their generosity and hospitality, not only allowing me to join their communal prayer and liturgical celebrations, but even letting me try my hand at making some of their famous gourmet confectionery. I thank as well my brother Paul Rhoniel, his wife Joy, and children Hannah and Renzo, who not only drove me all the way from Ridgefield, Washington to the monastery, but also gave me boxes of pencils, yellow writing pads, and nutrition supplies to help sustain me during the writing retreat.

Great Transformations
The Political Economy of City-Building Megaprojects in the Manila Peri-urban Periphery

FAR BEYOND THE SUBURBS of Metropolitan Manila, nestled in the rolling plains of the Central Luzon basin, the construction of the roadworks of the Alviera and Clark Green City (CGC) projects are now in full swing. Still surrounded by swaths of agricultural land and years away yet from completing their first phases of development, both mega-projects have already been heralded as the most promising ventures of their kind within the Philippines today. Despite being in their infancy, in fact, both Alviera and CGC have been seen to form the very “next frontiers” of Philippine urbanism (Manila Standard 2014), introducing all at once the future growth hubs of the Central Luzon region, the nation’s very first “aerotropolis” (Amojelar 2013), and new forms of sustainable urban development in the Philippines.

But these two mega-projects are only an inkling of historic changes that await the Manila peri-urban fringe, if plans to decongest the country’s National Capital Region (NCR) materialize. Owing to worsening dysfunctions in Manila mega-city life, the Philippine government adopted last September 2014 a “Mega Manila Dream Plan” for boosting growth clusters and transport networks in the surrounding peri-urban fringe (Japan International Cooperation Agency 2014). Meanwhile, a groundswell in large-scale, mixed-use townships by leading private developers has taken root in provinces north and south of NCR (Pacis 2014). Trammeled amidst these trends, land on the Manila mega-urban region has come to
fore as a frontier zone for market-oriented mega-project development, yet also a spatial platform for the creation of “next generation” built landscapes that are proliferating across East Asia (Webster 2014, 321–23).

This chapter investigates transformations in the geographies of governance that have been catalyzed by these mega-projects. Based on mixed-method research of the Alviera and CGC projects, I unravel how the realization of such ventures has gone hand-in-hand with the formation of new constellations of power, territory and governance processes, creating a special window for probing the dynamics of urban spatial production within developing countries like the Philippines. However, if partly due to the very features of these mega-projects—their non-routine nature, the sheer scale of costs and risks that they impose, and their disruptive tendencies (Altschuler and Luboff 2003, 4, 267)—these governance transformations have also resulted from scale-related challenges that have been faced by their proponents. Thus, I argue that a full understanding of these mega-projects’ development efforts must grapple with the state rescaling processes and the scale-manipulating strategies that market- and state-based actors have deployed in their bids to secure control over land and the production of new urban space.

Yet these mega-project processes have not occurred in an open, free-form milieu: rather, they have been situated within the Philippines’ prevailing strains of market-oriented urban governance. While the neoliberal restructuring of the Philippine political economy since the 1980s has resulted in deep-seated developmental doldrums, it has also precipitated a long-term “creative destruction” of the practices, mechanisms, and institutions governing space and urban development (Bello et al. 2014, 9–10, 55). Nowhere has this recalibration been more arresting than in the now-proliferating mega-projects of the Manila mega-urban fringe, where sclerotic governance regimes over the “losers” and “winners” of the Philippines’ “new” economy have been cast into stark relief with one another. All told, the significance of these mega-projects extends far beyond themselves: they tell an even broader story of how power relations are now exercised over the Philippines’ economy of space, of how governing regimes over new “world-class” urban spaces are established and maintained, and of what prospects exist for realizing universal and democratic rights to the city.

**Megaprojects and the Scalar Politics of Neoliberal Urbanism**

Since the late 1980s, cities across developing Asia have witnessed an upsurge in efforts by market-based property firms and state bodies to restructure urban landscapes by means of large-scale, integrated “mega-projects” (Shatkin 2011, 80). Normally presented as a measure for shoring up “world class” economic opportunities, and operationalized as parcelized interventions, these large-scale ventures have, from the 2000s onwards, taken the form of mixed-use developments addressing objectives ranging from commercial to social and environmental goals (Strauch, Takano, and Hordijk 2015, 178). Globalizing middle- and upper-classes, keen to flee the inconveniences of degraded urban arteries, have often been drawn to purveyed images of plush living and “progress” (Michel 2010, 388–89), yet the emergence of such megaprojects has not always been seen in a favorable light. Numerous observers, for one, have noted that such ventures have often run counter to social concerns, particularly by intensifying socio-spatial divisions through gentrification-driven displacement and the eviction of peripheral populations (Strauch, Takano, and Hordijk 2015, 177–78).

Yet these megaprojects have been only one means by which neoliberal urban governance has found expression in the cities of the Global South. Defined as an order of market-disciplinary socio-economic regulation in which urban spaces have been transformed into strategic arenas for capital accumulation and market-oriented growth, neoliberal urbanism has entailed the reshuffling of the territorial scales of state power (59–62). In tandem with
efforts to recast cities along lines of market-based growth, state structures that had previously been centralized, nationally standardized, and oriented to welfarist or developmentalist objectives have been subjected to various grades of decentralization, place-based customization, and the enshrining of global competitiveness as the principal aim of policy intervention (Klink and Denaldi 2012, 547–48).

At the heart of all these processes lies a historic shift in which neoliberal urbanism and privately-driven megaprojects have brought to fore new geographies of governance. As analysts have observed, implementers of contemporary urban megaprojects have commonly been granted “exceptionalist” measures exempting them from the authority of conventional state bodies and regulations, while endowing them with special powers of intervention, decision-making, and policy-formulation (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez 2002, 543; Kennedy et al. 2014, 13, 37). Justified in terms of commercial and technocratic prerogatives, unaccountable and exclusionary management regimes surrounding the governance of these ventures have increasingly prevailed, whether in the form of public-private partnerships (PPPs) between corporate firms and state organizations; autonomous and quasi-private parastatal agencies; closed-door networks of bureaucrats, business elites, professional consultancies, and technical experts; or token public participation exercises in which citizens are denied real institutional power to affect decisions concerning the governance of entire cities (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez 2002, 565–66). All in all, such exceptionalist mechanisms have further undermined already-sharp democratic deficits in urban governance.

Equally noteworthy, the existence of such governance dynamics attests to how questions of scale are cardinal concerns for the development of urban mega-projects. Though typically understood as the focal setting at which spatial boundaries are defined for specific social processes (Agnew 1997, 100), subsequent recognition in human geography that scalar boundaries are socially-constructed, relational, and fluid yet objectively-inherited phenomena has drawn attention to how the framing of scalar realities can themselves be factors in how socio-political processes play out (Born and Purcell 2006, 197–99). Through their role in shaping the relative socio-spatial power positions of different actors, and how institutional “command lines” of authority are drawn over territories (Swyngedouw 2000, 70–71), scale can even be said to constitute a socially-mediated apparatus of power—congealing and extending relations of power and control among variegated social forces. Within such understandings of scalar politics, all socio-political practices and processes are instead viewed as having indelible scalar dimensions, so that manipulating and leveraging these scalar features can have vital repercussions on the realization of the agendas of different agents, movements and organizations (MacKinnon 2010, 29–30, 32–33).

In the parlance of Smith (1993; 2004), for example, actors that are socially and politically handicapped at a given scale can seek to jump into different scalar settings where political opportunities and the balance-of-power may be more favorable for their activities. Likewise, other agents can seek to bend the existing scalar features of given social activities, disentangling the links between certain practices at given scalar frames, so as to suit the fulfillment of their interests. Through such multi-pronged scalar strategies, different agents in different spatial-institutional contexts are able to produce new gestalts of scale in the course of mega-project development, in order to temporarily crystallize certain geometries of power and governance (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez 2002, 542; MacKinnon 2010, 31). In fact, as will be shown later, the deployment of such strategies has been an indispensable feature of urban mega-project implementation, not only to better advance the strategic agendas of private and public sector developers, but also as a means of coping with incoherencies brought about by the Philippines’ long transition to a regime of neoliberal urban governance.

Tropic of Neoliberalism: Neoliberal Urbanism and Megaproject Making in the Peri-Urban Philippines

The strategic manipulation of scalar frames, especially in relation to state institutional structures and the consolidation of neoliberal governance regimes, have been manifested to an exceptional degree in the Philippines since the 1980s. If couched at the time in the discourse of democratization following the Marcos dictatorship, this rescaling process entailed the passage of the country’s
Local Government Code in 1991, which decentralized an entire continuum of governance functions, including in urban planning, land-use management, and the power to enter into joint ventures and PPP’s, down from the national toward subnational levels (Porio 2012, 11–13). Within the National Capital Region, this downscaling resulted in the dismantling of the cronymism-ridden Metro Manila Commission into a weaker Metro Manila Development Authority, limited to coordinating the urban governance functions of its constituent local government units (LGUs) (Michel 2010, 390–91).2

Even more striking has been the rise of new “exceptional” bodies oriented towards attracting investment and typified by market-friendly modes of regulation. In 1995, the Philippine government legislated the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act, making the country the first in the world to allow the creation of privately-administered SEZs as separate customs and investment-friendly territories (McKay 2006, 210–11). Autonomous Freeports have likewise been created by legislation over lands spanning tens of thousands of hectares across the country, with unprecedented powers of eminent domain, developing and regulating utilities, public services, and infrastructure, and planning as well as managing allocated territories (Bello et al. 2014, 94). No less important, through the Bases Conversion Act of 1992, former military bases were placed under the sole jurisdiction of the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), with powers, among others, of selling and leasing such lands to the private sector; overseeing urban planning and management within them, and constructing, owning, leasing, operating, and maintaining public utilities and infrastructure facilities (Ordoñez 2015, 36, 42–43).

In the highly class-stratified Philippine context, systematic neoliberalization has served to even further entrench the country’s privately-oriented and geographically-uneven dynamics of property development (Michel 2010, 386). While state units have failed to respond effectively to the country’s intractable urban woes, private conglomerates have secured unrivalled heights of control over urban planning and administration processes (Shatkin 2008, 398). Labelled by observers as evincing a pattern of neo-patrimonial trends in urban governance, the demonstrated weakness of the Philippine state in performing urban governance functions has enabled an oligarchy of family-linked companies to seize control over nominally public urban spaces and develop them into privately-run enclaves (Murphy and Hogan 2012, 23, 25). Unsurprisingly, the country’s urban form has displayed ever-higher degrees of socio-spatial fragmentation between high-performing, globally-connected nodes of the urban economy, and more publicly-neglected segments of Philippine cities, epitomized by the 500 major slum communities of Metro Manila (Ragrario 2003). For the most part, a “bypass-implant” character of developer-driven projects such as gated enclaves, privatized business districts, and privately-operated interconnecting infrastructures has obtained—with commercial developments tending to “bypass” all zones of unwanted urban “excess,” while “implanting” new spaces for globally-connected consumption and accumulation (Shatkin 2008, 384, 388).

These same trends have also been increasingly displayed in the peri-urbanization dynamics of the Manila Mega-Urban Region (MUR)—a roughly 12,000 km² conurbation consisting of NCR and parts of six surrounding provinces, which has been estimated to be the fourth most populous urban region in the world in 2015 (Demographia 2015, 20). Home to some of the foremost farming regions of the Philippines, large expanses of the MUR have already been buffeted by waves of land-use change since the early 1980s, usually through the mushrooming of SEZ’s, leisure estates, but most especially, private residential enclaves (Kelly 1998, 35–39). More recently, the longest ongoing real estate boom in the Philippines’ post-dictatorship history has tilted peri-urbanization trends in the MUR toward mega-project development, with advances in the scale, sophistication, master-planning and financing capabilities of property developers lending more and more prominence to the establishment of large-scale, mixed-use ventures on the urban fringe (Webster 2014, 323). Beginning with the 2007 unveiling of Ayala Land Inc’s 1,600-hectare Nuvali township in Canlubang, Laguna, the mixed-use township trend has continued to garner momentum, with observers declaring 2015 as “the year of townships” on account of at least 11 such ventures being developed across the country (Lamudi 2015).

Yet despite buoyant expectations, institutional impediments have still threatened the realization of such townships. As noted in studies of urban mega-projects across Asia, the most common
Great Transformations

JERIK CRUZ

Post-war Philippine history. To begin with, the firm was chiefly responsible for developing its former Hacienda Makati throughout the 1950s into the Philippines’ leading central business, diplomatic, and financial nerve center, setting a gold standard for Philippine property developers for years to come (Michel 2010, 389).

Causes for the failure of these ventures has been in consolidating large-scale tracts of urban land, protracted local resistance against project implementation, and oftentimes the unreliability and ineffectiveness of local governments (Shatkin 2011, 86–89). On one hand, even while incentivizing entrepreneurial governance approaches, local governance quality amidst decentralization has remained uneven, and improvements in lagging LGU’s have been sluggish (Capuno 2005, 28). On the other, the makeup of Philippine urban and peri-urban land markets have also posed persistent challenges to large-scale land acquisition and conversion processes. With a fragmented, inefficient, unreliable, and corruption-prone land administration system stretching across nineteen different state agencies, such markets have proven a fertile ground for conflict, with the same plot of land often harboring competing claims on the basis of different property regimes (Chikiamko and Fabella 2011, 133).

Confronted with these hurdles, mega-project proponents have usually found it necessary to “strategically localize” their development activities by meeting the needs of and simultaneously influencing political, institutional, and social conditions particularly at the local level (Coe and Lee 2006, 63–64). Far from simply “place-shopping” among pre-constructed sites, developers have systematically intervened across multiple scalar terrains not only in order to establish their leverage within local institutional processes and relations, but also to proactively reconstitute such conditions (McKay 2006, 8–9). How then have these above-mentioned challenges affected the Alviera and CGC projects, and how have local governance processes over land resources and urban space been transformed amidst project proponents’ efforts in order to surmount these constraints? We now turn to addressing these questions.

Ayala Land’s Alviera: In the Shadows of “Acting Government”

By acclamation the Philippines’ premier real estate developer, and a subsidiary of one of the country’s oldest family-owned conglomerates, Ayala Land Inc. (ALI) can lay claim to being a consistent pioneer of urban development trends throughout post-war Philippine history. To begin with, the firm was chiefly responsible for developing its former Hacienda Makati throughout the 1950s into the Philippines’ leading central business, diplomatic, and financial nerve center, setting a gold standard for Philippine property developers for years to come (Michel 2010, 389).

Fig.1. Entrance of Alviera as of February 2016
Source: Author

Fig.2. Ongoing Construction of Alviera as of February 2016
Source: Author
Since then, ALI has replicated such feats in now-iconic projects, the most recent being its 1,600-hectare Nuvali township in 2007 in Laguna province (Ayala Land 2015, 25–27).

Hailed by pundits to be Ayala Land’s most ambitious initiative since Nuvali, the 1,180-hectare Alviera project in Porac, Pampanga is a mixed-use, master-planned township that is envisioned to eventually serve as the growth center of the whole of the Central Luzon region (Dumlao 2014). To be developed over a twenty-five- to thirty-year period, the first phase of the project, from 2016 to 2019, will involve the establishment of three residential communities, two educational institutions, a high-end country club, and a 31-hectare industrial park (Montealegre 2014). With the Subic-Clark-Tarlac expressway (SCTEX) passing right through its property, and being strategically located close to the refurbished Clark International Airport, the mega-project has been projected to become a central district of a looming “aerotropolis” in CL (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2014). Likewise, Alviera is to be distinguished as a new “green township,” by preserving the project site’s mountainous environment for ecotourism purposes while incorporating eco-friendly urban landscapes (Vibar 2014).

This focus on Alviera’s development as an urban and nature hub highlights Alviera’s being constructed in the town of Porac, specifically within the barangays of Hacienda Dolores and Sapang Uwak, where communities of lowland farmers and Aeta indigenous peoples (IPs) reside. In these areas, the project will consolidate separate property contributions of 1,180-hectares from ALI and 761.1-hectares from Leonio Land Holdings Inc. (LLHI), which had acquired property in the town even earlier (Ayala Land 2015). Both companies have formed a JV company for the project called Nuevocentro Inc., in which a 55 percent (ALI) /45 percent (LLHI) profit-sharing scheme has been arranged (Magturo 2014; PEZA 2014).

Thwarting the Ayala Model in Porac?

From a project standpoint, the reported performance of Alviera has exceeded expectations: on the merit of the project’s ambition and initial success to date, Porac has been heralded as one of the leading “next-wave cities” providing alternative business and commercial hubs to Metro Manila (iMoney.ph 2015). Yet in reality, the venture’s operations on the ground have been far more complicated. For one, the capacity of the Porac local state remains anemic across practically all business-relevant areas: as of April 2014, Porac was ranked 826th out of 978 municipalities in the country’s Cities and Municipalities Competitiveness Index, suffering particularly in the categories of economic dynamism (940th) and infrastructure (853rd), but still also performing far below median levels for government efficiency (667th) (National Competitiveness Council 2014).

But even more serious has been Alviera’s enmeshment with local land disputes—especially in relation to the 761.1-hectare lot that ALI’s JV partner, LLHI, claims to have acquired by a 2003 Deed of Sale. This purchase, however, has been censured by residents and critics as a case of dispossession, having involved lands inhabited and tilled by 1,500 residents from local farming communities. In fact, certifications from the Barangay Council of Hacienda Dolores attest to many of these families’ first settlement within the area as far back as 1835 (Jimenez-David 2014). Despite this, the resulting land dispute has witnessed LLHI security forces and unidentified figures committing systematic human rights violations since 2011 against residents, including evictions, demolitions, crop destruction, intimidation, assaults, and extrajudicial killings (Hernandez 2014).

Meanwhile, though the 1,180-hectare lot of ALI (which the company purchased from the once nationally-influential Puyat family and their Manila Bank group in 2012) has been repeatedly emphasized not to suffer from land problems, critics maintain that the ongoing construction of Alviera has actually entailed an illegal conversion process, having been missing a formal conversion order from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (Carranza 2016). Likewise, rural justice advocates from Pampanga contend that the project’s development has flouted a 1990’s application of Hacienda Dolores residents to have the same land plot covered by the government land reform program. In the recollection of such advocates, the entire estate was originally intended by DAR to be developed into a model agrarian reform community, though efforts to this end were stymied by the resistance of the Puyats’ property managers and the long-term impacts of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption.
Secondly, ALI and LLHI have been able to exercise considerable influence over the crafting of the municipality’s Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP). Starting in 2005 with LLHI and 2012 with ALI, both companies have prompted major post-hoc adjustments in plans to accommodate the mega-project, by contributing substantial inputs and expertise to municipal planners (Lansangan 2016). One critical outcome of this has been the explicit recognition that the CLUP has given to the Alviera project as Porac’s “new economic center” (Municipality of Porac 2016, 42). As can be observed from fig. 4.3, the prominence of Alviera—located at the center of municipality’s land terrain and adjacent to various proposed road interchanges—corroborates its privileged status in the town’s planned land-use regime. Since CLUP adjustments are required for the passage of new zoning ordinances, these new features of Porac’s land-use plan effectively produce a quasi-legal instrument for facilitating local land conversion and fostering a broader growth-driven agenda.

(Enriquez 2016). Hence, while no legal proceedings are presently hounding ALI’s property, dormant legal risks have remained.

The Scalar Politics of Intervention: From Coalitions to Land Acquisition

Amidst such impediments, ALI has had to undertake unprecedented measures to craft more favorable conditions for Alviera’s development. This has evidently been the case in the firm’s coalition-building efforts, which have reportedly garnered the support of key power-brokers within Pampanga province, such as the governor of Pampanga, the present congresswoman of the second District of Pampanga (former president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo), former Senator Lito Lapid (a resident of Porac), and the Pampanga Chamber of Commerce and Industry (comprised by the province’s business elite), who have each contributed to the mega-project’s development (see fig. 4.2) (Mapiles 2015; Ayala manager 2016). Former president Arroyo especially has been recounted by project stakeholders to be a vital mediator of talks between LGU officials, ALI and prospective investors—and was even, in the recollection of Porac’s mayor, the key agent who facilitated ALI’s entry into Porac starting in 2010 (dela Cruz 2016).

But the extensiveness of ALI’s engagements goes far beyond the extension of a multi-level project coalition. On one hand, with communities in peri-urban settings reportedly being prone to “insular” outlooks, the Alviera project has witnessed attempts by ALI to cultivate supportive relational webs with the LGU and local communities, with ALI’s managers on the ground often having to comport themselves in a fashion reminiscent of Philippine landed elites of yore through gestures such as donating to local festivals, attending weddings, sponsoring dinners and local functions, as well as becoming godparents to children of key residents (Ayala executive 2016). Apparently, the ability of ALI personnel to conduct themselves in this quasi-patron manner, and to derive tactical advantage from it, has been a prized asset in Ayala’s Strategic Landbank Management Group. The said group has even reportedly stopped hiring business school graduates from Ivy League universities on the basis of their lacking the necessary flexibility for such activities (Alviera manager 2016).

Fig. 3. Porac Map with proposed Alviera project in the revised CLUP
Source: Municipality of Porac (2016)
Just as riveting has been the CLUP’s proposed development trajectory, which has buttressed ALI’s commanding position in the town’s local economy. This is most apparent in the revised CLUP’s endorsement of a public and private partnership model for undertaking eco-tourism projects—an area which the plan repeatedly identifies as the emerging industry within the municipality (Municipality of Porac 2016, 26, 34, 38). Though not mentioned explicitly in the document, this proposed policy focus promises to secure significant potential returns for ALI, given that the only access route to one of the town’s main tourism attractions—the Miyamit falls—is located right within ALI’s property (Ayala manager 2016).

The most pressing concerns of ALI and LLHI, however, have been their efforts to insulate the lands acquired for Alviera from coverage by the government’s land reform program. On one hand, vital to insulating Ayala Land’s 1,180-hectare lot has been its startling mode of acquisition. Secured in 2012, the land transaction occurred at a time when the Philippines’ Central Bank (BSP) had become the effective administrator of the land parcel (Ayala Manager 2016), as the parcel in question had been mortgaged to the BSP by the Puyat family’s Manila Bank (and eventually foreclosed) in the years after the Asian Financial Crisis (Dizon 2016). While details as to the exact arrangement between ALI, Manila Bank, and BSP are murky, this process has—in line with an August 10, 2012 Legal Opinion of the Philippines’ Department of Justice—ultimately resulted in an effective exemption of the parcel from land reform coverage. On the basis of the BSP’s being granted fiscal and administrative autonomy by the New Central Bank Act of 1993, the Legal Opinion stated, any mandatory requirement for BSP to transfer foreclosed agricultural lands that have come under its authority for land redistribution would constitute an undue infringement of the Central Bank’s unique “discretion to allocate and utilize its resources” (Alegado 2012; Dizon 2016).

In comparison to this exceptionalist acquisition tactic of ALI, LLHI’s maneuvers have been more locally-focused. Having purchased its 761.1-hectare property in 2003 in anticipation of SCTEX’s completion, the company afterwards secured an exemption order from DAR in 2006 on the basis that the lands within the property were non-agricultural, untenanted, poorly suited to cultivated crops, and also features an excessive slope of 18 degrees (Hernandez 2014, 1–3). Central to procuring the order was a compromise agreement LLHI had cobbled with the officers of a local irrigators association, Aguman, which consisted of local farmers who had been forced to settle in the LLHI-claimed lands due to post-eruption lahar flows in the 1990s. Entailing the cessation of efforts for land reform coverage in exchange for a 30-hectare residential land concession from LLHI, this agreement, however, has been impugned to have been forged without proper consultation of the organization’s membership while being out-of-odds with the facts on the ground (Mendoza 2016; Hernandez 2014, 3).

However flawed, the order has nevertheless allowed LLHI, with support from LGU officials, to drive forward land conversion proceedings against local settlers, who have reorganized themselves into a local association entitled the Aniban ng Nakakaisang Mamamayan ng Hacienda Dolores (Aniban). In 2011, the Mayor of Porac granted LLHI the authority to fence their land despite protests by residents and opposition municipal councilors; in 2012, a municipal ordinance reclassifying the land-use of LLHI’s property was issued despite lacking legally-mandated public consultation. Even more troubling, in the midst of demolitions, intimidation episodes, and outright killings, the municipal police has been consistently reported to turn a blind eye to reports of human rights violations (Tapang 2016; Mendoza 2016; Carranza 2016). In all this, LLHI has revealed itself as adopting more overtly patrimonial methods than ALI, having harnessed both clientelist and coercive techniques of asserting control over territory that have been standard fare among traditional Philippine political elites.

“Heroes at the Backstage”:
Emerging Power Geometries in Porac

As the above discussion has shown, the development dynamics of Alviera have hinged upon ALI’s harnessing a cornucopia of scalar strategies in the areas of inter-scalar coalition formation, planning, land acquisition, and consolidating supportive firm-local relations. Yet the most consequential impacts of these and other strategies have been its reshaping of local power networks which
have deepened ALI’s leverage over core governance processes. In discussing ALI’s role in local urban governance processes, an Ayala officer confided:

We shoulder all these—the [governance] responsibilities. Let’s say we develop this [a mixed-use estate]: anything that happens here is our call. It’s supposed to be the call of the government. We’re just supposed to develop buildings and subdivisions within. But since the government’s not the one developing, we basically become acting government… Basically we are the “heroes at the backstage,” as far as government functions are concerned. Sometimes they [the LGU] don’t know any better. So we do it, so we assist them. That’s how it goes in the Philippines. (Ayala manager 2016)

What accounts for this position as “acting government” within the territory of Alviera and the broader Porac municipality? ALI, undoubtedly, has profited from its immense financial muscle to contract high-level services of all kinds (e.g., security, legal, promotional), as well as its ability to hone strategic linkages with key influentials, such as Pampanga Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PamCham), Pampanga’s governor, Porac’s mayor, and especially former president Arroyo. And yet, based on the accounts of informants, even more decisive has been the company’s “soft,” flexible methods of projecting and consolidating influence. Ayala insists that it “never controls” and “never fights” LGU players (Ayala manager 2016). Instead, the company portrays its manner of influencing as entailing a more indirect guiding and even mentoring presence vis-à-vis local state officers, in which ALI seemingly assumes the role of a senior partner to the LGU in fulfilling of governance responsibilities: “We try our best to mentor them so that in the future, they know already what to do—but that’s already ideal since they always need our assistance. We mold them to think like us” (Ayala manager 2016).

Yet throughout the Alviera episode, ALI’s mentoring strategy to influencing local processes has apparently hinged upon two preconditions. It depends, for one, on the abiding proneness of peri-urban LGU’s—in the context of neoliberalized urban governance—to actively seeking capacity augmentation from non-state actors such as ALI, to adopting more entrepreneurial, investor-friendly modes of governance, as well as to granting planning, policy and administrative concessions to key investors (Ortega 2012, 1125, 1128). Collectively, such institutional dynamics have undermined the Porac local state’s bargaining position vis-à-vis prospective investors, while simultaneously incentivizing stronger public-private collaborations in order to compensate for perceived governance shortfalls, whether in employment generation, local enterprise growth, and overall governance.

But no less decisive has been the reputational capital that the firm has been able to amass for itself through the success of its previous ventures, including the technical and managerial competencies that have enabled its personnel to demonstrate expertise, and not to mention the capacity of its officers to adapt to relational dynamics at variegated contexts yet still attain de facto local leadership. In this, ALI’s ability to project seniority, competency, and legitimacy in its relations with its “junior” partners has been of cardinal importance, having purportedly relied upon their consensual appeals for support. By successfully garnering such positions of local hegemonic leadership, ALI, in short, is able to relatively ensure LGU’s “spontaneous” seeking to be mentored by them, even if in so doing the company is able to reproduce and deepen the conditions of its influence.

It may indeed happen that such interventions by ALI into local urban governance may offer the Porac government capacity-augmentation opportunities—yet what should be clear is that ALI has been remarkably adept at leveraging such opportunities for longer-term advantage. Coupled with the savvy of ALI staff at projecting themselves into positions of local hegemonic leadership, the firm has been able to systematically consolidate a new spatio-institutional gestalt of governance surrounding Alviera in which they are able to indirectly mold governance activities over the production of urban space by means of soft interventions of competency provision, administrative guidance, and seeming beneficence. In producing these new strains of governance, ALI’s influence over the municipality’s policy and development trajectory is itself produced and reproduced. Insofar as wide institutional disparities between ALI and the LGU continue to exist, and insofar as the municipality continues to be located in a setting of neoliberalized
inter-urban competition, there is every reason to expect that Porac local government will be continually consigned to be ALI’s junior partner in such urban governance collaborations.

**BCDA’s Clark Green City: Redeveloping the Developers?**

Over the past two decades, the Bases Conversion and Development Authority has come to prominence as one of the most successful government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) in the Philippines. Established in 1992, the authority claims to be the single largest landholder in the country today, having inherited 41,500 hectares of former military bases across Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, and Metro Manila (BCDA 2013, 4, 8–9), which was tasked to convert into SEZs and mixed-use urban growth centers (House of Representatives 2010, 3-4). Independent of guaranteed budget appropriations, and directed by the BCDA Act to “encourage the active participation of the private sector,” BCDA has also been noteworthy for harnessing private sector collaborations as one of its chief instruments for project development (BCDA 2013b, 18). Yet if influenced by market-oriented policy approaches, its operations have also been leagues away from patrimonial forms of urban governance in the Philippines. Owing to high pressures for sequestering the agency from corruption at the time of its establishment, highly-qualified technocrats have been regularly appointed to the agency’s Board of Directors and management—all of whom have remained answerable only to the Office of the President (Ordoñez 2015, 40).

These features of BCDA have been central in the agency’s CGC project—the agency’s most significant venture since converting Fort Bonifacio into Bonifacio Global City in the 1990s. Spanning 9,450 hectares of the former Clark airbase in the municipalities of Capas and Bamban in Tarlac province, the mega-project is aimed by BCDA to become the Philippines’ first smart, green and disaster-resilient metropolis (BCDA 2013, 22–23). Planned to incorporate numerous urban functions, such as a financial and commercial center, green industrial zones, residential areas, districts for schools/universities and backup government offices, and urban farmlands as well as forest areas, and to be supported by networks of already-existing and forthcoming infrastructures including
SCTEX, the Clark International Airport and future Clark Rail from CGC to Metro Manila, the venture is positioned, like ALI’s Alviera project, to become a core node of a budding Clark-centered aero
tropolis (Lee 2015, 188).

Beyond its metropolitan-scale aspirations, CGC is envisioned
as offering nothing less than a new model of urbanism for the
Philippines. As the project’s name suggests, it will be the country’s
first full-fledged eco-city, and will integrate a plethora of sustain-
ability features such as green spaces, urban farms, green build-
ings, renewable energy, and sustainable transport into its design
and operations (BCDA 2013, 22–23). But even more momentous
has been BCDA’s attempt in planning CGC to directly foster more
inclusive forms of urban development: at full development, CGC is
foreseen to house around 800,000 workers in “slum-free” fashion,
which BCDA plans to achieve by providing affordable, decent, and
quality housing (Sun Star Pampanga 2015).6

At present, the mega-project’s master plan envisions CGC’s
development as a 50 year-long affair, though the first phase of
the development until 2019 aims to construct two industrial
zones, two mixed-use lots, a “global campus” of the University of
the Philippines, a public park district, and roadworks all within
a 1,300-hectare land area (BCDA 2014). These components of the
first phase of CGC are slated for accomplishment through several
PPP mechanisms (e.g., joint ventures), in which most of financing
and risk allocation will be borne by the private sector (Bingcang
2016).

Unrest in the Baselands: Community and LGU
Opposition, and Master-Planning Dilemmas

With CGC’s master plan having been fully approved by the
Philippine government last May 29, 2014 (Locsin 2014), it is still too
early, as of writing, to provide a detailed assessment of the project’s
impact to date. Nonetheless, considerable stumbling blocks to the
project have surfaced. Firstly, though the governance conundrums
of the Capas and Bamban LGUs have not been as pronounced as
Porac’s, CGC’s development has nevertheless created friction with
officials of these municipalities. These tensions concern how the
military base lands encompassed by CGC have been excluded from
these LGUs’ jurisdiction since 1947, which the passage of the Bases
Conversion Act in 1992 sustained (Municipality of Capas 2011, 4–8).
Accordingly, on June 9, 2014, a hearing of the Special Committee on
Bases Conversion at the Philippines’ House of Representatives
was held at the behest of Tarlac LGU officials, where various misgivings
were voiced concerning the project. Based on their testimonies,
neither the congressmen, mayors, nor governor of Tarlac prov-
vince were reportedly consulted by BCDA throughout the planning
process for CGC (House of Representatives 2014, 12, 18).

Paralleling LGU grievances has been the threat of antici-
pated displacement for townsfolk residing within CGC-spanned
areas. Though BCDA has been granted legal stewardship of the
lands comprising the whole CGC area, a considerable portion of
project lands has already been occupied by settler households,
some of whom even claim to have resided within the area since
even before the creation of the airbase. Based on local surveys,
around 500 farming families stand to be relocated if the develop-
ment proceeds—though if non-agricultural households within the
area are included, the figure rises to nearly 20,000 (Letana 2016).
Many of these same territories have also been among the ancestral
domains of indigenous Aeta tribes, whose control over the lands
has been severely disrupted since the creation of Clark airbase
during the American colonial period. While such indigenous popu-
lations have not been able to regain complete possession of their
original ancestral lands, two Certificates of Ancestral Domain Title
(CADT) have nonetheless been issued for their communities in
Capas since the 1990s: the Aeta Sambal and Abellen area (6,671
hectares) and the Aeta Mag-Antsi area (4312 hectares). Both of
these CADT areas overlap with the military reservation of Capas
(House of Representatives 2014, 16).

Finally, as revealed by BCDA informants, another quandary
faced by the project concerned the development of the CGC
master plans. Developed with a wide range of experts, the master
plan ultimately establishes the frame of the agency’s land bidding
processes with potential business partners, allowing it to evaluate
different developers based on their overall capacity to bring the
plan to fruition (Ordoñez 2015, 41–43, 51). However, while the
initial conceptual master plan for CGC was completed in 2013
by a consortium of PROS Architects and Woodfields Consultants, critical flaws were soon discerned. In particular, the most glaring weakness of the initial plan lay in miscalculations of the gross floor area (GFA) of the different land uses in the project, which had a deleterious domino effect on plans and forecasts for items like utilities, population, finance, and investment. Additionally, it was characterized by an emphasis on intensive infrastructural development and a non-compact layout for CGC districts, which would have contradicted the sustainability commitments of CGC (Letana 2016).

The Scalar Politics of Intervention: Land Settlements to International Expertise

On account of these challenges, BCDA, similar to ALI’s own efforts in Alviera, has had to engage in intensive local intervention processes. In response to LGU tensions, the authority agreed to formulating a technical working group (TWG) following the congressional hearing that has since functioned as a steering committee by decision makers located across different government levels. Chaired by Tarlac’s provincial governor, and composed of representatives from BCDA, local executives and congress persons of Tarlac, the National Housing Authority, the National Commission for Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), as well as local farmers’ and indigenous peoples’ associations, the TWG has been said to have held regular consultative meetings as a means for fostering inter-organization consensus on projects (Sun Star Pampanga, 2016).

As it appears, the success of the TWG has been borne out in the reversal of the views of Tarlac officials: from being a vocal critic of the project, the former mayor of Capas has since become one of its boosters, and was among those who attended CGC’s groundbreaking last April 11, 2016 (see fig. 5.3) (Balita 2016). Joining such officials in their active promotion of the project, moreover, was former President Aquino himself, whom some in BCDA have credited to be CGC’s “number one marketing agent” in international venues in the past administration (Bingcang 2016). Similarly, BCDA’s interventions apropos LGU’s have also extended into the creation of a long-term program of governance capacity-building in order to ensure that the broader region surrounding CGC remains as seamless as possible with the mega-project (Casanova 2016; Bingcang 2016). In 2015, for one, BCDA sponsored the attendance of the mayors and planning officers of Capas and Bamban in an urban planning training program at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore for upgrading their municipalities’ urban planning capacities.

The BCDA-created TWG, in addition, also seems to have been the venue in which responses to the land claims of populations within CGC areas have been discussed. On the end of the indigenous Aeta, the NCIP has affirmed a commitment from BCDA to first solicit the Free, Prior, and Informed Consent of any indigenous community that will be directly affected by CGC-related development processes (Sunggod 2016). At the same time, however, BCDA officials assert that the boundaries of CGC were explicitly delineated in such a way so as not to overlap with lands covered by the IP’s CADTs in the military reservation (Casanova 2016); for this purpose, the agency reportedly contracted a surveyor in November 2013, partly to segregate all CADT areas in the vicinity from the...
mega-project (BCDA 2013c). Similarly, agency officials also reveal that currently-farming households will be offered lots, technical inputs, and marketing assistance in order to participate as higher-value agricultural entrepreneurs in CGC’s urban farming district (Casanova 2016). But for those farmers who stand to be immediately displaced by ongoing construction activities, TWG-formulated guidelines allow for furnishing such households a financial sum equivalent to a decade’s worth of agriculture-based income, or roughly PHP300,000 per hectare on average (Orejas 2016).  

Even though it remains to be seen whether each of these policy directions for local populations will be sustained, their communication toward established communities within CGC areas already appears to have diffused earlier opposition by residents. Emblematic of the shift in local sentiment toward the project are the views of the local Capas Green City and Proclamation No. 163 Affected Farmers Association Inc., which from forming barricades against the entry of heavy road-construction equipment in April 2015, have reportedly become CGC supporters a year later on the basis of BCDA’s compensation packages and promised future lots for affected farmers (Orejas 2015; 2016). This shift in resistance, in turn, has effectively allowed roadwork construction processes to begin proceeding for the project (see fig. 5.4).

Lastly, shortfalls in the PROS and Woodfields master plan likewise prompted the employment of multi-level strategic responses by the agency. Following the approval of the project by former President Aquino on May 2014 (for which in-house corrections to the CGC master plan were undertaken), BCDA launched an open international competition for the optimization of the CGC conceptual master plan in mid-December 2014. More recently, BCDA inked a JV agreement with the Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport and Urban Development (JOIN) last March 2016 for crafting a more detailed CGC Master Development Plan (Letana 2016; Bingcang 2016). Not only is JOIN’s involvement in CGC’s master planning expected to assure potential locators that the mega-project will fulfill the standards of the Japanese government; the said entity has begun encouraging Japanese investors in the Philippines to locate within the CGC area, while committing to help in garnering additional infrastructure funding from the Japanese government (Bingcang 2016). By such means, BCDA has contracted additional capacities and advanced its international network embeddedness by bypassing local entities for international-level actors.

Steering the Market: Emerging Power Geometries in CGC

These interventions reveal the central importance of BCDA’s realignment of initially-unfavorable conditions across a variety of scalar terrains. Yet in achieving each of these scalar interventions, BCDA has also begun to consolidate a marked position of influence over urban governance processes in CGC-proximate areas. As a BCDA architect narrates,

The vision for the LGUs is that since we do not want Clark Green City to be an island, unlike BGC [Bonifacio Global City], we want the neighboring LGUs to grow along with Clark Green City. . . . We want these LGUs to integrate the Clark Green City development in their own plans. . . . By being a model agency, and building a model city, we plan to influence our neighboring LGUs. (Letana 2016)
While this desire to foster the capacities of CGC-adjacent LGUs has been shared among informants, another motive also has been at play: namely, isolating the project and BCDA’s business partners from political undercurrents associated with intra-state incoherence and the Philippine electoral cycle. BCDA emphasizes that a defining feature of its urban development model has involved shielding “private partners from political risks, such as those associated with changes in administration” (BCDA 2013, 5); likewise, among the agency’s responsibilities in its JV agreements for CGC are commitments to assisting developers in politicized processes such as securing all required government approvals, supporting the acquisition of required permits, and coordinating with LGUs (BCDA 2015b, 6–7). In this vein, BCDA’s interventions to strengthen LGU capacities directly contributes to the agency’s efforts to minimize political disruptions against CGC’s development. By projecting its influence over other government bodies, and working to reconfigure key aspects of their operations along its own model of technocratic governance, BCDA has installed wider institutional and relational buffers against a backdrop of personalized state dynamics which have regularly threatened investors’ needs for regulatory predictability (McKay 2006).

But if certain features of BCDA’s governance approaches are technocratic in orientation, the earlier discussion also indicates that BCDA and CGC’s institutional complexion cannot be reduced to standard neoliberal mores. Indeed, the rigor with which the agency has formulated its master plans and harnessed them in bidding procedures suggests that BCDA possesses unusually authoritative features in the landscape of Philippine state anemia, which has merited its designation by some observers as a nascent “strong state technocracy” (Cardenas 2016). BCDA officers themselves express awareness of the distinct institutional facets of the agency, noting that good parallels have existed between them and Singapore’s Urban Redevelopment Authority (Letana 2016), which have been critical in honing a balance in the city-state between developmental and neoliberal policy regimes (Haila 2015, 15, 17–18). By this view, BCDA has hybridized market-liberal mores with quasi-“strong state” components, which have enabled it to exercise relatively greater power over business in governing the production of CGC. In contradistinction to ALI’s hegemonic leadership over the Porac LGU, such institutional features of BCDA have allowed it to pool governing resources from the private sector while nevertheless co-opting their participation into realizing the formulated master plan (Ordoñez 2015, 39).

This advantaged position of BCDA can be traced to several conditions. On one hand, the 1992 Bases Conversion law furnished the authority with a purportedly “very powerful” charter, which granted BCDA monopoly-level control over all the lands that have come under its jurisdiction (Bingcang 2016). In turn, BCDA’s resulting status as a monopoly merchant of strategically-located, commercially-attractive base lands has vested BCDA with a firm initial bargaining position against the private sector (Casanova 2016). Beyond being the monopoly seller/lessor of lands in its portfolio, however, BCDA has been simultaneously capacitated by Bases Conversion Act with significant development, administrative and regulatory powers over the territories that fall under its jurisdiction, furnishing it with multiple bases with which to influence private developers beyond bidding. Though it does not always maximize such powers, BCDA nonetheless can function as an effective city government for CGC, with all the powers and capacities that are normally afforded to LGUs (Ordoñez 2015, 63; Bingcang 2016). Beyond being the monopoly seller/lessor of lands in its portfolio, however, BCDA has been simultaneously capacitated by Bases Conversion Act with significant development, administrative and regulatory powers over the territories that fall under its jurisdiction, furnishing it with multiple bases with which to influence private developers beyond bidding. Though it does not always maximize such powers, BCDA nonetheless can function as an effective city government for CGC, with all the powers and capacities that are normally afforded to LGUs (Ordoñez 2015, 63; Bingcang 2016). Finally, not to be underestimated has been the overall efficacy of BCDA’s technocratically-oriented bureaucracy, which has been undergoing systematic capacity-building efforts at both domestic and international venues, particularly in the areas of urban planning and management (Letana 2016).

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Though initially formulated in market-liberal mores, a fortuitous set of circumstances has enabled the agency to consolidate a new hybrid regime of spatial production over CGC with both market-oriented and quasi-“strong state” characteristics. Mirroring, in this sense, forms of selective government steerage of market dynamics that have been observed in East Asian developmental states like Singapore (Wade 1990, 30), such efforts by BCDA have conformed with the parameters laid down by developers’ revenue imperatives, even while seeking to bend their trajectories to other purposes. As echoed by BCDA’s president development:
Though arrived at by dramatically different means, the formation of these new urban regimes around both mega-projects demonstrates an often-overlooked reality concerning the creation of new urban spaces in the Manila MUR: in a context of immense spatial and institutional fragmentation, the production of “world-class” urban spaces has hinged upon the simultaneous production of new institutional formations, new governance gestalts, and new lattices of power able to underwrite a modicum of stability throughout the entire cycle of project implementation. Ironically, the overall effect, even when sporting divergent forms of urbanism (i.e., enclave vs. inclusive), has been a diminution of public power over nominally-democratic institutions in favor of governance regimes ultimately directed by corporate elites or state technocrats.

Power and Neoliberal Governance in a Changing Peri-Urban Landscape

Beyond their immediate locales, what do the development processes of Alviera and CGC tell us about the workings of urban governance and spatial power in the Philippines and other similar countries today? While the outcomes of the Alviera and CGC episodes have partly reaffirmed narratives concerning the weak nature of the Philippine state (Hutchcroft 1997), the salience of patrimonial elites in urban governance (Shatkin 2006; Murphy and Hogan 2012), and the deleterious impacts of neoliberal restructuring (Bello et al. 2014), other processes in both case studies are less straightforward. Can BCDA’s current position of institutional strength and its newfound commitment to “slum-free” urbanism be easily interpreted as a weak state apparatus or as an exclusionary purveyor of neoliberal-urban regimes? Likewise, while some informants speculated as to possible links between ALI’s operations and LLHI’s more coercive actions (Carranza 2016), might the firm’s reported long-term avoidance of patrimonial tactics (Batalla 1999), along with the consistent avowals of all interviewed Porac LGU officials that “Ayala is different” (Lansangan 2016; dela Cruz 2016; Tapang 2016) make it problematic to lump it together with more consistently rentierist fractions of Philippine business? Amidst such disparities, it becomes difficult to presume the cohesiveness of a single regime of neoliberalized spatial production in

BCDA is not simply a developer. We are not a market player. We are the market, actually. We set the platform for developers, infrastructure builders, utility provider, businesses to come in. We are the stage, basically. (Casanova 2016)

The Scalar Powers of Neoliberal Urbanism

Alviera and Clark Green City: these mega-projects have not only served as nascent growth poles in a broader wave of peri-urban expansion—they have come to fore as the frontiers of new constellations of power amidst Philippine neoliberal urbanism. Both ventures, after all, have hinged on intensive public-private modes of collaboration, while also harnessing a wide range of market-friendly mechanisms. Similarly, they have gained immensely from entrepreneurial pressures affecting LGUs, which has firmly incentivized local state officials to grant considerable influence to mega-project developers—to the extent, at times, of delegating to them entire urban governance functions.

Whether due to efforts to assemble governing coalitions spanning power-brokers from the highest echelons of national politics to municipal levels, to governance augmentation interventions for affected LGUs, to measures that reshuffle the scalar features of their respective institutional jurisdictions, and finally to the creation of new institutional and quasi-legal instruments, the landscapes of power within the municipalities have undergone dramatic shifts, effectively placing ALI and BCDA at the commanding heights of the local production and governance of urban space. To achieve its self-professed role as acting government in Alviera, ALI has projected hegemonic leadership over the moribund Porac LGU—leveraging upon its reputational capital as the Philippines’ premier property developer and its assembled forms of expertise to harness spontaneous appeals for assistance and/or augmentation for advancing its commercial prerogatives. In the case of CGC, the exceptionalist composition of BCDA, which has endowed it with monopoly ownership as well as administrative, regulatory, and development control over its land assets, has granted the agency tremendous leverage to serve as a de facto steerer, not only of urban governance in adjacent LGUs, but also of private sector partners.
Philippines. As it seems, a variety of actually-existing neoliberal regimes have been at play in the Philippines—sharing the employment of a continuum of market-oriented practices of spatial production, yet differing substantially as to their exact regulatory contents, development trajectories, and political imperatives.

One could even go further by contending that these subnational varieties of neoliberalism have been an outcome of neoliberal state rescaling all along. With the unravelling of nationally-standardized spatial governance frameworks, the shift toward decentralized and area-customized governance regimes that have accompanied processes of neoliberalization has also granted subnational jurisdictions, especially cities, far more incentive and flexibility to experiment with new policy and institutional arrangements, whether to shore up local economic opportunities or to pursue other policy objectives (Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 2009). Though the adoption of such entrepreneurial arrangements has tended to intensify patterns of uneven spatial development between and within cities, it has also tended to encourage diverse, place-specific forms of governance across different locations (Brenner 2004, 474), most especially among municipal governments jockeying for better competitive positions. While the variety of such subnational governance formations may be far from unlimited, it is likely that more plural currents have obtained around different urban sites and around different organizational units than has tended to be recognized in Philippine urban governance discussions.

A second insight concerns how power relations have been employed in the process of mega-project development in the Manila MUR. Indeed, both Alviera and CGC have witnessed the realignment of power networks that have obtained in their host localities, which has been embedded in new scalar gestalts of governance. Yet seen from another angle, these great transformations of scalar and institutional realities affirm the established Foucauldian precept that “power is productive” (Foucault 1978)—if with an added twist.

For power, after all, in the process of developing Alviera and CGC has been eminently productive: the power to produce urban space in the peri-urban periphery has itself produced new institutional norms and arrangements, new legal and quasi-legal instruments, new forms of expertise and relational know-how, new networks and coalitions of actors, and new institutional capacities for urban development and governance. In this vein, the exercise of power by ALI and BCDA in developing their mega-projects has generally been less about the assertion of directly repressive forms of control, and more about “gaining and fusing a capacity to act” (Stone 2015, 115) otherwise dispersed across a mélange of actors. The purveyors of power, in such a context, have instead revealed themselves to be more predisposed toward eliciting the consensual collaboration of various forces in a broader governing coalition, often by leveraging upon existing assets and incentives for cooperation, strategically adapting to relational dynamics at diverse settings, creating new knowledge, and improvising new institutional approaches toward potential allies. Among neoliberalized mega-projects, one might say, the dynamics of power themselves have become entrepreneurial.

These come with two caveats, however. On one hand, this entrepreneurialized power to convene coalitions, along with the collective capacities that they represent, still admits of hegemonic control. As ALI’s and BCDA’s influencing tendencies have shown, even in the midst of adaptation to coalitional allies and scalar settings, decision-making control over the frame of mega-project development has remained squarely among main project proponents. Whether formalized or not in a master plan or other instruments, both organizations have demonstrated that they retain veto leverage to reject disruptions to anticipated project trajectories as well as strategic policy processes. This can mainly be traced to both organizations’ possession of crucial resources (e.g., land, expertise) whose removal would effectively jeopardize the mega-projects at stake and all forms of gain (whether real or imagined) that other allies might expect from their implementation.

But if power has been productive in the development of Alviera and CGC, it has also remained profoundly territorial, having been engrossed in the management, manipulation, and policing of spatio-institutional boundaries. This has been borne out in the varieties of spatial politics involved in the mega-projects: similar to elsewhere, the reshuffling of scalar formations that has accompanied these ventures has been instrumental in rendering the
territorial lines of authority far more "porous, unstable, and prone to transgressions and transformations" (Swyngedouw 2000, 68), giving rise to ambiguous institutional boundaries between nominally-public and non-democratic forms of urban governance. Yet in the case of both projects, such institutional porosity has hardly translated into a free flow of governance influence: though ALI and BCDA differ on the formation of spatial enclaves, the confluence of both organizations on the need to shield project processes from political risks and the commensurate need to shoulder paltry LGU activities, alludes to the heightened importance of managing institutional boundary-setting dynamics that have prevailed in both projects' relations with established government units. To the entrepreneurial power of assembling governance capacities is welded the police power to territorially exclude a spectrum of undesired forces within the Philippines' fragmented universe of urban governance.

No doubt, it can be argued that the use of these institutional boundary-setting practices has been an integral part of both Alviera and CGC's aims to produce spaces that deliver upon the preferences of global investors, modernized fractions of Philippine business, and prospective clientele from the middle-class upwards, who have all been documented to be predisposed to more programmatic forms of governance (McKay 2006; Hutchcroft 1998). But more importantly, the use of this territorial power in both projects has foregrounded an expanding domain of political and regulatory activity in which the production of prime urban space has become intertwined with the creation and policing of institutional territories. Distinct, if still linked, from the creation of spatial enclaves, this rapprochement has hardly been a foregone conclusion: ultimately, it has hinged on the accumulation of "transversal bordering capabilities" (Sassen 2013, 69) and their deployment to exclude disruptive processes from the institutional geographies of re-scaled governance formations.

Viewed before these trends, the emerging mega-projects investigated in this chapter become even more remarkable. Not only have these mega-projects been among the largest and most ambitious of their kind in the Philippines today; not only have they been at the heart of contemporary efforts to inject new strands of urbanism; not even have they been the beachheads of perhaps the most ambitious wave of city-building to have swept the country since the aftermath of World War II. In truth, their development provides a privileged panorama for discerning finer shifts in the fragmented landscapes of governance, and indeed, the birth and expansion—out from the ashes of neoliberal adjustment—of a cornucopia of new regulatory orders and scale-manipulating instruments for creating and maintaining them. How will these new governance gestalts develop in the years to come, both in themselves and with one another? And what relationships will they come to establish with nominally-democratic governing orders whose jurisdictional authority they have subtly yet indelibly reconfigured—if not already displaced? The eventual responses to these questions will prove to be of historic importance not just to the maneuverings of state and capital in neoliberalized contexts, but also to the prospects of still-struggling, still-evolving movements of non-elite forces to claim universal and democratic rights to the city.

Endnotes
1. The material for this chapter was originally written in mid-2016, prior to the election of the present administration of Rodrigo Duterte. Circumstances since then have prompted some outward changes in the two mega-projects being studied—particularly with the rebranding of Clark Green City as “New Clark City.” Despite such developments, there is little reason to believe that the fundamental governance dynamics discussed in this chapter have altered in the period since then up to the time of writing.
2. Other signal features of market-friendly urban governance were adopted by means of national legislation over the years. In 1992, major responsibilities for socialized housing were ceded over to the private sector with the passage of the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA), even as networked, public-private forms of urban infrastructural development were enabled through the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Act of 1990, and its amendment in 1993 (Bello et al. 2014, 92–96, 203).
3. Porac is the municipality with the largest land area in Pampanga province, most of which has been dedicated to forest reserve (45.50 percent), lahar (26.73 percent) and agricultural (22.89 percent) uses (Municipal Government of Porac 2016, 2, 27, 29). Lahar areas stand out prominently as the town was one of the most devastated in the CL region by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991 (Municipal Government of Porac 2016, 1).
4. According to the Index, Economic Dynamism covers data mainly related to business registration, employment, and financial institutions; Government
Efficiency to transparency and accountability, public finance, performance recognition, business responsiveness, and basic government services; and infrastructure to road network, basic utilities, and registered vehicles (National Competitiveness Council 2014).

5. Even while professing reserve at the prospect of establishing new PPPs within Porac, for instance, the town’s municipal planner still justified appealing to ALI’s help in formulating the municipality’s development plans on the following basis: “Right now we’re already talking that we need their help because their development, they’re the ones who know how to do it. . . . If only they could sponsor it, they could help us with our Comprehensive Development Plan because they’ll be the center of development. . . . If Porac can possibly become a city, if Porac really progresses, if their development is realized, it’s only then that we will be given a chance for Porac to be uplifted.” (Lansangan 2016 trans.)

6. Tellingly, one of the very first CGC initiatives being undertaken has entailed the construction of 2,000 units of affordable rental housing across 279 hectares of land for approximately 85,000 minimum wage earners, as part of a partnership between BCDA and the Philippines’ Home Development Mutual Fund (Remo 2015).

7. On the other hand, while BCDA’s guidelines for non-farming residents were still being finalized as of writing, the authority’s agreement in the TWG has been not to relocate any resident that had been dwelling in the area by the time that BCDA conducted a household census in 2013 (Casanova 2016).

8. The winner of the competition—the Singaporean branch of world-leading design firm AECOM—was selected on the basis of its flexible, more comprehensive incorporation of a PEZA zone in Alviera are particularly symbolic of this.

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HAVING TRAVELLED WITH EASE across the different countries of nineteenth-century Europe, José Rizal experiences “el demonio de las comparaciones” upon his return to Manila. This “demon” no longer allows him to see Manila without constantly being reminded of the cities in Europe. This “demon of comparison” created a form of double-consciousness, such that Rizal could not help but experience the rising German capital Berlin without simultaneously thinking of then provincial Manila and vice versa. His perspective on Manila had changed. It is this story that serves as the title of Benedict Anderson’s essay collection on Southeast Asia, *The Spectre of Comparisons*. It is this epistemological vantage point that allowed Rizal to judge Spain’s backwardness from the perspective of more progressive European nations in the way the Spaniards judged the Filipinos (B. Anderson 1998, 229). 

Thinking about public spaces and writing about the city of Manila cannot be disentangled from that epistemological vantage point. Not only nations are imagined communities—to refer to Benedict Anderson’s famous phrase—cities are, too. Talking about cities is thus largely shaped by our own experience and imagination.

This essay deals with the political significance of the urban landscape of Manila. Key to this analysis is how the notion of the “public” plays out with respect to the polarity of private and public. The shape of the public is an index of the democratic organization of any larger community; without a public, an essential aspect