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PARTY-MOVEMENT INTERACTIONS IN A CONTESTED DEMOCRACY

The Philippine Experience

Arjan Aguirre

Introduction

Party-movement interactions with its role in democratization involve the presence of political actors whose actions and even inactions affect the overall institutions, processes, and outcomes of democracy. Its history goes back to the very dawn of modern parliamentary politics in England when both the factions in the English parliament and middle-class movements fought over civil liberty issues—involving the free speech of John Wilkes and religious freedom of Roman Catholics, among others (Tilly and Tarrow 2015; Tilly 2004; Tilly 1981). Parties were eventually created as an internal response to the institution of power—the parliament or the legislature, with the changing environment brought by the electoral reforms of 1832, 1867, and 1884, to organize political resources, including existing factions and organizations that are needed to stay in power (Scarrow 2006; Lapalombra and Weiner 1966). This same impetus was seen with the emergence of the political parties in the fledgling government of the United States, where the intense factionalization was formally transformed into a more organized and disciplined body of legislators having the same stands on issues and pushing for a shared set of beliefs, agenda, and priorities in the government (Crotty 2006).

In most consolidated democracies, parties and movements are responsible for activating or disengaging the interplay between policy directives and issue articulations that affect either the development or decay of democracy (Tilly 1978). Social movements often produce or shape democratization through policy initiatives, reforms, regime change, and revolution (Markoff 1996; Coy 2001; Tilly 2004; Della Porta 2013). On the other hand, political parties are typically understood as an institution that organizes formal democratic politics—articulating issues, mobilizing support, responding to voters, and representing cleavages, among others (Gunther and Diamond 2003; Stokes 1999; Cox 1997; Lapalombra and Weiner 1966).

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While these different roles seem too easy to recognize in most democratic societies, this distinction becomes "fuzzy and permeable" as new opportunities and openings to intervene appear to both parties and movements (Kriesi 2015; Kitschelt 2006; Goldstone 2003; Dalton 1995; Maguire 1995). As recent studies show, parties and movements can be both a bane and a boon to democracy. This enigmatic relationship has been used to radicalize mainstream politics with the emergence and growth of far-right movements masquerading as parties (Pirro and Gattinara 2018). Opposition parties also utilized it to increase their chances of defeating the incumbent party (Maguire 1995). This has also innovated political engagements due to the growing political base of new social movements, such as environmental movements that produced Green parties and coalesced with big parties, among other things (Dalton 1995).

In other societies, though, this understanding seems inadequate to capture the complex relationship between parties and movements whose interests, motivations, and choices are constantly shaped in contexts and histories that are contested and negotiated. As discussed in the first chapter of the book (See Teehankee, Padit, and Park, 2023), "democracies against the odds" tells us of a phenomenon where democratic resiliency is not associated with their economic performance (Bermeo and Yashar 2016). In the Asian region, many countries have shown positive signs of enduring democratic institutions and practices despite numerous economic shocks, political crises, and other social disruptions. Societies with long experience mobilizing the populace during their struggles against their colonizers and unresolved historical legacies that continue to shape their political structures, issues, and identities have succeeded in remaining democratic, notwithstanding numerous fluctuations and brief interruptions through the years.

Considered one of the oldest democracies in the Asian region, the Philippines has had some of the most bizarre combinations of qualities, attributes, and conditions that have shaped her democratic experience since the beginning of the twentieth century. Its first experience of democratic practice in the 1900s was designed and configured to appease and tame the political interests and excesses of the Filipino elites—from local to national (Hutchcroft 2019; Hicken 2014; Teehankee 2012a, 2012b, Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003). The two-party system during the post-war era is nothing but an extension of this open and regular contestation for power and dominance between elite factions and dynasties belonging to the *Nacionalista Party* (established 1907) and the *Liberal Party* (established 1946) (Teehankee 2012b; Teehankee 2002; Wurfel 1988). From 1972 to 1986, the one-party/military rule of the late dictator, Ferdinand Marcos, in the 1970s gave a brief interregnum to this pattern and paved the way for the emergence of the political "machines" that changed the acquisition and utilization of political resources, no longer dominated by traditional families or dynasties (Teehankee 2012b; Machado 1974). The multiparty system that is currently used since the restoration of democracy in 1986, however, only saw the return of elite-based clientelistic party politics with some variations due to political "machines" and "marketing" campaigning (Aspinall and Hicken 2020; Teehankee 2010; Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003).

Alongside these parties are movements whose history and traditions go way back to the Spanish era with the emergence of movements such as the Katipunan or the *Kataastaasan, Kagalanggalang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan* (The Supreme and Honorable Association of the Children of the Nation) that mobilized against the abuses of the Spanish authorities (Ileto 1979); *Sakdalista* (Accusers) that with their uprising during the American colonial era (Terami-Wada 2014); and Hukbalahap or *Hukbong Bayan laban sa Hapon* (People's Army against the Japanese) during the time of the Japanese occupation and reconstruction era (Kerkvliet 2002). In contrast with the elite-based parties, most of these movements are inherently mass-based and mostly left-wing in orientation. Other movements appeared later, having different agendas: free election movements such as National Citizen's Movement for Free Elections or NAMFREL and the anti-Marcos movements such as the *Lakas ng Bayan* (LABAN or Peoples Power (Hedman 2006; Thompson 1995).

These parties and movements were present in some of the most crucial moments in Philippine history. On the one hand, parties are a political means to get into power during local and national elections and a conventional way of engaging policy-making and running the government at the local and national levels. On the other hand, movements have been the impetus of the struggle for independence, especially during the latter part of the Spanish colonial rule; became an organized guerilla force against the Japanese forces; mass organizations for the peasants during the crucial years of the aftermath of the Second World War; a vocal critic of western imperialism and called for the protection of the nation's interest in the late 1960s up to the early 1970s; and later on, a plethora of civil society groups, cause-oriented, and church-based movements mobilized during the authoritarian rule of Marcos, among others (Abinales and Amoroso 2017). With the new spaces and moments for political interaction brought about by the restoration of democracy in 1986, both parties and movements in the Philippines have struggled together and against each other in realizing their short-term and long-term political goals. Through this period, powerful dynasties, with their populist tendencies, patronage politics, and cartel parties, among others, continued consolidating their control of the institutions of power in Philippine society. This unfolded in the presence of weakened opposition party politics, passive movement mobilizations, and widespread political disinformation.

In those critical moments, it would be interesting to know how parties and movements interacted as a product or perhaps a cause of the fluctuations, shifts, and changes in the larger scheme of things in Philippine democracy. It would be equally worth exploring what types of interaction tend to produce conditions that may or may not facilitate the stability and persistence of democracy in the Philippines.

This chapter focuses on these party-movement interactions to understand how parties and movements facilitate democratization in developing societies. This focus on the role of parties and movements in democratization is an interesting area to explore, especially in understanding the puzzle involving developing societies and their positive democratic performance. This chapter will have a closer look at this phenomenon by investigating how parties and movements facilitate democratization

in a developing society with their emergence, dynamics, and outcomes. In particular, it will look at how parties engage movements during those crucial moments that shape democratic institutions and practices in a particular society.

Looking at the Philippine case, it seeks to understand how party-movement interactions—their emergence, dynamics, contexts, histories, and outcomes—shaped the trajectory or set the pace of democratization in almost four decades: from the restoration of democracy in 1986 up to the populist inversion of Philippine democracy that began in 2016. With its long history of democratic practice and rich tradition of civil society and social movements, it is vital to know why it has yet to democratize fully. Also, it would be equally interesting to understand how parties engage social movements in democratizing Philippine society. Most importantly, it seeks to know how and in what ways this interaction has contributed to democratic resilience in the Philippines.

The discussion below begins with a brief discussion of the "party-movement interaction" framework, "Contentious Political Interaction," used in this study. Second, the discussion of the Philippine case covers a brief background of its party politics and democratic practice, contentious politics, and democratic outcomes since 1986—the year of the nonviolent revolution that ended the rule of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos. Third, the framework is further elaborated against the backdrop of the Philippine case. The chapter concludes with a claim that the democratic outcomes which reveal democratic resiliency in the Philippines can be explained by the variegated engagements between parties and movements. It claims that despite moments of contestation and cooptation, parties-movements have been seen to cooperate in various instances to help democracy to thrive.

Party-Movement Interaction Framework: "Contentious Political Interaction"

Borrowing the theory of "Contentious politics" from Tilly and Tarrow (2015), the interaction between parties and movements can be seen as similar to the "interactions in which actors make claims bearing on other actors' interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties." This study uses this theory to make sense of the interaction between parties and movements—calling this "Contentious political interaction." Contentious political interaction has the following features: *contention* or the act of making claims that bear on someone else's standing or interest; *collective action* or the coordinated ways of engaging other entities on behalf of shared interests and programs; and *politics* or the presence of the entities of power (Tilly and Tarrow 2015) (see Figure 7.1). The concept of "political parties" is defined as an organized body that could influence public opinion, communicate social demands to the government, articulate a sense of belongingness or community, and act as a form of political recruitment in society (Lapalombra and Weiner 1966). "Social movement" here is understood as the presence and combination of sustained campaigns of claim-making; arrays of public



FIGURE 7.1 Contentious Politics.
Source: Adopted from Tilly and Tarrow (2015).

political performances (like protests, petitions, lobbying, and the like); repeated displays of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment; and their sustainability through their organization, resources, solidarities, among others (Tilly and Tarrow 2015; Tarrow 2011; Tilly 1981).

Apart from the features of collective action, contention, and politics, the contentious political interaction between parties and movements has the following specific elements. First, the political outcome in this interaction is assumed as an offshoot of a *relational process* involving parties and movements in the initiation, alteration, deliberation, execution of bills, laws, policies, regulations (Goldstone 2003). This means that the action of an actor is understood to be constantly connected to the other actors engaged in a contentious situation. Second, the participants of this process are *rational actors* having dispositions and interests that come from the nature of their organization and function in the political arena—parties for conventional politicking and movements for challenging the status quo (Tilly 1981). This speaks of the ability of the actors to weigh in on their decisions and choose the best option for their desired outcome. Last, the interaction is *reactional* to the opportunities that may appear in a context or situation (McAdam and Tarrow 2019; Hutter, Kriesi, and Lorenzi 2019). This talks about the contingent nature of the space of relation between parties and movements—where the available resources to be deployed depend on what is provided by the present moment.

In interpreting this contentious political interaction in the Philippine context, the study revisited the Gramscian framework Hedman (2006) used in understanding the mobilization of pro-democracy movements in the Philippines in 1953, 1969, and 1986, and 2001. In her work, she identified crises of hegemony and authority as the main catalysts for the mobilization of movements such as the National Movement for Free Elections in 1953, the Citizens' National Electoral Assembly in 1969, the National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections, and the anti-Estrada movement in 2001 to mobilize civil society to counter any threat—from

the excesses of power of political leaders—against their dominance in the society (Hedman 2006). This framework is useful in understanding the mobilization of movements, especially those that embody the qualities of being in the "dominant bloc" and its interaction with parties that aim to advance the cause of "defending" the democratic gains from 1986.

The chapter also reconsidered the framework used by Quimpo (2008), "contested democracy," to understand, this time, how left movements behave in the post-authoritarian era. In his work, he highlighted how movements and parties from the left were mobilized as a counterforce to the dynastic and clientelistic politics of the powerful sectors of Philippine society. By using this framework, the study assumes that as elite parties continue to ignore the plight of the general public and maintain their hold on power in the government through electoral means, the participation of the left parties and movements in conventional politics is aimed at "deepening" democracy by creating openings for making it more participatory and egalitarian (Quimpo 2008).

The framework, therefore, assumes that contentious political interaction comes from above (liberal democratic civil society groups and their allies with the moderate left) when movements mobilize to protect the gains and democracy by "defending" them and from below (moderate left and radical left) where movements also mobilize to cause democratic "deepening." This characterization of party-movement interaction source, whether above or below, speaks of how party-movement interaction can make an impact on the democratization process in the Philippines: the "defending democracy" of the liberal democratic movements and its moderate left allies is aimed at preserving the institutions, values, and principles of liberal democratic practice; the "democratic deepening" of the progressive, moderate left and the radical left is aimed at introducing radical changes that aim to make Philippine democracy more social—egalitarian, participatory, and the like.

Therefore, contentious political interaction is assumed to manifest in three ways (Hutter, Kriesi, and Lorenzi 2019):

a) *cooptation* or the taking over of a weaker entity intended for a new purpose;
b) *cooperation* or the working together of two actors to achieve a common goal;
c) *contestation* or the situation when actors openly go against each other.

These types of contentious political interaction are influenced by the context or environment that involves a heightened interaction between actors in a particular moment. In this situation, actors mobilize their collective action and articulate their contention vis-à-vis entities and institutions of power. In this framework, the concept of a *cycle of contention* is helpful to highlight the emergence of a struggle or contentious situation that activates the features of contentious politics (collective action, contention, and politics), intensification of forms of collective action (campaigns, protests, etc.), articulation of contention (differing claims on a particular object of contention), and contestation over power (targeting institutions, influencing processes, etc.) (Tilly and Tarrow 2015).

In investigating this phenomenon in the Philippines, the study used archival research and the existing literature to rediscover anecdotes about how parties and movements have behaved and facilitated political outcomes since 1986. With the use of process tracing and historical institutionalism, it examined this contentious political interaction by identifying and making sense of those moments, instances, and historical junctures that reveal how parties have become instrumental in the democratization of the Philippines.

Parties and Movements in the Philippines

Since the return of democracy in 1986, the interaction between parties and movements vis-à-vis democratization in the Philippines has always been characterized by an intense, protracted, episodic, and unbalanced power struggle that usually favored the stabilization of elite rule (Hickens 2014; Hedman 2006). Parties in the Philippines are predominantly well-entrenched in the institutions of power, dominating and controlling the process and outcomes of the government and all of its instrumentalities. They organize their resources during elections and mobilize their ranks to constitute a government. Philippine movements, on the other hand, usually operate outside the space of power, challenging and disrupting the political space and its institutions by mobilizing the people on issues that concern their interests.

The privileged position to the power of parties in the Philippines can be explained by their development—its long years of being captured by powerful dynasties (Tadem and Tadem 2016; Teehankee 2018). Despite the entry of mass-based parties, dynasties, and their machines have continued to rule over elective posts in the Philippines—with more than 70 percent of the members of the House of Representatives coming from well-known dynasties (Tadem and Tadem 2016; Mendoza et al. 2012). While seen as an offshoot of the extant familial, factional, and clientelist relations (Teehankee 2012a; Teehankee 2009; Kerkvliet 1995; Lande 1965, 1968), these parties continued to evolve that allowed them to effectively capture some of the democratic institutions and processes in the Philippines. Through time, the Philippine state created institutions and practices that inhibit parties from converting social cleavages to their viable political forms: excessive powers of the executive office, exclusion of the left, and weak internal party organization (Manacsa and Tan 2005).

Second, this advantage of parties in Philippine politics can also be understood by looking at how parties have been organized since 1986. Since the return of democracy in 1986, parties in the Philippines have continued to evolve and harnessed their ability to offer an effective and organized yet "transient" means for actors to win a seat in the government (Manacsa and Tan 2005; Machado 1974). As a real political "machine," they continue to specialize their operations, expand their networks, and incorporate new actors and practices that enable them to become a full-fledged electoral organization that coordinates the mobilization of the resources of a political actor (Machado 1974). This new tendency allowed elite factions to further their oligarchic rule with the

widespread exploitation of state institutions, bureaucracies, and practices to gain more wealth and power (Hutchcroft 1998). This dominance can also be explained by the dearth of alternative actors and institutions for people to direct their grievances, interests, or issues and represent them in the government (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003). For some authors, this predatory tendency was also seen in the effective and politicized appropriation and deployment of state coercion and physical violence by "bosses" to further solidify their rule and control in a locality (Kreuzer 2009; Sidel 1989).

Traditional Political Parties

With no real resources to cling to, contemporary parties also tend to depend on personalities or external forces with the wherewithal to run the party. This has created structurally deficient and institutionally superficial party organizational structures that undermine party discipline, weaken recruitment system, among others. As these "trapo" (short for "traditional politics") parties serve the interest of their ruling elites, they participate in the larger scheme of patrimonial and predatory relations. Parties organize and mobilize their resources through these political alliances forged out of survival and having a share in the government (Quimpo 2007). Consequently, desperate politicians to persist and stay in power are usually forced to bolt their parties and switch to the ruling party. This inability to enforce party discipline and the allure of power have eventually contributed to the prevalence of party-switching in Philippine politics.

In connection with this, another way to make sense of the dominant position of parties in Philippine politics is regarding party performance. While there is no real party contestation in the institutions (e.g., legislative, executive, etc.) and practices (e.g., elections, issue articulations, etc.) of power in the Philippines, real political power is often seen in the government as monolithic parties more often than not tend to dominate the political space and smother opposing parties. This tendency to gravitate toward the ruling coalition can be explained by how the political structure and institutions of power in the Philippines were designed to allow the sitting government to have unbridled power to dispose of many political resources (Kasuya 2009). With this concentration of powers at the hands of the ruling party, opposition parties usually become marginal and almost not nonexistent. They are usually obliterated and decimated because of the accumulation of "pork barrel" among allies, widespread party-switching, weak representation, or lack of portfolios in the government, among others.

In the past 11 major elections since 1987, monolithic parties have emerged together with the election of a new sitting president (see Table 7.1). The incumbency of Fidel V. Ramos (with *Lakas-Kampi Christian Muslim Democrats* or LKC in the coalition), Joseph Estrada (with *Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino* or LDP and Nationalist People's Coalition or NPC in the coalition), Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (LKC and Kampi in the coalition), Benigno Aquino III (with the *Liberal Party* or LP in the coalition), Rodrigo Duterte (with *Partido Demokratiko Pilipino – Lakas ng Bayan* or PDP Laban in the coalition), and Ferdinand Marcos Jr. (with Partido Federal ng Pilipinas,

TABLE 7.1 Percentage of Votes/Seats of Major Parties in the House, Philippines, 1992–2022

	1992	*1995*	*1998*	*2001*	*2004*	*2007*	*2010*	*2013*	*2016*	*2019*	*2022*
Turnout (%)	75.7	70.7	81.3	76.3	84.1	65.5	74.3	75.77	80.69	74.31	83.07
Pres. Votes Share (%)											
Ramos	23.6										
Estrada			39.9								
Arroyo					39.9						
Aquino							42.1				
Duterte									39.01		
Marcos, Jr.											58.77
Party Share in House % (% of votes)											
LKC	20.1 (21.2)	49.0 (49.0)	53.9 (49)	35.6 (35)	44.3 (35.3)	38.0 (25.5)	37.1 (38.5)	4.8 (5.3)	1.54 (1.3)	3.9 (5.11)	8.2 (9.39)
LDP	66.7 (45.0)	8.3 (10.8)	27.0 (26.7)	10.2 (10)	5.2 (7.6)	1.3 (1.5)	0.7 (0.5)	.7 (.33)	.67 (.30)	.65 (.62)	.31 (.78)
NPC	15.1 (18.7)	10.8 (12.2)	4.4 (4.1)	19.5 (21)	25.2 (19.6)	11.6 (10.9)	10.8 (15.3)	14.3 (17.08)	14.1 (17.04)	12.17 (14.3)	11.07 (11.7)
LP	4.2 (6.9)	2.5 (1.9)	7.3 (7.3)	9.2 (7)	13.8 (11)	6.6 (8.7)	15.8 (20.3)	37.5 (37.2)	38.7 (41.7)	5.9 (5.7)	3.16 (3.7)
NP	3.5 (3.9)	1.0 (0.8)			1.0 (0.5)	3.3 (1.5)	9.0 (11.4)	6.1 (8.41)	8.08 (9.42)	13.81 (16.1)	11.39(13.7)
PDP-LABAN					(0.1)	1.9	.69 (.72)	(1.02)	1.01 (1.9)	26.9 (31.2)	20.88 (22.7)

Source: Taken from Teehankee 2012a; Commission on Elections.

Nacionalista Party and LKC in the coalition) saw the concentration of support to the monolithic party of the sitting president in the House of Representatives. The emergence of a monolithic party usually comes from the change of party affiliation of most house members, which usually takes place during the early years of the new administration (Teehankee 2012a).

The disruptive nature of social movements in the Philippines since 1986 can be explained by their emergence, mobilizations, and outcomes. Considering their emergence, one can easily notice the strong connection of contemporary movements with their particular ideological orientations. Coming from the anti-dictatorship struggle of 1972–1986, there are two main strands of democratic movements that evolved since 1986—the moderate strand, which is composed of the liberal democratic movements (libdems), and social democratic/democratic socialists movements (socdems/demsocs) from the moderate left; the radical strand that is dominated by the national democratic movements (natdems) who are affiliated with the underground Communist Party of the Philippines (Thompson 1995). These movements, especially the moderate left and radical left, were formed and later expanded by their strong adherence and commitment to an ideology or set of ideas or beliefs that continue to help them make sense of political issues, offer programs of action, inform people of their roles, among others. Coming from the socialist ideology, the moderate movements opted to follow the social democratic/democratic socialist traditions, while the radical movements chose to subscribe to the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist tradition (Tolosa 2012; Quimpo 2018, 2008).

This strong ideological commitment has allowed these movements to effectively mobilize sectors in society by becoming an alternative locus for ordinary people, who for the longest time have been constantly excluded in Philippine politics due to the dominance of dynasties and their elite-based parties, to advance their causes and demand change in the society. Taking off from being an armed organization against the Japanese forces during the Second World War, the *Hukbalahap* during the time of the Japanese occupation and reconstruction era, later on, was reorganized and became a leading armed peasant movement, *Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan* (HMB) that adopted the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the *Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas* (PKP) (est. 1930) to engage the fledgling Philippine government in their agrarian struggle in Central Luzon (Quimpo 2008; Kerkvliet 2002). The story of the social democratic movements in the Philippines, on the other hand, is closely connected to organizations and formations that promote the Catholic social teaching and champion principles of social justice, protection of laborers and the marginalized, and so on—Social Justice Crusade in the 1930s, Institute of Social Order, Federation of Free Workers and Federation of Free Farmers in the 1950s (Tolosa 2012). These groups helped organize laborers, fisherfolk, and the urban poor, among others, in airing their grievances and pushing for societal reform.

Newer ideological movements were mobilized as a response to cater to the new cleavages and the growing dissatisfaction of the masses, peasants, youth, women, and laborers, among others, toward the Philippine state. From the radical left, a new communist party, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), was established

TABLE 7.2 Major Left Movements and Parties in the Philippines in the 2010s

RADICAL LEFT						*MODERATE LEFT*	
Ideology	*Communism (National Democracy) (Marxism-Leninism-Maoism)*	*Communism (Marxism-Leninism)*		*Communism (Marxism-Leninism)*	*Communism (Marxism-Leninism)*	*Democratic Socialists (mixed ND, SD, DS, Independent Socialists)*	*Social Democrats*
Party	CPP (1968 from PKP)	RWP-P (1995 from CPP)	RWP-M (2001 from RWP-P)	PKP (1930)	Partido ng Manggagawang Pilipino (2002, split from CPP in 1995) Partido ng Lakas ng Masa (established in 2009)	AKBAYAN (1998)	PDSP (1973)
Armed wing	NPA	RPA-ABB	RPA-M	–	–	–	–
Movements	BAYAN, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Kabataang Makabayan, Kilusang Mambubukid ng Pilipinas, League of Filipino Students, Migrante, etc.				Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino, Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Tagalungsod, etc.	Popular Democrats, Bisig, Pandayan, Siglaya, Alliance of Progressive Labor, Confederation of Independent Unions, etc.	

(*Continued*)

TABLE 7.2 (Continued)

RADICAL LEFT						*MODERATE LEFT*	
Ideology	*Communism (National Democracy) (Marxism-Leninism-Maoism)*	*Communism (Marxism-Leninism)*		*Communism (Marxism-Leninism)*	*Communism (Marxism-Leninism)*	*Democratic Socialists (mixed ND, SD, DS, Independent Socialists)*	*Social Democrats*
Party-list	Bayan Muna, Gabriella, Anakpawis, Kabataan Partylist, Act Teacher	Alab Katipunan	Anak-Mindanao		Partido ng Manggagawa[a], Sanlakas	Akbayan Partylist	

ACRONYMS (RWP-P—Revolutionary Workers' Party-Philippines and its armed wing, RPA-ABB—Revolutionary Proletariat Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade / RWP-M—Revolutionary Workers' Party - Mindanao and its armed wing, RPA-M—Revolutionary People's Army-Mindanao)
Source: Quimpo 2018; 2008.
[a] Partido ng Manggagawa (PM) became an independent party in 2007. This is different from the Partido ng Manggagawa ng Pilipino (PMP) established in 2002.

in 1968 using the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist orientation and later on absorbed the disgruntled members of the old HMB to form the New People's Army (NPA) (Weekley 2001). This underground movement was responsible for mobilizing peasants, students, workers, and so on, during the early years of Marcos' dictatorship or "First Quarter Storm" of 1970 through armed guerilla tactics, militant politics, and so on (Weekley 2001). From the moderate left, the 1970s also saw the rise of social democratic/democratic socialist movements such as the *Kapulungan ng Sandigan ng Pilipinas* (KASAPI), *Lakas ng Diwang Kayumanggi* (LAKASDIWA), *Hasik Kalayaan*, and *Kilusan ng mga Anak ng Kalayaan*, to mobilize groups from the peasants, urban poor, youth, laborers, and so on, using pressure politics and reformist electoral politics under the social democratic and democratic socialist ideologies (Tolosa 2012). In parallel with CPP-NPA armed struggle, some of these moderate left movements even adopted urban insurrection and armed resistance to intensify their opposition against the military rule of Marcos—*April Six Liberation movement* and the *Partido Demokratiko Sosyalista ng Pilipinas* (PDSP) (Tolosa 2012; Thompson 1995).

Another way of explaining the disruptive ability of movements in the post-authoritarian era is their outcomes. In 1986, the ouster of Marcos was a clear testament to how powerful the movements in the Philippines were in terms of their ability to mobilize and achieve their goal. During the 1986 revolution at Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA), or popularly known as "EDSA 1986," the thousands of people who participated in the four-day stand-off from 22 to 25 of February were mostly instigated and led by known activists and street-parliamentarians who have adopted and promoted the principles of active nonviolence since the assassination of the leading opposition to Marcos, Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. in 1983 (Tolosa 2012; Nebres, Karaos and Habana 2010; Aguirre 2010). These people who first responded to the call of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, Jaime Cardinal Sin, to protect the rebelling military officers at Camp Crame (along EDSA) were previously trained from 1983 to 1985 in active nonviolence seminars/workshops initiated by the transnational pacifist movement, International Fellowship of Reconciliation's representatives Jean Goss and Hildegard Goss-Mayr, at the behest of some Church officials, priests from the Society of Jesus, and other religious personalities (Aguirre 2010; Zunes 1999). Members of social democratic movements who are also closely working with institutions or groups aligned with the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy in the Philippines were able to attend seminars and workshops on nonviolence and, later on, organized their own seminars/workshops, like the pacifist movement, *Aksyon para sa Kapayapaan at Katarangunan* (AKKAPKA), for their communities leading to EDSA 1986 (Aguirre 2010; Moreno 2006).

Within the radical left, the aftermath of EDSA 1986 caused major rethinking and debates within the CPP and its affiliated movements (Quimpo 2018, 2008; Rocamora 1994). The major split in the party took place in 1992–1993, which led to the emergence of the "rejectionist" and "reaffirmist" camps—the latter committed itself to the Maoist line of revolutionary trajectory while the former refused to subscribe to such ideological reconfiguring and pushes for a more democratic and electoral engagement in the post-authoritarian era (Quimpo 2018, 2008; Rocamora

TABLE 7.3 Philippine Party-List Elections: 1998–2022

Partylist Elections	*No. of Available Seats*	*No. of Won Seats*	*No. of Winning Party Lists*	*No. of Contesting Party Lists*
1998	52	14	13	122
2001	52	20	12	46
2004	53	24	16	66
2007	55	23	17	92
2010	57	41	31	150
2013	59	59	43	136
2016	59	59	46	116
2019	61	61	51	134
2022	62	62	55	166
Averages:	56.6	40.3	31.5	114.2

Source: Taken from Teehankee 2019 and Muga 2011.

1994). The split paved the way for new parties and movements, which later participated in the electoral contest for the party list system in 1998 (See Table 7.3). Since 1998, both the rejectionist and reaffirmist radical left movements and parties have been participating in the party-list elections by organizing party-list organizations aligned to their ideological cause (see Table 7.2) (Kuhonta 2016; Quimpo 2008).

Contentious Political Interaction in the Philippines

The investigation of contentious political interaction in the Philippines covers cycles of contention that emerged during the a) the restoration of democracy in 1986; b) the overthrow of President Estrada of 2001; c) regime stability under the Arroyo presidency; d) the Second Aquino presidency, e) populist resurgence under Duterte, and f) majority election of Marcos, Jr. These periods entail the existence of critical issues that mobilized both the parties and movements to engage each other (*relational element*). Also, they involve the presence of interests, motivations, and dispositions of these parties and movements toward those issues that inform their decisions and actions (*rational element*). Last, these periods saw differing responses from parties and movements anchored to the situation or context (*reactional element*). Each of these moments also saw three types of interaction: *cooptation*, or the taking over of a weaker entity intended for a new purpose; *cooperation*, or the working together of two actors to achieve a common goal; *contestation*, or the situation when actors openly go against each other. Last, to further understand these types of interaction, the discussion will also highlight the type of source of this interaction: "from above" or "from below." With this understanding of the source, the interaction is assumed to impact democratization either by "defending" or "deepening" it.

During the *restoration of democracy in 1986*, the anti-Marcos movements and the opposition parties against the Marcos regime worked together to restore democratic institutions and practices. This was seen in the establishment of the revolutionary

government, drafting the new constitution, appointing officials at the local level, and so on. During this time, liberal democratic movements from the civil society and social democratic forces cooperated to achieve the goal of restoring Philippine democracy through the drafting and promulgating of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Most of these anti-Marcos movements activists, both from the traditional parties and moderate left movements, were eventually absorbed into the government by holding key positions in some of the important departments of the Philippine government (Tolosa 2012; Nebres, Karaos and Habana 2010; Quimpo 2008; Thompson 1995). The social democratic party and movement, PDP-LABAN, for instance, saw the rise of one of its leaders, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., to hold one of the crucial portfolios in the first Aquino government, the Department of Interior and Local Government (Thompson 1995).

This partnership can also be explained by the long alliance between the two forces, which were already in existence even during the time of Marcos regime—being part of the larger opposition coalition composed of opposition parties and movements that were mobilized in the 1978 legislative election, the 1981 presidential election, the 1984 legislative election, and the 1986 presidential snap election. In 1983–1985, this alliance was vital in promoting the active nonviolent approach, in contrast to the radical left's armed struggle approach in engaging Marcos. Also, during the numerous coup attempts against the first Aquino government, these movements remained loyal and supported the Aquino administration (Thompson 1995).

Most importantly, the cooperation between parties and movements during this period was also seen in the policy-making area, which saw the legislation of some controversial policies and measures. Progressive movements, with their allied non-government organizations and people's organizations, were able to engage the first Aquino government on the agrarian reform measure of 1988, the labor relations issue of 1989, and the urban land reform of 1992 (Borras and Franco 2010; Magadia 2003). These allied movements were crucial in giving their input and perspectives in deliberating and nuancing the policy measures being discussed in the legislature (Borras and Franco 2010; Magadia 2003). Unfortunately, though, the deliberation and legislation of these measures were generally controlled and dominated by established elite parties.

Concerning this, traditional politicians who used to be part of the old elite parties managed to infiltrate and return to power during the time of the first Aquino regime. This then led to a power struggle in the sitting party, PDP-Laban, where powerful elite figures, such as the brother of the sitting president, Jose Cojuangco as the party leader, and his allies from the newly created *Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino* (LDP), coopted the organization and the social democratic orientation within it by accommodating other elite politicians to join the party and disregard the strict and rigorous political education and training of the party (Montiel 2012). This transformation of PDP-Laban during this time saw the beginning of the end of its progressive leftist movement character. This moment of cooptation between a party and movement only shows the privileged position of parties over movements—given their resources, influence, access to power, and so on.

In 2001, the overthrow of Estrada also revealed some patterns of party-movement interaction through the cooperation of liberal democratic movements, the moderate left, and the radical left to defend democracy against a corrupt and populist leader. This cycle of contention involves the mobilization of both movements and parties against then populist president Joseph Estrada who was elected following the presidency of Fidel V. Ramos in 1992–1998. Estrada was facing an impeachment trial over allegations of corruption involving his alleged participation in illegal gambling operations in the country. From the traditional opposition, parties such as Lakas-CMD, Liberal Party, and so on, have positioned themselves against Estrada from the day the scandal was publicized up to the last moment of the impeachment trial. Movements during that time were already active in their campaign against Estrada, focusing on his misdeeds, extravagant lifestyle, and so on. During the night when the Senate, seating as an impeachment court, decided not to open the envelope that would bolster the case against Estrada, movements from the moderate left, civil society groups, Roman Catholic Church leaders, and businessmen, through Kompil II or the Congress of Free Filipinos, were quick to mobilize in the historic EDSA Shrine to call for Estrada's immediate resignation (Arugay 2004; Hedman 2006). Unlike in EDSA 1986, anti-Estrada movements were finally joined by the radical left, the national democrats, with their own network of groups, and the Erap Resign movement, calling for Estrada's resignation (Quimpo 2008; Arugay 2004).

However, not all groups who went against Estrada are the same regarding their stand and disposition about the outcome of their cause. As an instance of contestation, other radical left groups who joined the call for Estrada's resignation also clamored for the resignation of all public officials in the government. This faction, People's Action to Remove Erap, is led by the rejectionist communist PMP allied movements and parties such as the *Sanlakas*, PM, BMP, and so on (Quimpo 2008). This effort to contest the dominant framing of the issue on Estrada is ideological in nature, for it highlights and openly rejects the mere overthrow of Estrada and restoration of elitist rule with Arroyo's assumption of power (Quimpo 2008).

Going back to the partnership of civil society groups, the Roman Catholic Church, movements, and parties, the assumption to power of Arroyo also saw the same cooperation of liberal democratic movements and parties with the moderate left movements and parties that shaped the first Aquino government of 1986. Veterans of EDSA 1986 who assisted Arroyo during the second People Power in 2001 were appointed to key positions in the government—keeping the alliance of liberals and socdems intact. Once in power, however, Arroyo quickly restored the same clientelist network of politicians and dynasties in the House and strengthened her grip on the military with her renewed efforts to clamp down on communist insurgency. This became relevant throughout her term, especially with her election in 2004 for protecting herself from numerous impeachment attempts for allegedly cheating the presidential election against her closest rival, Fernando Poe, Jr., numerous scandals thrown against her involving the first gentleman, Jose Miguel Arroyo, and several coup attempts from junior military officers staged from 2003 to 2007 (Hutchcroft 2008).

Her former allies, the liberal democrats, some social democrats, and the influential Makati Business Club, among others, bolted the coalition in 2005 due to the "Hello Garci" scandal involving the discovery of a recorded phone conversation of her and an election commission official talking about the lead that she can get to win the election in 2004. This same group would later lead the opposition in resisting her attempts to change the constitution, mobilizing the public on numerous issues involving her government. In 2007 and 2010, this same group mounted national campaign efforts to engage the unpopular president and her allies.

The second Aquino administration (2010–2016) was actually an offshoot of this mobilization of movements and parties who are critical of the Arroyo administration in defending democracy. This period saw the return of the same partnership between the liberal democratic forces and moderate left movements and parties, closely resembling the first Aquino government from 1986 to 1992. Veterans of the anti-Marcos struggle and anti-Estrada movement, like Dinky Soliman, Florencio Abad, Cesar Purisima, and Teresita Deles, among others, were once again appointed by President Benigno Aquino III in the government holding the same positions that were given to them during the time of Arroyo. During the campaign, aside from the liberal democratic movements such as the Black and White movement, the Liberal party of Aquino renewed its alliance with moderate left movements and groups aligned with the *Akbayan party* (Hofileña and Go 2011). This partnership allowed the Liberal party to have direct engagements at the grassroots level, especially with the various sectors that Akbayan and its allied organizations served. The radical left decided to support the other presidential contender during the 2010 elections, Manuel Villar of the Nacionalista Party. The radical left movement and its allied party lists later became vocal critics of the policies and initiatives of the second Aquino administration.

During this era, movements and parties from the liberal democratic and moderate left were able to push their reformist agenda, which saw the passage and institutionalization of the following social protection measures or initiatives: Bottom-up-budgeting, Reproductive Health law, Sin Tax law, K-12 law, among others. However, these gains were easily sidetracked by numerous controversies that threatened to put his legacy into doubt. In 2013, for instance, when Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines, the second Aquino government was constantly criticized for its laggard and disorganized response. During his last year, his administration faced a crisis in handling the Mamasapano incident, where 44 members of the special forces elite group, Special Action Force (SAF) of the Philippine National Police, were killed by elements from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and its key ally Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters. The government was heavily criticized for seemingly halfheartedly handling the incident to fears of compromising the delicate peace negotiation with the MILF.

Most importantly, the time of the second Aquino regime also saw impressive economic growth. With an annual average of 6.1% GDP growth and increased domestic market activities, the second Aquino presidency witnessed the fastest economic growth since the 1980s (Teehankee 2016; Batalla 2016). While this economic

growth seems positive at the macro level, the economic gains did not translate to improving the lives of the general public—worsening the traffic situation on some major thoroughfares and a decrepit public transportation services (such as the Metro Rail Transit, etc. (Teehankee 2016)). Also. this administration also failed to curb the longstanding problem of abuse of the "pork barrel" among the legislators, and this got even worse with the discovery of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) allegedly used by the executive to facilitate political maneuverings in the legislature (Teehankee 2016). Unfortunately, these issues were left unattended and not addressed by the sitting administration and its allies. To the dismay of many, even the movements and parties aligned with the moderate left were helpless in influencing the government to push for reform measures such as the Freedom of Information bill, anti-dynasty bill, and party development bill, among others.

The populist resurgence in 2016 speaks of the electoral victory of Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte and his open contestation with the democratic movements and parties in the Philippines. Voted mostly by the upper and middle classes in society, Duterte's rise to power is unprecedented due to its profanity-laced messaging, rugged image, and appearance of a disorganized campaign team which was composed of the small, yet old party, PDP-LABAN, and some ragtag volunteer groups scattered across the country (Teehankee and Thompson 2016). Duterte's campaign actually mobilized the groups, parties, and factions that were excluded during the six-year term of the second Aquino administration—former president Arroyo and her allies in LKC and Kampi, the Marcoses and their "solid north" supporters, among others. Not to mention, during this period, typical party switching immediately happened months after the election of 2016 took place. Several allies of the previous administration, like the NP and NPC, were also quick to support the new administration by joining the ruling coalition. PDP-LABAN immediately becomes the new monolithic party overnight from a small party during the campaign period.

Since 2016, the Duterte administration has had many controversial policy changes that took many democratic movements and parties by surprise: unresolved killings of suspected drug users and dealers; the burial of the late dictator, Ferdinand Marcos, at the *Libingan ng mga Bayani* (Heroes' Cemetery); the foreign policy shift toward China and Russia; imprisonment of his known political critic in the Senate, Senator Leila de Lima; the impeachment of Chief Justice Sereno, among others (Aguirre 2019). Apart from this, his administration is also known for pushing for controversial bills that used to cause major divisions and tension in society: the death penalty, lowering the age of criminal liability, and so on.

These issues, unfortunately, were met with little and weak resistance from various democratic movements and parties, even from the moderate left and radical left. Except during the mobilization for the burial of Marcos in November 2016, most mobilizations from movements and parties from the liberals, moderate left, and radical left were relatively small and mostly attended by the same protesters who were active in 1986, 2001, and Arroyo-era cycles of contention. Also, these mobilizations usually go simultaneously with other activities (protests, demonstrations, etc.),

being mounted for other existing controversial and contentious issues concurrently being activated by the allies of Duterte. This was seen in 2017 when the allies of Duterte floated the idea of reviving capital punishment to redirect the attention of the public. Democratic movements and parties during this time are usually distracted by this non-stop activation of issues. Most importantly, most of the framings used by the opposing movements and parties are politically reactive and too predictive—they usually articulate the same framings used in the past mobilizations—making it unappealing and insincere to the common and non-aligned people. The use of "Marcos" framing has been conveniently used to demonize Duterte as an authoritarian and fascist president and has been ineffective in undermining his popularity since 2016.

During the electoral cycle of 2019, the Duterte bloc (composed of former president Arroyo, Marcoses, Cayetanos, Villars, and other allies) was able to consolidate its forces by capitalizing on Duterte's constant high popularity rating and strengthening its coalition by establishing the regional party, *Hugpong ng Pagbabago*, led by Duterte's daughter, Davao City Mayor, Sara Durterte (Aguirre 2019). This eventually led to the election of some of Duterte's trusted and closest men to occupy seats in the Senate: Christopher Lawrence "Bong" Go and Rolando "Bato" dela Rosa. To the dismay of the opposition forces, only the independent candidates, re-electionist Senator Grace Poe and Senator Nancy Binay, and returning senator, Lito Lapid, manage to win senate seats other than the administration candidates.

However, it is unfortunate that despite the dominance in the Senate and House of Representatives, the ruling coalition seemed distracted by their internal petty political squabbling and short-sighted priorities. Through the years, despite the successful passage of some of the reform measures needed to further economic growth and social stability (such as the Ease of Doing Business Act, Feeding Program Act, Universal Healthcare Act, Tertiary Education Act, Bangsamoro Organic Act, among others) as advocated and pushed by other civil society groups and interest groups, the ruling coalition was not keen on tackling political reforms that are essential in defending and deepening democracy. Just like the previous administrations, Duterte's government does not seem interested in working with the more progressive movements and parties to reform the electoral system to make it more representative and reflective of the current political interests; restructuring the party system to make parties more institutionalized and accountable to the voters; revisiting the political system/structure, especially on the issue of reforming the unity set-up, among others.

In 2022, the Duterte bloc pulled off another master stroke by facilitating the electoral victory of its ally and the first majority electoral outcome for presidential and vice-presidential elections since 1986. The son of the former dictator and his namesake, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., and Duterte's daughter, Davao City Mayor Sara Duterte-Carpio, with their own political parties and support bases, decided to cooperate and coalesce to secure the presidential and vice-presidential victory in May 2022. Through their coalition called "UniTeam," Marcos, Jr. won the presidential race and got 58.77% of the total votes share for the presidential election,

while Duterte-Carpio received 61.53% of the total votes to become the vice president. The Senate and House of Representatives are also dominated by known UniTeam coalition partners from NP, NPC, LKC, and so on.

Just like in the 2016 and 2019 elections, the opposition parties and other political forces critical of Duterte and its political bloc (composed of Marcos, and Villar, among others) are once again decimated. Only the incumbent, Risa Hontiveros, won a seat in the Senate, and a handful of opposition members of the House (such as Edsel Lagman of Albay, Kid Peña of Makati, etc.) managed to win or get reelected. The emergence of the "Pink Movement" as the people's campaign behind the presidential campaign of Vice-President Leonor "Leni" Robredo was able to unite some of the major opposition forces (such as the Akbayan party-list, Magdalo party-list, among others) and even got the support of the radical left movements (such as Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, etc.) and party-lists (such as Bayan Muna, Kabataan, Gabriella, etc.) critical of the Duterte bloc and its allies.

This cooperation between parties and movements of the libdems, socdems, demsocs, and even natdems was inadequate in stopping the Marcos and Duterte dynasties, with their allies, from dominating the 2022 elections. Despite the huge campaign rallies organized across the country, support from influential people and personalities, and house-to-house operations, among others, the "pink movement" failed to counter the consolidated political bases of the UniTeam and their dynasties from northern and southern Luzon, Central Visayas, and the whole island of Mindanao; the well-entrenched disinformation operations found in various social media platforms (such as Facebook, TikTok, etc.); the intensified efforts to vilify the "EDSA 1986" narrative and its promises especially on Philippine democracy; and the emergence of the "NeoMarcosian" fantasy that recreates the authoritarian narrative of the past with the populist tendencies of the present. Despite the loss, this electoral alliance between and among the progressive forces and mainstream parties provided the needed blueprint for more democratic engagements in Philippine politics.

Parting Thoughts

The role of party-movement interaction in democratization lies in their effort to work together to affect the overall institutions, processes, and outcomes of democracy. While most consolidated democracies are usually seen as responsible for the interplay between policy directives and issue articulations, democratizing societies have parties and movements whose interests, motivations, and choices vary due to the contexts and histories they constantly contest and negotiate in their societies.

As discussed above, these party-movement interactions showed how parties and movements facilitate democratization in developing societies by either defending or deepening the democratic gains and advancements of the recent past. In the Philippine case, the study was able to show how party-movement interactions during the restoration of democracy in 1986, Estrada's ouster in 2001, Arroyo's regime stabilization in 2005 to 2010, the second Aquino regime's reforms and frustrations,

and Duterte's populist rule have shaped the trajectory or set the pace of democratization by defending democracy in 1986 and 2001 and failing to deepen democracy during the time of the second Aquino regime. The episodes of Arroyo in the 2000s, Durterte's inversion of Philippine democracy in 2016–2022, and the massive win of Marcos Jr. and Duterte-Carpio can be seen as reversals and setbacks to defend the democratic gains and efforts to strengthen democratic reforms in the society.

In these instances or cycles of contentions, the study was able to show that the interactions have been shaped by the a) dominance of political dynasties, especially with its exclusive access to wealth and power; b) clientelistic-patronage relations with its systemic and uninterrupted flow of resources to networks of control; c) malleability of the middle class and its newfound worth and importance that makes this class autonomous and believe that it is capable of producing its own class of leaders; and d) unresolved tensions among the Left movements that continue to cripple any effort for a concerted move to push for substantial and long-term reforms in the society.

The interactions that shaped Philippine democracy in the past decades were made possible by the numerous moments of cooperation in 1986 and 2001 between movements and parties to defend democracy; some instances of cooptation that allowed parties and movements to further agenda during times of normalcy; many cases of contestations that allowed parties and movements to either frustrate the democratic deepening in the 2010s or appropriately engage the reversals of the 2000s and late 2010s.

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