trade in the eastern archipelago and the South China Sea.

23. Grau y Monfalcon, *Memorial*, pp. 101-102.

24. See Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 27.

25. Such merchants as Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo were trading with Manila out of Makassar up till the 1660s. See Boxer, *Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo*, passim. Andre Ferrão, S.J. refers to Castilians from Manila among the foreign merchants frequenting Makassar during the same period (Boxer, *Vieira*, p. 24). On the Malacca-Manila trade see Antonio Bocarro, *Livro das plantas*, pp. 30-31.

From 1621 the Dutch were able to impose frequent blockades on the port of Manila, though none of their three attempts to capture it, in 1610, 1617 and 1647, was successful. The Portuguese revolt against Spanish rule in 1640 and the accession of D. João IV to the Portuguese throne, led to the closure of Manila to all Portuguese shipping and the severance of trading links between Manila and Macau. This was followed almost immediately by the fall of Malacca to the Dutch, which dealt a grievous blow to Portuguese trading activities in the Indian Ocean and the Indonesian archipelago that the use of Makassar as an alternative entrepôt was only partially to offset, and by the establishment of a Dutch settlement on Formosa that further damaged Manila's trading links with China.²⁶

Diego de Bobadilla in his relation of the Philippine Islands written about 1640 states that Spain now held on to her possessions in the Moluccas "rather for the conservation there of the faith . . . than for the profit that is derived from them."²⁷ Though this was no doubt true by 1640 when both the Portuguese and the Spanish commercial position in Southeast Asia had become so greatly weakened, it had certainly been hope of profitable participation in the Moluccan spice trade as much as any desire to propagate the Catholic religion in those islands that had first led the Spanish to intervene in the struggle for a foothold in the spice islands and to attempt the conquest of Ternate.

THE EXTRACTO HISTORIAL

The *Extracto historial*, a work probably compiled by D. Antonio Alvarez de Abreu on the various debates concerning the commerce of the Philippine islands held in the Council of the Indies up to the year 1640, went so far as to give the defence of the Moluccas and their trade as one of the principal justifications for the Spanish remaining in the Philippines, along with preaching the gospel and conversion of the infidel to Christianity, maintaining the prestige of the Spanish crown, supporting other Luso-Spanish possessions in Asia, notably in India, relieving the West

26. See T'ien-tse Chang, *Sino-Portuguese trade from 1514 to 1644* (Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1969), pp. 138-41.

27. Diego de Bobadilla, *Relation of the Filipinas Islands*, n.d. in Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, vol. XXIX, p. 309.

Indies from the attacks of their enemies, assisting in the destruction of Dutch power and protecting the commerce of China for both Spanish and Portuguese.

The importance of the spice islands, says the author of the *Extracto*, "is everywhere known because in all the world there are no other islands nor any other region in which grows this spice or drug [cloves], so highly valued." He goes on to say that, when the Portuguese found it no longer possible to defend the Moluccas against the Dutch, who gained "possession of them all and of their commerce," the task of wresting them from Dutch hands fell to the Spanish in the Philippines, which by that time were "quite populous" and also much nearer to the Moluccas than either the Dutch settlements in Banten and Batavia or the Portuguese in India. This version of events seems intended to suggest that the Spanish seized Ternate from a disinterested desire to help the Portuguese by driving out the Dutch from the area rather than for opportunistic strategic reasons or in the hope of gaining commercial advantages for themselves in the Philippines. Nevertheless, the clove trade had been left to the Portuguese, because it was considered so important to them that, if it had been taken from them, their position in their Asian empire, already seriously weakened, would have been completely undermined.²⁸

The Spanish found that with the scanty resources available from the Philippines it was impossible for them to expel the Dutch or prevent them from dominating the spice trade from their several well-fortified posts in the Moluccas. The *Extracto* reckoned that the total annual crop of Moluccan cloves was 2,816,000 lbs., of which the Dutch secured 1,098,000 lbs. and the Portuguese and Spanish between them 1,718,000 lbs. Grau y Monfalcon gives the same figures. They do not take into account the cloves purchased by other traders, both European and Asian, many of which were shipped clandestinely to Makassar.²⁹ Even this total was only made possible because the Spanish possessed the Philippines and could protect the Moluccas from there. The *Extracto* reckoned that the Dutch carried away cloves to a value of as much as three times what it cost them to maintain the

28. *Extracto historial del expediente que pende en el Consejo Real, y Supremo de las Indias a instancia de la Ciudad de Manila y demas de las Islas Philipinas*, Madrid, 1736. In Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, vol. XXX, pp. 35-38.

29. *Extracto historial*, p. 37; Grau y Monfalcon, *Memorial*, p. 109.

garrisons and fleets necessary for the collection of the spices and their transport to Banten.³⁰

The *Extracto* points out that if the Moluccas were lost, as they certainly would be if support from the Philippines ceased, the Portuguese in India would be further weakened by being deprived of the trade in imported spices, and the Dutch would then gain complete control of the trade, while at the same time greatly reducing their expenditure on garrisons and fleets in east Asia, and so might be able to drive the Portuguese out of Asia altogether. If they entered into an alliance with the English, "their invasion would be irresistible." The only way of preventing this danger hitherto had been "the diversion furnished by the Philippines", which diminished Dutch trade and profits in the Moluccas, China and elsewhere and compelled the Dutch to divide their resources by maintaining a military force and fleets in a state of readiness in several widely separated places. The Luso-Spanish empire in Asia was divided into two vast maritime areas—one from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Malacca and the other from the Straits to China and Japan. The first area was, at least in theory, defended by the Portuguese fleets in India and the second by the Spanish fleets in the Philippines. In both these areas the Dutch consequently had to maintain fleets, but they could unite all their sea forces to attack the Iberians in the former area if the latter area were ever left undefended. The author of the *Extracto* reminds his readers that the Dutch devoted far more military resources to the eastern area than the western, being content only to keep unfortified trading posts in India, while they had at least twenty fortresses through the Indonesian archipelago and the South China Sea between Sumatra and Formosa, including their numerous fortresses in the Moluccas.

In 1616 their forces in the area amounted to 3,000 soldiers, over two hundred pieces of bronze and iron artillery, three hundred *pedreros* and thirty war galleons. These relatively large forces were kept by the Dutch primarily to defend themselves from attack from the Philippines and to deny the fleets of their enemies access to the sea routes in the area.³¹

30. *Extracto historial*, p. 37.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40. Pedro de Heredia gives a brief account of all the Dutch factories and garrisons in Asia about 1618 in Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, vol. XVIII, pp. 107-110.

The compiler of the *Extracto* was keenly aware of the serious drain on Spanish resources which continued possession of the Philippines and the defense of the Moluccas entailed. The Portuguese in the Moluccas "had consumed in supporting and defending them great sums of ducats and many soldiers," and, after they became possessions of the Castilian crown in 1607, the Spanish administration in Manila had to bear all the expenses of defending the islands and "the continual trouble of succouring and provisioning" them, while the Portuguese retained their former share of the clove trade.

The *Extracto* estimated that since 1607 the Portuguese had saved more than 400,000 pesos, all of which they would have had to spend on maintaining control in the Moluccas had the Spanish not done this for them. The annual expenses of the Moluccan garrisons alone came to over 230,000 pesos, of which about 100,000 were spent on keeping an armed fleet in Manila in a state of continual readiness.³²

Fr. Francisco Combes in his *Discurso Politico del Gobierno Maluco*, written in Manila in 1658, also argued forcefully that the Spanish government of the Philippines should give up their fortress on Ternate as an expensive encumbrance, which drained the Philippine treasury, already deeply in debt, of its remaining resources and produced no compensating commercial advantages. Few profits could any longer be expected from the clove trade and there was little chance of inflicting serious damage on the Dutch, whose monopoly of the trade was now virtually complete.³³ By the time Combes' work was published this was the general view held by Spanish officials in Manila with regard to the Moluccas, though mention was no longer made of its corollary, that the Moluccan spice trade was not sufficient justification for the Spanish maintaining their expensive colony in the Philippines.

32. *Extracto historial*, pp. 45-47.

33. Jacobs, "Discurso Politico", pp. 321-25. Combes draws attention to the paradox of the situation in which the Spanish found themselves, spending large sums of money on maintaining their small share of the clove trade and then having to buy cloves at great cost thereafter from the Dutch in Europe.

CONCLUSION

During the 1640s the VOC remained generally opposed to the idea of peace with Spain, while anxious to curb Spanish influence in Southeast Asia, where they still viewed the Spanish presence in the Moluccas as a threat to their domination of the spice trade. They tried to wring concessions out of the Spanish in return for peace, including undertakings that they would not increase the number of their fortresses or their trading activities in the area, that, if they recovered any former Portuguese territories, these should not become part of the Spanish dominions, and that the VOC be permitted to trade with the Philippines. But the Spanish resisted all attempts at an accommodation, and the last battle in the Eighty Years War was fought on 18 July 1649 on Ternate over a year after the ratification of the treaty of Munster, when 250 Spanish and 600 native soldiers landed from Tidore and began to destroy the clove plantations.³⁴ It was not until 1662 that, in the face not of Dutch hostility but of Koxinga's threats to attack Manila from Formosa, the Spanish authorities in the Philippines withdrew their garrisons from Tidore and Ternate and so finally abandoned the part they had played since 1580 as successors of the Portuguese in the struggle for dominance in the Moluccas and as their partners in the rich trade in the spices that those islands produced.

34. See Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 334-36.