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Risk Governance in Metro Manila: De-Politicising State-Civil Society Relations in Crafting Housing Resilience for/with the Poor

Emma Porio
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines, and Manila Observatory, Philippines
eporio@ateneo.edu

The 1990s decentralization and democratization movements saw the rise of civil society engagements with the state in crafting/implementing its social reform agenda. Partnership with civil society was the key in making urban governance an effective foil for the rising informality in Metro Manila and other rapidly urbanizing areas (Karaos 2018; Porio 1997, 2004). But the increasing climate disasters (e.g., Ketsana 2009, Haiyan 2013) that inundated millions of urban-rural poor had led to shifting spaces of power (Porio 2012) in state-civil society engagements, revealing the complexities of urban governance in the era of climate disasters and heightened state-capital partnerships. Mayors, for example, have taken hold of their constituencies by employing democrat-laden strategies like “networked governance practices” (Porio 2017). While multi-stakeholder engagements have defined housing-land acquisition initiatives, lately public-private partnership agreements seem to articulate the ascending power of governments, private sector and external NGOs (see Porio, 2017). Examining the housing-land initiatives of six NGO federations, this paper argues that state-civil society engagements have been reconfigured by 1) increasing climate disasters, 2) entanglements with external NGOs and local governance systems and 3) rising tensions within/without. While CSO partnerships with external NGOs/local governments have advanced the “land, housing and livelihood” agenda of the poor, it had also “blunted” civil society’s “relatively autonomous spaces” to erode the oppressive tendencies of both capital and the state. In conclusion, the concept, “negotiated resilience” (Chu, 2017; Porio 2017) allow understanding of how local-national leaders’ craft risk governance strategies while building housing-livelihood resilience among the urban poor, highly exposed and vulnerable to climate disasters.

Introduction

Among megacities in the Asia-Pacific region, Metro Manila faces many great challenges in urban governance, namely, managing climate/disaster risk, housing shortage, transport/traffic, and the reduction of informality and poverty, to name just a few. In this metropolis of 15 million, governance systems are woefully inadequate to address the unintended consequences of rapid urbanization, social and economic inequality, and more importantly to tackle effectively impacts of natural and human-induced disasters, especially those in marginal, riverline communities (Porio, 2011, 2014).

Key argument(s) and structure of paper. This paper will re-examine the ways that state-civil society relations, with special focus on the housing sector, have been largely reconfigured by the democratization-decentralization movements and its failed social reform agenda in the 1990s, its failure exacerbated by the flooding disasters from 2009 to the present. Part I of this paper describes the socio-demographic, territorial and economic expansion of Philippine cities and implications to risk governance
especially as it concerns post-politics in state-civil society relations in urban development while the second part outlines the contextual drivers of the shift(s) in the lens used in urban governance: from the democratized-decentralized perspective, emphasizing empowerment of the 14 basic sectors (e.g., urban-rural poor, farmers, fisherfolks, etc.) in the 1990s to crafting risk and resilience policies and programs (2000-present) in governing cities, especially for those in marginalized, urban poor communities. Meanwhile, Part III provides four case studies/boxes of climate-resilient housing programs implemented through tri-partite partnerships (government, business/private sector and civil society organizations (CSOs)) to illustrate how this shift in governance strategies was facilitated by de-emphasizing “anthropogenic activities” and “naturalizing” the drivers of climate change and flooding disasters as embedded in the Climate Change Act, and the Disaster Risk and Reduction Management Act, enacted in 2010, after the 2009 Ketsana floods in Metro Manila and reinforced by the 2013 Haiyan in the Visayas region. Finally, Part IV concludes that by highlighting the natural causes of flooding disasters and de-emphasizing the political-economic aspects or human-induced dimensions, tri-partite partnerships successfully disembodied “politics” from state-civil society engagements in the social housing sector through controlling processes and “coercive harmony” strategies (Nader 1997); thus, making resilience planning and development initiatives anchored largely on local governance systems and the poor who must become active agents and participants in constructing their own “community resilience” through their climate-resilient housing and livelihood initiatives (i.e., CCA-DRR adaptation). In a sense, cultural politics (i.e., coercive harmony achieved by controlling processes) embedded in the CSOs’ negotiated resilience perspective (i.e., partnership and collaboration given relative resources and capacities of governance actors) became a strong mantle for the flourishing of post-politics in the Philippines and shrinking civil society’s “relatively autonomous” spaces created during and right after the martial law period (1983-1992). Finally, the strategies proposed by the post-politics adherents to obliterate it (cf. critique by Matijasevich 2018) through their trust in neo-liberal strategies, will find themselves pushing Sisyphus’ rock as CSOs are deeply embedded with their negotiated resilience frames and processes with local governance systems.

Urbanization and urban expansion/development. The Philippines, with a population of 100.98 million in 2015, has become the most populous country in Southeast Asia, next to Indonesia. Following the revised definition by the National Statistical Coordination Board (now the Philippine Statistics Authority or PSA) of “urban area”, the level of urbanization in the country stood at 45.3% in 2010 or 41.9 million of the 92.3 million Filipinos (PSA 2013). In 2017, PSA estimated that Philippine urbanization has gone down a bit to 44.24 percent (Statistica, 2018). Although the level of urbanization has been relatively steady with some fluctuation, there has been a steep increase in total urban population during the last decade. In merely 2 decades, the national population grew from 60 million in 1990 to 94 million by 2010.

Metro Manila accounts for about 38 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and almost 50 percent of the investments in infrastructure are heavily concentrated in the metropolis. Thus, the label “Imperial Manila” finds strong resonance among pro-federalist groups in contemporary politics because of the embedded inequalities in the relationship between the metropolis and the regions. The Philippine National Framework for Physical Planning: 2001–2030 (NFPP) identified 12 metropolitan areas as the country’s leading industrial, financial, and technological centers that serve as the main hubs for international trade. Metro Manila or the National Capital Region (NCR) is the largest metropolitan area of the 12 metropolitan regions (see figure 1 below). Urban economies in agglomerations like those in metropolitan regions drive the rapid urbanization and economic expansion in the Philippines. These urban agglomerations contribute 80% of the country’s GDP (ICF International 2014, 1). In 2016, NCR accounted for 36.6% of the GDP (36.6%), followed by the urbanizing regions adjacent to it: CALABARZON (Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon) with 16.8% and Central Luzon with 9.5% (PSA 2017). Rapid growth of the cities surrounding Manila can be seen in the appendix table 1. Six of the top ten fastest-growing cities from 1990-2000s are located in Metro Manila. This has mainly affected the housing backlog
of over 2 million units according to the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC). The agency projects that the future housing needs at least 6,796,427 units (NEDA 2016). Housing rights for the poor, especially for those in “danger zones” of the city, has become a major battle cry for both CSOs and peoples’ organizations (POs).

**Figure 1. Administrative regions in the Philippines**

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**Economic expansion, climate disasters and post-politics in social development.** This rapid socio-demographic expansion alongside a “jobless growth economy”, highlighted the failure of the national/local governments’ efforts to stem the tide of rising informality, environmental degradation, flooding disasters and to deliver basic social services, especially in urban poor communities (see Appendix Tables 1-2). The flooding disaster brought about by tropical storm *Ketsana/Ondoy* in 2009 and the tsunami disaster in the Visayas region by *Haiyan/Yolanda* in 2013, highlighted the resulting governance failure of local/governance systems. Since then, the horrific impacts of these extreme events have been continually exacerbated by regular tropical cyclones and floods during the rainy season (June-November) and drought during the dry season (March-May). Meanwhile, along the coastlines/river lines, about 25-30 million residents’ livelihoods and basic services are affected by the rising seas and flooding inundation.

Several authors (e.g., David (1998), Karaos (1998), Porio (2004, 2016, 2017), Castillo and Ancheta (2018) to name a few) have argued the ascendancy of civil society as a major force in urban development politics. The post-Marcos “rainbow coalition”¹, especially during the Ramos Administration (1992-98) succeeded in legislating Republic Act No. 8425 or the “Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Act of 1998”, which instituted the formal collaborative state-civil society relationship to undertake social development programs for/with the poor. This policy instituted the governments’ “Social Reform Agenda” or SRA, which *supposedly* through a policy environment and systematic package of social interventions, the state in partnership with civil society will address the basic inequities in Philippine society. RA 8425 also divided

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¹ Dubbed “rainbow coalition” by President Ramos because it united most of the political orientations (from the Left to the Right) within the state and civil society.
the basic sectors into 14 main groupings\footnote{For elaboration of the sectors, http://psa.gov.ph/poverty-press-releases.}, where the urban poor comprising about 10 million such as farmers and landless rural workers, artisanal fisher folk, urban poor, etc. (for elaboration, see appendix table 1) and instituted their participation through their representatives in policy-making at the highest level of governance involving 25 national government agencies and presidents of the four (4) leagues of local government units (LGUs). SRA also instituted about 12 government structures to address its goals such as the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC). Thus, the consultative ideology and mechanisms have been inserted into the national governance system like the NAPC or the Social Housing Corporation (SHFC) to address the social housing and other basic services for the poor. Ironically, these structures when operating within these governance systems became bogged down by the bureaucratic “entanglements” not used to “participatory governance” mechanisms like the People’s Plan emerging out community assemblies and dialogues with local/national officials.

**Controlling processes embedded in consultative mechanisms.** According to some CSO/NGO/CBO leaders, this period allowed them to craft” relatively autonomous” spaces in their negotiations as well as “contesting” (through public demonstrations, rallies and community assemblies) some of the government policies. But they noted that after the flooding disasters, as they get more engaged in collaborative partnerships in implementing social housing and resilience initiatives, the “spaces to contest or critique existing policies and practices” have diminished. They have learned that “exclusionary mechanisms” like being sidelined or not invited to some negotiations, meetings and events are being exercised after some “contestation” or negative reviews by CSOs of the partnerships took place.

In community meetings/assemblies, some kind of self-censorship occurs because the participating members of homeowner’s associations (HOAs) know that their leader(s) will not be happy if they show some kind of critical stance, negativity or misgivings about the delay of the programs. As one member told me: *Ang kapitan nagsabi sa amin walang modo daw kami kung dating ‘yong mga bisita at maghanap kami ng butas sa programa; dapat daw may utang na loob kami kasi dumating ang program ditto sa barangay namin* (The barangay captain told us that if we critique or complain about the delay of program delivery or we find some shortcomings in the program, we appear ungrateful; we should just express our debt of gratitude to the visitors who brought the program to us). According to Nader (1994), these mechanisms constitute “controlling processes” of possible “contestations”/criticisms during the community consultations. In the process, “coercive harmony” is achieved by these consultative processes, which is part and parcel of the design of tri-partite partnerships as seen in case box 3 below.

In my earlier works (e.g., Porio 2012, 2016), I alluded to this “velvet glove control” through “networked governance practices” of local chief executives in getting partners within/without aligned with the implementation of their social housing programs. In retrospect, this appropriation of seemingly democratic laden practices by the local political elites, in fact represent their hegemonic authority and dominance rather than the success of decentralization-democratization nexus in local governance. This is clearly demonstrated in case box 3 below.

**Shifting Frames in Governing Cities to Risk Governance and Crafting Urban Resilience in Cities**

With rapid urbanization and increasing disaster risks amidst rising prosperity and informality in Metro Manila (Porio 2016), this paper interrogates the ways urban governance has shifted its emphasis from governing cities to managing risks (risk governance) and crafting resilience programs (i.e., bouncing forward better ala Manyena/UNISDR, not build back better) for the vulnerable communities, CSOs and their local governments. This is heavily embodied in the climate change adaptation and disaster risk
reduction (CCA-DRR) programs, formulated after the big floods by the state, business/private sector and civil society organizations (CSOs/NGOs).

The tri-partite partnerships or PPPs which became the dominant mode in formulating and implementing social development programs in the early 2000s to the present, thus, reconfigured the state-civil society relations in designing and implementing social housing programs (e.g. creation of Social Housing Finance Corporation and the transfer of the Community Mortgage Programs (CMP) from the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), in the process diminishing the relatively “autonomous spaces” that civil society enjoyed in the early phase of the decentralization-democratization phase in the 1990s. I would argue that this shift has, in part, been brought about by the ways the flooding/tsunami disasters brought about by tropical storm Ketsana/Ondoy in 2009 and Haiyan/Yolanda in 2013 by “naturalizing” the framing of these extreme events, disembodied/removed any discussion of social power and hierarchies in the crafting of climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction (CCA-DRR) policies and programs or initiatives for resilience in the social housing sector.

Governance strategies like the tri-partite partnerships crafted in implementing social housing programs find resonance in the principles of operation and discourses of UN agencies and other bi-/multi-lateral organizations. In turn, these are downloaded to/by national/local governments and international/national CSO networks and partners. As can be seen in the case boxes below, whether it is LGU-led or CSO/Community-Based Organizations (CBO)-led, the same modality of consensus-building and participation of the communities and partners in government, CSOs and private sector dominate the processes of engagements and entanglements.

Public-Private Partnerships in Social Housing: The New Mode in Planning and Implementing Climate Resilient Housing Programs

The Local Government Code and the Urban Development and Housing Act, both enacted in 1992, brought the democratization-decentralization nexus of social reforms in the early phase of the post-martial law period (Porio 1997; Karaos 1997). These landmark legislations defined the state-civil society relations in the social housing sector in the 1990s, where government is the “enabler”, CSOs/NGOs/POs and private sector (i.e. Congress of Realtors and Builders and allied banks) as key partners/facilitators in implementing key social housing programs like the Community Housing Program and Unified Home Lending Program (Karaos and Porio, cited in Herrle, Ley and Fokdal, 2016) in the same manner, two landmark legislations enacted in 2010, namely, the Climate Change Act and Disaster Risk and Reduction and Management Act (CCA-DRR) shaped largely the governance and institutional strategies of national/local governments, business/private sector, and civil society.

In the wake of the 2009, Manila floods caused by Typhoon Ketsana and the 2011 Bangkok floods, the Philippines and Thailand introduced new legislation. In the Philippines, the National Climate Change Act launched in 2009 emphasizes mainstreaming disaster risk reduction (DRR) mechanisms into climate change adaptation (CCA) measures. The Act led to the creation of the Climate Change Commission, and support for the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010. The laws on DRR and CCA have been praised by the UN as being ‘the best in the world’. In Thailand, the government formulated water management and flood prevention schemes in early 2012 with worth USD9.4 billion. It also increased inter-governmental cooperation with countries well-versed in disaster management like the Japan International Cooperation Agencies, USAID, EU, World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). While these are laudable innovations in the social housing sector, challenges remain both at the macro level and also at the local implementation level.
In this section, four illustrative cases of climate-resilient housing programs implemented through the partnerships of the government, business/private sector and CSOs are presented. First case discusses the People’s Survival Fund (PSF), a government-led funding support for climate change adaptation and mitigation policies and program. The 2011 Philippine Congress enacted PSF to empower the CCA-DRR legislations on the ground. The second case introduces Asian Coalition for Community Action Program (ACCA), a community-led program driven by both external and internal resources/networks, and how they contribute to environmental management. Third case presents Valenzuela City’s Climate Resilient Housing Programs led by the LGU. Fourth case presents the Partners for Resilience (PfR) Climate and Disaster Resilience Programs with/for the Poor that is led by international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Case Box 1. State-Civil Society Relations in Climate Financing through the People’s Survival Fund

The Philippine government created the People’s Survival Fund (PSF) to provide support for the climate change adaptation and mitigation policies and programs as prescribed by the Climate Change Act of 2009 and Disaster Risk and Reduction Management Act of 2010.

PSF is embodied in the Republic Act (RA) No. 10174 or the “Act Establishing the People’s Survival Fund to Provide Long-term Finance Streams to Enable the Government to Effectively Address the Problem of Climate Change” and was allocated a billion pesos budget as its opening balance.

The establishment of PSF shows the seeming seriousness of the government in making CCA-DRR programs effective for the urban poor communities. PSF is expected to support the programs and projects under the National Framework Strategy on Climate Change (NFSCC) created by the Climate Change Commission (CCC). NFSCC’s goal is to establish a climate “risk-resilient Philippines” (Aquino, Abela, & Ani, 2014), but, perhaps the lodging of the program in the CCC—its commission status may have affected the concrete “operationalization” of the program and its slow implementation on the ground.

Congress created the PSF in 2011 as a way of operationalizing and financing the Climate Change Adaptation Act of 2010. But it took the PSF board four (4) years (2015) to consider the fund operational, i.e., institutional/organizational mechanisms already set-up. But in 2015, there was no single proposed project approved by the board. PSF Board argues that no LGUs and NGOs were able to meet the requirements they’ve set. To date, there were less than a hundred LGU and NGO applicants that submitted a project proposal to PSF.

The requirements and eligibility criteria of being able to access the fund seemed unrealistic. Some of the requirements PSF asks from LGUs and NGOs are to conduct feasibility study in the area and if applicable, conduct vulnerability/risk assessment/hazard maps or provide any relevant document that explains climate exposure of the community, and more (Lagsa, 2016). These requirements required the applicant communities to conduct a study and assessment of their locality by asking assistance from experts such as climate scientists and social scientists. Thus, it had been difficult for marginalized, urban poor communities to fulfill these requirements. It seems like the implementing design set up for the program were almost intended not to make the program work because of the impediments created.

In figure 2 below, the PSF design and structure of how the fund may be accessed and utilized is presented. It requires community applicants to fulfill the principles stated in the figure below. The PSF principles requires a lot from its applicants, making the fund be hardly awarded or given to any applicants.
From 2012-2018, (see table 1 below), only four (4) applicants qualified for the grant, with a total appropriation of 1.92 million out of the allotted 1 billion or almost a measly 20 percent of the total amount budgeted by the Philippine Congress. This made the Philippine Congress declare that because of low utilization of the fund, they will not put any more funds into the project. The Congress members believe that the fund has become stagnant and is not put into something useful, thus, the halting of its budget allocation.

**Table A. PSF Approved Projects with Signed Financing Agreements Summary (2012-2018)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Local Government Unit</th>
<th>Approved Project</th>
<th>PSF Amount (PHP)</th>
<th>Counterpart Amount (PHP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lanuza, Surigao del Sur</td>
<td>Management Response as an Adaptation Mechanism to Resiliency</td>
<td>39.08 M</td>
<td>8.41 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Del Carmen, Surigao del Norte</td>
<td>Siargao Climate Field School for Farmers and Fisherfolk</td>
<td>80.7 M</td>
<td>12.8 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>San Francisco, Camotes Island (Cebu)</td>
<td>Building Resilience through Community-Based Ecological Farming</td>
<td>33.89 M</td>
<td>2.17 M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Moreover, there are nine pending project applications that needed approval of the PSF board. These projects include: the “Establishing Climate Smart Barangays in Los Baños, Laguna, with a requested funding of P24 million; the Carranglan three-in-one protection project in Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, amounting to P82.3 million; the Libon Ecosystem Improvement Project in Libon, Albay, with P649.8 million; the Mount Magdiwata Watershed Adaptation Technologies and Ecosystem Resiliency Project in Agusan del Sur, amounting to P33 million; the Improving the Coastal Resources and its Management Systems as Mitigating Measures for Climate Change for Sustainable Communities in Hinatuan Passage Development Alliance Areas in Surigao del Norte, with P18.9 million; Saub Watershed Ecosystem Rehabilitation and Flood Risk Reduction for Increased Resilience to Climate Change and Natural Hazards in Sarangani, amounting to P119.5 million; Integrated Ecosystem and Forest Management in Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte, with P10 million; Adaptive Capacity Building of Agusan del Norte: Enhancing the Disaster Preparedness Dissemination System through Information and Communication Technology in Agusan del Norte, amounting to P14.9 million; and Establishment and Sustainable Management of River Ecosystem in Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte, with P27 million” with a total of PhP 979.7 million (Cu, 2018).

As shown in the formulation and implementation of the People’s Survival Fund, the People’s Plan (i.e., the beneficiary community’s) was “trumped” by the technical requirements such as the science-informed vulnerability assessment which was beyond the capacity of the people to produce. The PSF administrators expected the community to hire climate and disaster risk assessment experts to prepare the required documents which really defeated the goals of People’s Plan.

Case Box 2. Asian Coalition for Community Action’s (ACCA’s) community-led programs

The Asian Coalition for Community Action (ACCA) is one of the programs introduced by the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR), based in Bangkok. The program operates in 215 cities in Asia, where 24 of it comes from the Philippines. ACCA supports the land and housing initiatives of the different urban poor communities in the country. Aside from providing finances, ACCA, trains people to take over the design, implementation and execution of the programs and projects in their own communities. This is a way of not only empowering the community but also of exposing them with the different sectors and stakeholders such as government authorities, NGOs and others (Galuszka, 2014) that could help them sustain and establish connections.

ACCA’s partner countries include Cambodia, Indonesia, Nepal, Myanmar, South Korea, Philippines, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Fiji, Thailand, India, Lao PDR, Pakistan, China, Japan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Afghanistan. From these countries, ACCA has contributed a total of 2,285 projects or an equivalent of 391,755 households, with the help of hundreds of people’s organizations from Asia, where six comes from the Philippines.

These ACCA projects are divided into small and big projects. Small upgrading projects, on one hand, include walkways, drainage, toilets, water supply, community centers and solid waste system. A total of 2,139 projects have already been implemented in all ACCA cities. These projects are
implemented through the budget contributions of ACCA itself, the community, government, and other stakeholders. Big housing projects, on the other, focuses on securing land and housing projects for the urban poor communities. A total of 146 big housing projects have been implemented in all ACCA cities, where 20 projects are found in the Philippines. Big housing projects in all cities are made possible through the provided lands of the government, which are either given for free, long-term lease and/or for installment.

CSOs that come from the Philippines include the (a) Foundation for the Development of the Urban Poor (FDUP) in Quezon City, (b) Urban Poor Associates (UPA) in Manila, (c) Homeless People’s Federation Philippines (HPFP) in Manila, (d) Tao Women’s Association (TAO) in Navotas City, (e) SMMI in Illigan City, and (f) Sama-Sama in Quezon City. These organizations have made ACCA projects successful in different cities in the country. In Metro Manila, a total of 351 households affected by Typhoon Ketsana were given house repair loans. When Baseco slum in Manila encountered a fire accident which destroyed parts of the area, ACCA provided funds for them to build start-up houses. These are only some of the many engagements ACCA had with its partner stakeholders and communities.

The ACCA programs implemented in the different communities, however, are still dependent on the decisions being made by other stakeholders (Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 2012), and does not solely depend on the voice of the community, if they have any. ACCA projects may be led by the community per se, but it is still driven by both external and internal resources and networks. Communities would need to negotiate themselves with these groups in successfully implementing projects that could benefit them such as the housing projects. An example of which is how the Philippine CSO partners of ACCA, tried to negotiate a $50,000 fund from the city mayor in order to push through with a housing project in Quezon City (ACCA, 2014).

The ACCA project enjoyed a bit of a relative autonomy from the local regulatory framework because most of the funding sources came from external donors. Local resources just served as counterpart donation. In a sense, relative autonomy of civil society actors seems to be within their grasp when they do not have to depend on the government for resources.

Case Box 3. Valenzuela City’s Climate Resilient Housing Projects

Valenzuela, one of the highly urbanized cities in Metro Manila, is surrounded by three different river systems – Polo, Tullahan, and the Meycauayan. Because of this and having been situated in a low-lying area, Valenzuela City has not escaped the effects of the different natural disasters that struck the region. Several typhoons have already devastated the city, leaving several informal settler families (ISFs) reside in dangerous sites. This has made the local government unit of Valenzuela exert more effort in providing a safe space for its constituents; as Mayor Rex Gatchalian envisions “zero ISFs along the waterways of Valenzuela City” (Santos, 2016).

In pursuance of Mayor Gatchalian’s vision for the city, one of his administration’s project focuses on providing housing programs for the people. One of their projects is the Disiplina Village, a public rental housing project that aims to relocate ISFs found along the informal areas in the city to a much safer and secure space within the city (Canete 2014), an in-city relocation. The village was created in 2009 as a response to Typhoon Ketsana. It has two sites located inside the city with a total of 13 hectares. Its first site, which is in Barangay Ugong has benefitted 892 ISFs in 2009, while its second site, which is found in Barangay Bignay has benefitted around 3,702 or more ISFs in 2016.
The village is created with different amenities such as day-care station, elementary and high school buildings, health station, basketball and volleyball courts, police precincts, fire sub-station, and a whole lot more. They are also provided with different livelihood facilities and outlets of which they could utilize such as community fishpond, vegetable farm, tofu production mini-plant, bag-sewing, shirt printing shop, and a lot more (Dizon, 2017). These facilities are established to make its beneficiaries feel that as if their previous way of living was not taken away from them but was only enhanced and even upgraded.

There are still more ISFs found along the rivers and other informal areas of the city, and the LGU would want to narrow down its number to zero. In the pursuance of such, the city government has reached out to other government agencies. Valenzuela has then become one of the beneficiaries of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) with an allocated PhP 6.9 million budget in 2017 for the housing project’s continuity and improvement and another PhP 1.2 billion budget from the City Housing and Resettlement Office and National Housing Authority for the construction of new houses.

Aside from the different government agencies, city mayors could also be one of the sources of donations for the project. In one of the cities affected by Typhoon Haiyan, one urban poor leader told me that their mayor is always their source of donation during events like fiestas and anniversaries:

“Ma’am, ang hirap maki-pagbanggaan sa mayor namin. Paano tinutulungan kami palagi. Pag may patay, nagpapadala siya ng limos at corona; iyong anniversario ng kapulungan namin, pinadalhan niya kami ng lechon, happy at enjoin ang mga kasamahan ko. Kapag may sakit, sa kaniya kami dumudugong para may gamit at pambayad sa ospital. Yung iba sa kasamahan naming miembro ng 4Ps ay maraming tulong nabigay ang gobyerno sa kanila-pera para sa pagpaaral ng anak nila.....”

(Ma’am, it’s really hard to put up some “resistance” moves with our mayor. How will that be possible? He is always helping us during our time of need. When there is death or funeral here in the community, he always sends out alms and funeral flowers/crown; in the anniversary of our group association, he sent us lechon, my colleagues enjoyed and were happy about it. If someone’s sick, we always seek assistance from him for us to be able to pay the hospital bills. Some of my colleagues who are members of the 4Ps (Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (Bridging Program for the Filipino Family)) are given much help especially in terms of their children’s education.)

This statement somehow shows that being an ally of the government or for that sake, any government authority, plays a vital role in being a beneficiary of any project. For the urban poor leader of whom I conversed with, he finds his being non-enemy of the mayor a key to access the different benefits of which are stated above. To relate this with that of Valenzuela City’s Disiplina Village housing program, it seems possible that if the city ISFs are found to be “enemies” or non-followers of the politician, they could be not chosen as one of the beneficiaries of the program and all other programs.

As shown in the case of LGU-led housing programs, the urban poor community is always regularly on issues related to housing and the provision of other basic needs, especially lack of access to safe water and electricity. Several dialogues have been conducted by the city’s human settlements office, service providers like Meralco, national housing agencies, and the community. Strengthening the partnership between the government and the poor and marginalized sectors of society is central to their local governance mandate. The participation of these basic sectors in governance and
nationalist development is envisioned to create a cohesive community, politically and economically empowered in the fight against poverty, according to the local chief executive and his leaders. Ironically, here, the LCEs strong leadership seem to stymie the growth of local leaders as the latter seem intimidated by his strength and political will.

**Case Box 4. Partners for Resilience Climate and Disaster Resilience Programs with/for the Poor**

Partners for Resilience (PfR) is an association made up of five different Netherlands based organizations such as CARE Nederland, Cordaid, Netherlands Red Cross, Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre, and Wetlands International, and other civil society organizations. PfRs mission, as an international organization, is to promote an Integrated Risk Management (IRM), integrated DRR, Ecosystem Management and Restoration (ERM) and CCA as a way to provide assistance to different vulnerable poor communities.

PfR’s programs are geared towards strengthening the community's resilience and livelihoods against innumerable hazards (Partners for Resilience, Partners for Resilience: Philippines, 2018) by strengthening institutional resilience through partnerships. Their programs have been implemented in eleven countries such as Ethiopia, Guatemala, Indonesia, India, Kenya, Mali, Nicaragua, Uganda, South Sudan, Haiti, and Philippines.

In the Philippines, programs such as (a) “reforestation of the La Mesa watershed upstream of the Malabon-Navotas-Tullahan-Tinajeros (MANATUTI) River Basin in NCR, (b) livelihoods diversification projects in locations such as Typhoon Haiyan-affected areas and Valenzuela city in NCR to tackle food insecurity and to strengthen livelihood resilience, (c) integrating ecosystem management and restoration in a cash-for-work post flood emergency programme” and more (Partners for Resilience, 2018) have been successfully implemented by PfR from years 2011 to 2015.

These programs are made possible through the help of PfR Philippines’ local and international partners that come from the government (from barangay to national level), CSO, and PO sectors. They are the Assistance and Cooperation for Community Resilience and Development (ACCORD), Philippine Red Cross, National Caritas of the Philippines (NASSA) and local diocesan partners, Ecoweb, Samdhana, International Institute for Rural Reconstruction, Zoological Society for London, and the Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas (Phildhrra). This partnership is seen by PfR as a way for them to reach policy dialogues.

PfR has aligned their policy agendas in different global environmental initiatives such as the Sendai Framework for DRR, Paris Climate Agreement, and the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Proliferation and adaptation of climate resilience strategies such as (1) integrated approaches through inter-/trans-disciplinal research, (2) forming partnerships, (3) recognizing scales of applications, (4) promoting community self-management, (5) focus on strengthening institutional and community resilience, (6) focus on livelihood resilience, and etc. These kinds of strategies bode very well for partnerships with international NGOs, national/local governments and local CSOs and other so-called communities of practice.

Core to the PfR program is the assertion that if the three elements for strengthening resilience—DRR, CCA and EMR—are implemented in an integrated manner, it creates a significant synergistic effect. DRR strategies will be more robust if climate and ecosystems factors are included in the analysis, and risks and approaches are looked at within the perspectives of disaster risk, climate change and ecosystems. By positioning the ‘triangle’ of DRR/CCA/EMR, PfR is grounded on an innovative and cost-effective solution for creating resilience for development. The figure below depicts the inter-linkages between development, ecosystem degradation, natural hazards and climate change.

*Figure 3. CSOs-LGU-CBO’s Inter-linkages for resilience*
In the above case box 4 (figure 3), resilience as the central goal of the program is devoid of the human dimensions of the drivers of climate change, disasters, ecosystems and development. Thus, the discussion of the constitution and re-constitution of social power and hierarchies among the actors involved in constructing resilience initiatives among/with urban poor communities by CSO actors have been buried deeply rather than reflexively informing the community engagements. Their housing programs might have provided strong housing materials and “climate resilient” designs but their social power and identity as “vulnerable groups” have become closely intertwined with both the local and external power holders.

Concluding Comments
As Karaos (2012) and others (Porio 2017, 2018) have argued after the 2009 Ketsana, most post-disaster and/or rehabilitation and recovery initiatives done by most government agencies and NGOs/CSOs are very reactive. More specifically, disaster recovery planning has become the space for technocratic planning to assume its moral ascendancy. While a segment of CSOs have fought “tooth and nail” for their “peoples plan” to inform the implementation of social housing programs with the local climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction (CCA-DRR) policies and plans, in the end, it becomes an exercise in technical planning as argued here by Kim (2018) in Tacloban City after Haiyan in 2013.

Matijasevich (2018:1) has also argued that “for those who have identified its current prominence (Swyngedouw, Mouffe, Ranciere, Zizek), post-politics is not a condition to be negotiated but radically obliterated. This is because under it, politics is no longer ‘the art of the possible’ but rather a limited series of compromises within an overarching framework whose key assumptions are to remain unchallenged. Of the most central of these assumptions are the notions that a consultative capitalism (underscoring mine) is the necessary third way between left and right and that a logic of consensus is more appropriate than a logic of dissensus. Since this framework is understood to produce deep injustices, the theorists of post-politics propose a “return to the political” – a politics more properly conceived as contestation.”

It seems to me that this proposal is similar to the political contestations during and after martial law, at least in the early period of the decentralization-democratization period as demonstrated by the “rainbow coalitions” during the Ramos administration (1992-98). Ironically, this consultative capitalism (as exemplified in the tripartite partnerships or public-private partnerships (PPPs) during the Ramos administration, more significantly, gets “trumped” by cultural politics on the ground through controlling
processes and coercive harmonious tactics (Nader 1994) exercised by local officials over their constituencies. So, the prospect of *negotiated power and resilience* (Chu, 2017; Porio 2017) in “contested” spaces for reclaiming the organic power of marginalized groups seem destined to find their own Sisyphus rock.
References


Appendix A. Tables

Appendix Table 1. Poverty Incidence Among the Basic Sectors/Marginalized Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Increase/Decrease</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
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<td>2.1</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>38.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fishermen</td>
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<td>4.6</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<td>Children</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed and Unpaid Family Workers</td>
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<td>2.2</td>
<td>29.9</td>
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<td>Women</td>
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<td>25.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
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<td>2.2</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>22.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Migrant and Formal Sector Workers</td>
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<td>16.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior Citizens</td>
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<td>16.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individuals residing in urban areas</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Increase/Decrease</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty Incidence (%)</td>
<td>CV</td>
<td>Poverty Incidence (%)</td>
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<td>Poverty Incidence (%)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed Population</td>
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<td>22.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployed Population</td>
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<td>4.4</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority
Appendix B. List of Abbreviations

4Ps Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program or the Bridging Program for the Filipino Family
ACCA Asia Coalition for Community Action Program
ACCORD Assistance and Cooperation for Community Resilience and Development
ACHR Asian Coalition for Housing Rights
CBO Community-Based Organization
CCA Climate Change Adaptation
CCC Climate Change Commission
CMP Community Mortgage Program
CSO Civil-society organizations
DILG Department of Interior and Local Government
DRR Disaster Risk Reduction
ERM Ecosystem Management and Restoration
FDUP Foundation for the Development of the Urban Poor
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HOA Homeowner’s Association
HPFP Homeless People’s Federation Philippines
HUDCC Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
IRM Integrated Risk Management
ISF Informal Settler Families
LGU Local Government Unit
MANATUTI Malabon-Navotas-Tullahan-Tinajeros River Basin
NAPC National Anti-Poverty Commission
NCR National Capital Region or Metro Manila
NFPP National Framework for Physical Planning
NFSCC National Framework Strategy on Climate Change
NGO Non-governmental Organization
NHMFC National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
PfR Partners for Resilience
PO People’s Organization
PSA Philippine Statistics Authority
PSF People’s Survival Fund
RA Republic Act
SHFC Social Housing Corporation
SRA Social Reform Agenda
TAO Tao Women’s Association
UN United Nations
UPA Urban Poor Associates