Universalizing Local Values through 'Lifting Up'

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Universalizing Local Values Through “Lifting Up”

FERNANDO N. ZIALCITA

Work on Philippine values has focused on either 1) identifying shared values or on 2) proposing needed values. While these are both important, this paper has a different focus. It proposes that everyday particularistic values, which other authors have identified, could serve as bridges to more abstract, universal values. The model used is Hegel's dialectical “lifting up” (Aufhebung) of a concept to a higher level. (This I translate into Tagalog as “pag-aangat.”) As such this discussion of universalizing traditional particularistic values is significant to the wider public, for we all face the challenge of adapting to new circumstances while retaining one’s identity. This paper reviews three cases where a “lifting up” occurs implicitly: 1) Albert Alejo's dialogic seminars on the value of utang na loob (a client’s feeling of indebtedness toward a patron) invert a relationship of dependency by demonstrating that the patron actually depends on the client; 2) the teachings (turo or aral) of three heroes of the Philippine Revolution invite all to discover that concern for the family is unrealizable without concern for the nation; 3) during the People Power Revolution of 1986, activists used pakikisama (harmonizing the self with a group) to draw multitudes to resist the dictatorship and to vivify abstractions like “freedom” and “justice.” The paper recommends that Alejo’s dialogic seminars could be one way to vivify universal values by using familiar values as starting points. Dialogic seminars could flesh out the sketches by the heroes or discuss how a narrow value, like pakikisama, can become a gateway to a broader one.

KEYWORDS: Aufhebung, lifting up, pag-aangat, pakikisama, utang na loob
Situations appear when we must concern ourselves with an abstract common good that will supposedly benefit all of us including anonymous strangers. Should my business company consider the impact of our products upon the welfare of others who are not my kin? As a public official, what is this “public” I should serve? Why can I not provide for my kin who have supported me emotionally all my life and will continue to do so long after I have resigned from my post? What value should guide me in trying to decide between my duty to my kin and my duty to a broader public? One approach would be to remind ourselves of the deeper values we all share. While I see merit in doing so, in this paper I would like to propose another approach: our re-imagining of particularistic values that people already observe in their everyday life as initial signs that can be oriented toward more universal values such as concern for an abstract common good. Rather than propose new paths that may be alien to people’s experiences, let us acknowledge the paths that people do take and indicate possible future trajectories such paths could assume. But how to do so? How do we draw the unfamiliar from the familiar, the universal from the particular?

In defining a value, the definition formulated in 1951 by anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn remains relevant: It is a “conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action” (Robbins and Sommerschuh 2016, 3–4). To go back to the situation discussed above where the individual faces a dilemma as to which path to take given the conflict between loyalties, either to the small group of familiars or to the wider community, his decisions will ultimately be based on what he explicitly or implicitly regards as desirable. In this essay, I see values as either particularistic or universalizing. By the former, I mean a particularistic value’s scope is a small group—a family, a barkada (peer group), a patron vis-à-vis clients. In contrast, a universal value’s scope embraces a wider group—the neighborhood, the city, the nation.

Interest in values as a topic for serious discussion has varied according to context. In both sociology and anthropology this interest has been a roller coaster ride. From Emile Durkheim in the nineteenth century down to the Functionalists of the twentieth century, an overriding goal was to show how a society is integrated through commonly shared sentiments. However, the rise of Marxism during the 1970s to 1980s called this consensus into question by
revealing conflicting powerful interests. In turn, postmodernism critiqued Marxism and cast doubt on grand narratives that generalized about society. But values have again become topical because of the crisis in self-definition that many nation-states, rich or poor, are now experiencing vis-à-vis global factors like increasing immigration or the integration of the nation-state into regional blocs (like the European Community and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Paradoxically, renewed interest in Marxism has re-ignited interest in values as a product of social labor (Robbins and Sommerschuh, 2016, 6). In the Philippines, interest in values has never waned. One reason may be because the question of defining the Filipino persists. The other is because of the many problems facing us: the widespread poverty, the corruption in the state bureaucracy, the destruction of the environment, and the deterioration of our cities. Indeed, there are continuing proposals urging a program of action based on explicit common values, whether in the public or private sphere (Shahani 1993; Villalon et al. 2019). It would be interesting to compare our efforts with those of other countries like Indonesia where, upon independence in 1950, the leaders formulated five basic principles that would guide all conduct and be taught in schools: the Panca Sila.

Much of the work on values in the Philippines has focused on either identifying shared values or proposing needed values. All these are important. But rather than identify values, I would like to start with everyday particularistic values, which other authors have already identified, and propose using them as bridges to more abstract, universal but much needed values. To do so, I would like to use Hegel’s method of “lifting up” (Aufhebung) a concept from one level to a higher one. An application of this method in our cultural milieu may be significant to readers in other countries, for always there is the challenge of how to adapt to new circumstances while retaining one’s identity.

**CONTRASTING VALUES**

In reviewing the literature on values whether local or international, two dichotomies appear: 1) studying values as they are versus proposing ideal, moral values and 2) values for small, primary groups versus values for large, secondary groups.
VALUES AS THEY ARE VERSUS WHAT THEY SHOULD BE

Through my master’s degree in Philosophy, I have become acquainted with the consternation caused by social scientists’ studies on values. I continue to hear the following complaints among philosophers and nationalist thinkers: “Why focus on utang na loob and pakikisama? Are these desirable values? How can they be moral if they do not free the individual?” Underlying this consternation is a misunderstanding of what sociology and anthropology seek to do. As sciences, they aim to understand values as they are rather than to propose values as they should be. The latter goal is the domain of philosophers and theologians who are rightfully concerned with morality. In practice it is not easy to separate the “is” from the “should be.” But it is important that we try lest we imagine that what we believe in is shared by all. This is unfair to other people and ultimately unfruitful for our cause. We should establish first what other people do believe in before launching our advocacy.

Examples of studies of Filipino values from a moral perspective are those of the philosophers Ferriols (1999) and Ibana (2009). In the social sciences, studies of values are those of Bulatao (1962); Jocano (1992a, 1992b, 1993); Salazar (1999); Racelis (1961, 1962, 1963); Lynch (2004); Enriquez (1979, [1978] 2018). Albert Alejo (1990, [2017] 2018), an anthropologist and a philosopher, crosses the boundary between the “is” and the “should be” in his exploration of the complex notion of loob (the self as a space that is simultaneously for-itself and for-others) as the matrix of Tagalog values. All these studies have been conducted since the 1960s. I shall discuss only those relevant to this essay’s problematique.

The sociologist Mary Racelis (1963), then a Hollnsteiner by her marriage to an Austrian, conducted fieldwork in a fishing village in Bulacan province for her master’s thesis at the University of the Philippines. Using participant observation and key informant interviews, she highlighted the cultural phenomenon called utang na loob (a feeling of self-indebtedness to someone who granted a favor) and articulated the effect of this on power relationships. How this value can be universalized is one component of this essay’s problematique.

During the same decade, Racelis’s colleague at Ateneo de Manila’s Institute of Philippine Culture, anthropologist Frank Lynch, SJ, began studying the value of “social acceptance.” His study was originally a lecture to religious missionaries, who wanted
to know Filipinos better, at the fourth annual Baguio Religious
Subsequently in 1970 and 1972, he rewrote the study, which evolved
and was buttressed with additional data. For Lynch, while values
cut across culture, cultures differ in the values they prioritize. He
cites Kluckhohn’s observation that “the musical notes A, B, and G
are the same notes regardless of how they are played, but the total
effect is quite modified by any change of order” (32). While both
Filipinos and Americans value pleasant interactions, they differ in
their emphasis. The American will spell out basic disagreements
before looking for a basis of agreement, but the Filipino tries to avoid
conflict by resorting to either “silence or evasive speech” (ibid.). The
value of social acceptance would rank higher for a Filipino than for
an American.

“Social acceptance” was conceptualized as having two
intermediate values: 1) Smooth Interpersonal Relations (SIR) and
2) Sensitivity to Personal Affront (amor propio). SIR is acquired and
preserved by three means: pakikisama or knowing how to get along
with others, the use of euphemism, and the recourse to go-betweens
to avoid confrontations. SIR is an intermediate value that enables
one to be socially accepted. On the other hand, the individual who
disregards social acceptance courts sanctions. He may feel shame
(hiya) if he is in a socially unacceptable situation. Or he may lose his
self-esteem (amor propio) if he does not act in a manner expected
of him by society (Lynch 2004, 38, 42). Originally, the data analyzed
were primarily statements people made about ideal norms of conduct
that mattered to them. However, in the 1972 edition (re-published
in Lynch 2004), behavioral data were included. These showed that
interpersonal activity was cited as possibly stressful. The data came
from studies by Lynch and from independent studies by foreign
and Filipino social scientists such as anthropologists, sociologists,
psychiatrists, and psychologists. Methods used were focused group
discussions, key informant interviews, participant observation,
surveys, and various psychological tests.

The studies by Racelis and Lynch received mixed reviews. Some
of my philosophy professors at Ateneo de Manila, notably Roque
Ferriols, SJ, criticized Racelis in my classes for reducing the value to
a businesslike transaction between parties and for seeing it wholly
from without. Ferriols, a phenomenologist, always counseled seeing
relationships from within. On the other hand, at the University of
the Philippines, Virgilio Enriquez ([1978] 2018, 288, 291; 1979),
founder of Sikolohiyang Pilipino, questioned the focus on utang na
loob. He asked if this was because foreigners wanted Filipinos to forever feel grateful to the US. He also decried the attention paid to pakikisama. Enriquez argued that pakikisama was only a surface value, one that engendered colonially oriented passivity. He argued that the deep value was *pakikipagkapwa-tao* (solidarity with others). The furor over the Americans’ temerity in studying Filipino values, particularly two with supposedly dubious importance namely utang na loob and pakikisama, has not yet died down. I experienced this furor in a recent forum on values. However, I do understand this negative reaction given our history of colonialist outsiders imposing their standards on us. But Racelis was a Filipino-American mestiza from Quezon province whose lifelong advocacy has been helping the urban poor organize for their rights. Though Lynch came as an American, he eventually obtained Filipino citizenship.

Enriquez’s contrast between deep and surface values was a distinction drawn by the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss between deep and surface structures. While recognizing the value of ethnographies and statistical analyses of observable structural relations such as kinship, Lévi-Strauss (1958) urged probing deep into the “unconscious” to disclose the hidden logic underlying such structures. Inspired by structural linguistics, he showed that the “mind” organizes the world via unconscious binary opposites. However, rather than delving into a universal culture, Enriquez was interested in a particular culture—the Filipino. Perhaps because of his untimely death in 1994, he was unable to work out his theory of pakikipagpwa-tao using empirical data sorted into binary oppositions.

What empirical data can shore up the claim that kapwa is the core Filipino value? A team of University of the Philippines psychologists—Jose Clemente, Delia Belleza, Angela Yu, Effie Vinia Diane Catibog, Goyena Solis, and Jason Laguerta ([2008] 2017)—conducted a two-stage study of the values of adolescent university students. Their approach is highly significant because it is what we anthropologists call “emic” rather than “etic.” It looked at the world from the perspective of the insider questing for meaning rather than from that of an outsider. Recall that to this day the studies of Racelis and Lynch have been criticized as the work of foreigners and therefore of outsiders.

In Study 1 (Clemente et al. [2008] 2017), 136 students were given the 12 values proposed by Enriquez as the values Filipinos possessed: 1) *hiya* (sense of shame); 2) *utang na loob* (sense of moral obligation); 3) *pakikisama* (getting along with others); 4) *bahala na* (determination); 5) *lakas ng loob* (courage); 6) *pakikibaka* (resistance);
7) pakikiramdam (feeling with); 8) pakikipagkapwa-tao (solidarity); 9) kagandahang loob (generosity of spirit); 10) karangalan (dignity); 11) katarungan (justice); 12) kalayaan (freedom). Enriquez’s model classified these values into six categories: colonial/accommodative surface value, confrontative surface value, pivotal surface value, core value, linking socio-personal values, and associated societal values. The male and female students (aged 16–23) came from four universities, two in Metro Manila and two in the province of Bulacan. They were asked to rank the values according to their importance as well as to name and rank other values not in the given list.

Utang na loob and pakikisama were classified as colonial/accommodative surface values while karangalan, katarungan, and kalayaan were associated societal values. They were regarded as polar opposites. Enriquez had identified kapwa as the core value linking all values. Because bahala na was regarded by most as unimportant, it was dropped from Study 1. In the meantime, two new values were identified as important: 1) maka-Diyos (God-centeredness) and 2) paggalang (respect). In the ranking of the values listed by Enriquez, ten of the twelve values were listed as very important with mean ratings at 4.24–5.88. Utang na loob and pakikisama were regarded as important as pakikipagkapwa-tao. However, the highest means were registered for: 1) kagandahang loob, 2) katarungan, and 3) pakikipagkapwa-tao. Further analysis showed that the three were not regarded by the participants as significantly different from each other (Clemente et al. [2008] 2017). It appears that the students organized their values differently from Enriquez.

Study 2 by Clemente et al. ([2008] 2017) brings us closer to my essay’s problematique. The study sought to see how participants mentally map selected values using perceived proximities and distances. This time the participants were fewer (47) and were all Introductory Psychology students from one university. Everyone was given thirteen pieces of paper each with one of the thirteen values from Study 1. Another group of students were asked to locate the values on a large sheet of Manila paper. Distances between values were measured with a ruler. A statistical technique called Multidimensional Scaling was used to create a visual summary of all the visual maps. The values were located on an x–y axis centering on the sarili (individual self). On one axis was grupo (group) versus lipunan (society); on another was hindi ibang-tao (insiders, in-groups) versus ibang-tao (outsiders, out-groups). Grupo refers to small groups: family, friends, colleagues; lipunan to larger groups: a community or the entire nation. Interactions range from closeness (di-ibang tao), such as among
family members, to distance (ibang-tao), such as people we “barely know or hardly know of” (Clemente et al. [2008] 2017, 306). This resulted into a visual map with four cells: small group (grupo) with interactive closeness, small group (grupo) with interactive distance, large group (lipunan) with interactive closeness, and large group (lipunan) with interactive distance (fig. 1). The research team located maka-Diyos as in-between because while it is very personal, it can also be shared with a larger group.

![Figure 1. The value system of the Filipino adolescent as analyzed by Clemente et al. ([2008] 2017; translations by Fernando Zialcita)](image)

Significant for this essay is that utang na loob, pakikisama, pakikiramdam, and pakikipagkapwa-tao were closely clustered together and located in the second cell of the small group (grupo) with interactive distance. They were regarded as values to be invoked when dealing with a small group, such as friends, but still regarded as outsiders (ibang tao). This part of the study’s analysis (Clemente et al. [2008] 2017) baffles me. How can friends with whom one interacts through utang na loob, pakikisama, pakikiramdam, and pakikipagkapwa-tao be regarded as outsiders (ibang tao)? To continue with the analysis, values such as karangalan, kalayaan, katarungan, lakas ng loob, and pakikibaka were identified as those invoked when
dealing with society as a whole. This part of their study is easy to understand. In using their findings, I shall skip the contrast between interactive closeness and interactive distance and focus solely on the contrast between the small group and the large impersonal group called “society.”

My question then can be rephrased: How can values operative in a small group of friends and acquaintances become bridges toward values needed within a larger group, such as a city or a nation, overwhelmingly made up of strangers? I assume that in promoting the common good, such as for the city or the nation, it is better to begin with the familiar as a bridge to the less familiar. The values cited by Clemente et al. as operative in society or the larger group would be less invoked in everyday dealings with friends and acquaintances. By “particularistic” then, I mean pakikisama and utang na loob. By universal, I mean those values cited by the study of Clemente et al. as needed within society as a whole (table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grupo (Primary Group)</th>
<th>Lipunan (Secondary Group)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakikisama (Getting Along with Others)</td>
<td>Kalayaan (Freedom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utang na Loob (Sense of Moral Obligation)</td>
<td>Karangalan (Honor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Katarungan (Justice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pakikibaka (Active Struggle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lakas ng Loob (Courage)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Values in a primary group (grupo) versus values in a secondary group (lipunan)

I dwell on pakikisama and utang na loob because empirically supported studies have been conducted on these two, as shown above. In addition, two of the insults that cut a Filipino to the bone in everyday life are: “Wala kang pakikisama!” (You don’t know how to get along with others) and “Walang kang utang na loob!” (You are extremely ungrateful). A third value that is possibly a bridge toward broader values would be “maka-pamilya” (concern for the family). Strangely, this is not mentioned by students in Study 1 (Clemente et al. [2008] 2017). Yet this is of obvious primacy. When the occasion
arises, Filipinos help their siblings by supporting them in school and sometimes even after; moreover, either as a sibling or as a parent, they go abroad to work for the sake of the family. Possibly the reason for this omission can be found in the respondents’ position in the life cycle: they are adolescent university students. Although they care for their families, they unconsciously want to emphasize their independence.

VALUES IN A PRIMARY GROUP VERSUS VALUES IN A SECONDARY GROUP

One of the assumptions in anthropology is that values are shaped by their cultural context (Robbins and Sommerschuh 2016, 9). Unfortunately, discussions of Philippine values often overlook the importance of such a context. Values are discussed in the abstract without reference to the type of group where the values occur. But the context, the type of group, matters. When acting in a primary group, like one’s kin or a farming neighborhood where my relatives are my neighbors and my neighbors are my relatives, the values I would abide by would be particularistic and concrete. Primarily, I would consider the interests of my kin whom I meet regularly. I would also be careful about questioning group decisions because in my small group we are woven together by a web of interpersonal exchanges. It is otherwise when acting within a large secondary group like a suburban subdivision, or a city, or a nation. Here, the supposed common good that connects us together is abstract and hard to imagine. The overwhelming majority are not my relatives nor will I ever meet most face-to-face.

Historically, it has not been easy for people to internalize universalistic values. Consider the case of France. Following the 1789 Revolution, the state ceased to be thought of as deriving its legitimacy from a ruling dynasty but rather from an abstract concept: the “nation,” where all the French were expected to imagine themselves as one people despite their diverse backgrounds. Yet down to the 1880s, most Frenchmen, especially in farming villages, did not know and care about their rights and obligations as “French” (Weber 1976). What was more real to them was the village they came from. Those coming from other villages were treated as aliens to be suspected. A sense of common identity and purpose slowly emerged when an efficient transport system and universal public schooling began in
the early twentieth century (ibid.). Public services, either on the municipal or the national level, in twentieth-century France are run reasonably well and suggest a strong sense of the common good. Yet a civil war between the Left and the Right burst open in 1940–1945 under Nazi rule, while a near-civil war over Algeria’s future heated up in 1954–1962.

It seems that the values most familiar to Filipinos today are really values of a small, primary group (grupo) rather than of a large, secondary group (lipunan). Values that work well within the former may be disruptive within the latter. A powerful patron has granted my family a huge favor by footing the hospitalization bill for my ailing mother. Now that he runs for office as city mayor, he expects me to vote for him. But what if he is corrupt and violent? If I vote for him because of a traditional value that insists on personal debts of any sort, I shall do good for my family, but not for my city. What values do we live by within the city or within the nation? What values do we live by beyond our kin? In our country today, political parties with meaningful programs are fragile coalitions of politicians who look for powerful patrons who can support their ambitions. They dissolve and regroup according to which high official is elected. Moreover, dynasties have taken over political office in all levels of government.

In response to such challenges, during the presidency (1992—1998) of her brother Fidel Ramos, Sen. Leticia Ramos-Shahani launched a Moral Recovery Program 1) to encourage the exercise of moral values in everyday life and 2) to recognize the power of such values. Psychologist Dr. Patricia Licuanan (2016) fleshed out the program by urging an emphasis on unique strengths (pakikipagkapwa-tao, family orientation, joy, hardwork, flexibility, and religiosity) while admitting weaknesses (excessive family-centeredness, extreme sensitivity, colonial mentality, and an individualistic attitude) that foster the idea of each man for himself.6

Another track urges a return to the communitarianism we supposedly had before Western influence introduced individualism. Supposedly our brethren in the rural areas are more “communitarian” than us in the city who are egotistic and individualistic. Let us be wary, however, of the easy dichotomy between “individualism” and “communitarianism.” A fellow may be communitarian because he subordinates his interests to those of his kin, but it does not follow that he is communitarian vis-à-vis the bayan, understood as either the municipality or the nation. In a neighborhood where most are friends and relatives, he will be mindful about throwing his trash just anywhere. People he knows and cares for are watching. However,
it may be otherwise in a city neighborhood where most of his neighbors are perfect strangers. Here lies the contrast between tidy neighborhoods in rural hamlets and dirty city neighborhoods.

The importance of face-to-face relations as the context for Filipino values was conveyed to me in the 1980s through a narrative of the late Dr. Emy Pascasio, a linguistic scholar. Her neighbor in Cubao, Quezon City would leave his garbage bin in front of her house. She decided to make friends with him. He stopped his offensive habit. Instead, he dumped his garbage elsewhere in Cubao where he did not know anyone! This pattern of leaving trash in front of the house of an unfamiliar neighbor is not an unusual story in Metro Manila. The lack of concern for the unknown stranger comes out in another form in a story given to me in the early 1990s by Mr. Jaime Cura, a career technocrat in urban resettlement programs. He was concerned about keeping tenement housing orderly. Neighbors in multi-level tenement apartments sweep the corridors that their apartments open into. However, public areas shared by all, like the stairway landings or the lobby, are dirty. Since they supposedly belong to all, no one takes responsibility for them. Mr. Cura’s solution was a cultural one. Acknowledging that what mattered most to each household was its face-to-face dealings with its immediate neighbors on the same floor, he organized yearly contests with prizes for the best-maintained stairway landing. It worked. If it is not easy to imagine the good of a neighborhood in a tenement, it is harder to imagine the nation, or even the city, as having a common good to which all should contribute.

During fieldwork in rural hamlets in Ilocos and in the Tagalog Region from the 1970s onward, I realized that municipalities resemble archipelagoes. The urbanized center is made up of barangays or wards that cluster together to form the población with a core of the church and government offices. However, other barangays are scattered like islands among fields and hills. Moreover, particular barangays are divided into sitio or purok (neighborhood) that are separated by streams or fields. Probe deeper and you will find that the purok is made up of households connected by consanguinity, affinity, or both. In these situations, neighbors are relatives and relatives are neighbors. Relations between purok/sitio and other purok/sitio range from friendship to indifference to hostility. Sometimes the latter takes the form of accusations of malevolence. But what about the much-touted value of bayanihan? I was told that this value does not involve the barangay as a group. Rather it is an exchange between a household that needs assistance and others willing to help. The exchange can
take the form of assistance in building a house or in transplanting rice shoots. However, for constructing a house of hollow blocks, metal roofs, and glass windows, it was deemed better to hire paid labor rather than throw a feast for those willing to help. What was needed was expert labor. Of course, if the house were made of nipa and bamboo, homeowners could use unpaid labor in exchange for a free meal. But this attracts even the lazy. For transplanting rice, they prefer to hire and pay for labor. Were they to exchange free labor, they would have to work for a commensurate number of days on the rice field of the household that helped them. This would be risky because transplanting rice requires speed lest the rice shoots mature soon (Zialcita 2000).

Perhaps farmers who rejected Hispanization, like those in the Cordillera and Sierra Madre mountains, have a communitarianism that transcends the kin? However, in Ifugao, the famous rice terraces have been and continue to be owned by families rather than by the entire village (Barton [1919] 1969). Indeed, Ifugao households are divided according to a class system based on ownership vs. non-ownership of rice fields. Membership in the upper class (kadangyan) is validated by throwing expensive feasts and owning material signs of wealth. Moreover, the forests that protect the watersheds by collecting rainwater that gushes out as springs are owned by lineages and not by the village per se. In between villages in the Cordilleras, relationships prior to the middle of the twentieth century ranged from co-existence to wars settled by marrying together the children of conflicting villages (Barton [1919] 1969; Jenks 1905). What about swidden cultivators, do they not own the entire forest as a group? Rather than ownership of land, what matters to them is open access to the forest, for what they open in burned patches of the forest are gardens that are abandoned periodically after every three years or so. The forest is simply there. They own their crops rather than the location of the swidden garden (M. Rosaldo 1980; Conklin 1957; Kikuchi 1984). Again, relationships between villages, even those with no class distinctions, ranged from co-existence to violent wars (Faye-Cooper [1922] 2005; M. Rosaldo 1980; R. Rosaldo 1980).

Since our communitarianism seems weak on the level of either the city or the nation but strong on the level of the kin group and the rural hamlet, should we therefore build up the secondary group over the primary group? Should we regard the latter as an obstacle to demolish?

I view the matter dialectically. Both poles are needed and should be retained in tension with each other because there is another side
to the small, primary group, one that is positive. Today, in a highly competitive capitalist world where a person’s worth is measured by never-ending outputs, we are less sanguine about the blessings of radical individualism and full liberation from the small group be this the kin (kamag-anak) or the peer group (barkada). Two centuries ago, our ancestors often had little voice on their lifelong occupations, on their class position, or even on the choice of their marriage partners. Such decisions were made for them by their kin. The affirmation of the individual promised by the French Revolution and triumphant capitalism seemed liberating.

Today, however, we are not so sure. Within a capitalist society, competition is fierce. The possibility of failure and therefore rejection by one’s peers is ever-present. But, as human beings, our sense of self-worth is intimately tied in with recognition by others. Rejection by our peers can lead to despair. Which group can give us recognition regardless of our failures? For many Filipinos, these emotional anchors are the kin and the peer group. Filipinos are certain that, regardless of their failures, their groupmates will always accept them in their entirety. This readiness to accept the failures of an adult child, especially the son, does not seem to be the norm in some cultures—were I to base myself on accounts of students. There is another consideration. Wealthier, developed nation-states have instituted welfare systems that in varying degrees extend help during unemployment, illness, and old age. Looking at the welfare state in Western Europe, we marvel at the generosity extended to those in need and lament the stinginess of our state. Yet students and acquaintances from Western Europe praise the kindness and concern expressed by Filipinos in face-to-face encounters—intimate neighborhood meals, hospitality toward guests, care for aged parents. These are values from the small, primary group (grupo) that they miss despite the effective functioning of the welfare system in their well-run nation states (lipunan).

The challenge is balancing values associated with the small group of intimates and the larger group mostly composed of strangers. But how to do so on the level of discourse?
RE-STATING OUR PROBLEMATIQUE

Let me now re-state this essay’s questions and its approach. Given many Filipinos’ preference for the small primary group, how can we localize the universal but abstract values of serving the common good of the bayan (community), defined either as city or nation? How do we create a discourse where concern (pagmamalasakit) for the bayan is as important in everyday life as concern for the kin? Conversely, how can concern for the kin be expanded to include fellow citizens within the city and the nation? I do not intend to propose new values or to research on core values. As stated above, foundational research has been done by others. Instead, I focus on the everyday values that matter most to people and consider how such values can be transformed into bridges to higher and more universal values. As such my approach is purely theoretical. Its effectivity can only be tested in actual praxis. I am, of course, aware that for an idea to be effective, its implications should be institutionalized or else the idea remains but a dream. Care for the poor, the needy, the sick, and the old exist on the national level in advanced nation-states because an existing system of laws has institutionalized such practices by ensuring that revenues from taxes on wealth will be channeled into social services. We must aspire to this. On the other hand, since as humans, both our thinking and our behavior occur within a dynamic linguistic web, we should re-think and re-word our discourse on values.

During recent years, Albert Alejo, SJ, an anthropologist, has conducted seminars aimed at curbing corruption by inviting the participants to rethink the value of utang na loob in a way that they can free themselves from its shackles and make choices for the common good. I shall report on his dialectical method as a practice that can be emulated in reconfiguring other particularistic values. I shall then discuss two particularistic values and suggest how future discourse could use these values as bridges toward values that, though needed, presently seem vague. The two particularistic values are 1) concern for the family (maka-pamilya) and 2) social acceptance as interpreted by Lynch. Regarding the value of concern for the kin, I shall show how, within the thinking of three heroes of the 1896 Philippine Revolution, there are hints as to how this value can be
unfolded to embrace a wider public. On the other hand, regarding the value of social acceptance, I will show how Lynch’s comment that a value can be both an end and a means was validated by how that value was used in the People Power Revolution of 1986 to bring together civilians and the military to a peaceful agreement.

PARTICULARIZING THE UNIVERSAL, UNIVERSALIZING THE PARTICULAR

Two movements occur here: 1) from the universal to the particular and the local and conversely, 2) from the local and the particular to the universal. I would like to show how both localization and universalization can be possible. There is a long tradition in anthropology of interpreting how imported practices become rooted in a receiving culture. “Syncretism” and “hybridity” have been used for denoting this phenomenon of the encounter between cultures.¹² My preference is for “localization.” In this essay, I shall use “particularization” and localization interchangeably.

How can we show that the particularistic can lead to the universal? Let us use Hegel’s dialectical method. Hegel has demonstrated how even as a being (whether as self or thing) changes, it retains its identity (Schultz 2012). Or conversely, how even as it remains the same, it grows into a new form. Writing at the dawn of modernity during the early nineteenth century, Hegel pioneered in interpreting being as a continuous becoming, that is, as a process where even as a being shifts from one stage to another and assumes new features, it retains continuity with what it was at the beginning (Davis 2012, 177–194). The process can be the growth of an individual self or the development of an institution. Hegel also showed how knowledge of the particular develops into an acknowledgment of the universal. Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* ([1807] 2012)¹³ responds to the query concerning what can be known with certainty. At first the individual self assumes that only the concrete and spontaneous particular is reliable, but it soon realizes that the very act of knowing involves an active participation of the mind: It organizes sensory data into organized wholes; it posits an abstract universal. At a deeper level of consciousness, the self realizes that its knowledge always implies other active selves: The political sphere, art, and religion are all social spheres of activity that enable the world to be known as deeply
meaningful. Yet even as the self acknowledges its involvement with other selves, it realizes its own particularity as a self that is irreducible to other selves.

The crucial expression in Hegel to denote active transformation is Aufhebung, which should be taken dialectically. Though it denotes “abolition” (and therefore “negation”), it likewise denotes “retention” and a third sense of “raising up” according to Michael Inwood (Hegel [1907] 2018, 329). The English cognate is literally “heaving up.” Faulty translations of Hegel use only “abolition” and lead to distortions.14 Let us keep the image clear in our minds. As an object is raised, it may assume new characteristics that cancel out a previous one even as previous characteristics are retained and given a new form. I prefer to use “lifting up” rather than such Latinized translations like “supersession” or “sublation,” which sound overly abstract in an English language setting. Were I to translate Aufhebung into Tagalog, I would use “pag-aangat.”

To further clarify the concept of “lifting up,” let me present two images. One is a paraphrase of a famous metaphor in Hegel, the other is my own. According to Hegel, the flower negates the bud from where it burst; in turn, it is negated by the fruit that issues from it. Yet the fruit does affirm both flower and bud for those are necessary stages in its emergence. The three forms culminate in a single process, the life of a plant (Hegel [1807] 2012, 4). To add to this, I cite my own image: the transformation of an offspring’s relation to its parents from 1) childhood to 2) adolescence to 3) adulthood. Love or concern for the parents runs throughout, but its content changes according to the context. The young child loves its parents in a relationship that involves both affection and dependency. The child cannot fend for itself because physically and psychologically it is immature. During this stage the parents occupy the center of its emotional life. Its love for them is unconditional indeed, but not free since it is born out of necessity. As an adolescent, the offspring’s body and its mental powers become mature. It discovers that it need not depend on its parents for all its wants and needs; it begins to distance itself from its parents. Its love is no longer unconditional. As a full-grown adult, the offspring can now satisfy its wants and needs by itself. Selves, other than its parents, are active players in its emotional life. It can now carve out an identity distinct from that of its parents. Indeed, it can see both the strengths and the weaknesses of its parents. At last it can now offer a love that is truly unconditional because it is offered
freely despite the now visible failings of the parent. The content of concern for the parents thus changes from one stage to the other. Abolition and differentiation occur but so do identity, retention, and an elevation to another level of relationship. I want to show that “lifting up” (pag-aangat) allows us to keep both poles of a dialectic intact, though in tension with each other.

THREE VALUES LIFTED UP

Let us now examine how three particularistic, local values can be “lifted up” toward more inclusive, universal values: 1) utang na loob and how Alejo turns it upside down; 2) concern for the family vs. concern for the nation as hinted at in prescriptions of three key figures of the 1896 Revolution; 3) pakikisama in Lynch as a means to other values that the People Power Revolution of 1986 acted out. My aim is to contribute to developing a discourse that encourages people to transition from an everyday, particularistic value relevant to their small group to a universal value relevant to a broader impersonal and therefore abstract group. I use Alejo’s dialectical questioning of utang na loob as a model of what could be done. I then show how the writings of key figures in the Philippine Revolution sketch an outline of how family-centered values could be oriented toward the nation. The emphasis is on the word “sketch.” Finally, I suggest that Lynch’s notion that any value can be a means to other values was validated in actual life by the People Power Revolution of 1986, which used pakikisama as a means toward broader but more abstract values relating to the nation. Hence a discourse that connects both social acceptance within a small group and concern for the nation could be constructed in the future.

INVERTING AN OBLIGATION

The value called “utang na loob” was analyzed and studied in a monograph on a village in Bulacan province by the sociologist Mary Racelis-Hollnsteiner [1963?]. In 1961, it was conceptualized as a form of reciprocity where an individual who has received a huge favor from another individual feels a moral and emotional obligation to repay the favor over a lifetime, indeed at an interest. For example, a poor man receives financial help from a wealthy patron for the hospitalization of a family member; he feels obligated to repay the
favor in different ways (e.g., a choice portion of his catch at sea or asking his family to vote for the patron who is running for office).

A strong moral obligation toward a powerful patron who has voluntarily extended him a big favor is experienced by a voter when the former approaches him seeking his vote during an election. This moral obligation cuts across social classes. While the poor may be more vulnerable, even those with means will vote for a corrupt politician who came to the funeral of a beloved relative. As part of the campaign against corruption, Albert Alejo, SJ has conducted seminars in the vernacular questioning utang na loob. His approach is linguistic and dialectical. Below is my summary based on an interview with him.

Alejo asks the participants: Is every utang an utang na loob? If we borrow 10,000 pesos from the bank, why is that not an utang na loob? In contrast, if we borrow money from someone we know, then it becomes an utang na loob. Why is that? Is this because a personal tie has been introduced? But this leads to other questions. Must an utang na loob be forever? Why should it be forever, especially when paying it becomes onerous for the debtor? What is the moral basis for believing that one must pay back an onerous utang na loob?

According to Alejo, the patron who did the poor man a huge favor, did so supposedly because of his kabutihang loob (kindness) and kagandahang loob (generosity). If his act was truly spontaneous and aimed at the poor man's welfare, he cannot dictate the form of repayment. For instance, the patron enables the poor man to obtain a job at a close friend's company. The poor man cannot repay the favor in kind and so repays it in various ways. He could work hard at his job to enhance his patron's prestige in the eyes of his new boss. “Para di mapabiya ang nagrekomenda sa kanya” (so as not to embarrass the recommender). In contrast, if the patron expects that he be voted for in the election and reveals his act as calculated and dictated by self-interest, the patron is then dependent upon the poor man! He needs the latter's help. Such being the case, the poor man is now free. He may or may not choose to help his patron.

Hegel's famous Master-Servant relationship ([1807] 2012, 50) recalls that this linguistic and dialectical approach results in a reversal of roles. At the start of the relationship, the servant is dependent upon the master's goodwill for his very existence. He is entrusted with providing the master's material needs. He must do this to ensure his own sustenance. However, in and through his labor of transforming material objects, he achieves self-confidence. In contrast, because the master is unable to provide for his own material needs without
recourse to the labor of his servant, he de facto becomes dependent upon the servant, however much he may think of himself as superior.

In Alejo’s dialectical dialogue, the particularistic value of utang na loob is “lifted up.” The emotionally intense relationship between client and patron continues, but the client is now potentially the patron and the patron the client. At the same time, through the dialogue, the awakened individual can now think beyond utang na loob to broader relationships, like his responsibility to care for the common good by voting for the best candidate. Alejo’s dialogues, when supported by a conscious use of Hegel’s “lifting up,” could be used when discussing other particularistic values dear to many Filipinos.

It should be noted that while Alejo discusses utang na loob dialectically in relation to combatting corruption, it can also be used to introduce other themes. For instance, the propertied should be aware that when an individual makes a lifetime investment of his/her labor on daily work, the former (the propertied) contracts an utang na loob to the latter (the worker). Neither their business nor society at large could function without this daily contribution by millions of individuals; hence, the necessity of providing a livable pension to the latter once employment ends.

FROM FAMILY TO NATION

The organizers of the 1896 Revolution articulated a secular set of norms on which all could agree, regardless of faith. They introduced a new and abstract concept: bayan as the entire archipelago rather than just bayan as the town or city. Emilio Jacinto, editor of the Katipunan’s periodical called Ang Kalayaan, wrote fourteen statements that he called the Kartilya or guide to conduct, which all members were to follow upon initiation into the revolutionary association (Santos 1935). Apolinario Mabini, adviser to Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, wrote a secular version of the Ten Commandments entitled El verdadero decálogo (The true decalogue). This was written in 1897 months after his detention in the hospital for having been involved in the uprising of August 1896 (Mabini 1960, xii, 3; Palma 1931; Majul 1960). On January 21, 1899, the National Assembly of the First Philippine Republic ratified a constitution (Filipinas 1899). In the latter document, under “Título IV” (Title IV) entitled “De los filipinos y de sus derechos nacionales e individuales” (On the Filipinos and on
their national and individual rights), Articles 6–32 define Filipino citizenship and accompanying rights such as freedom from arbitrary detention, relocation, and taxation as well as the right to ownership of private property, to speech, to association, and free education. They also define obligations such as to defend the Motherland and to register all property-related institutions with the government. Although the constitution was written by Felipe Calderon and Felipe Buencamino, it was reviewed by Apolinario Mabini before giving it his approval. The Decálogo can be read as a guide to citizenship and as a brief code that encapsulates the philosophy underlying the constitution. A third figure who also wrote a guide to conduct was Gregoria de Jesus, the second wife of Andres Bonifacio who helped co-organize the women’s chapter of the Katipunan. After the execution of Bonifacio in 1897, she married his secretary (*kalibim*) Julio Nakpil. In 1924, at the request of Jose Santos, she wrote a brief autobiography in Tagalog and closed this with a *Sampung Aral* (Ten teachings) addressed specifically “to the youth” (*sa mga kabataan*) (Alzona 1964).

In these codes of conduct, we detect two movements: 1) the universal is localized using familiar examples and 2) local values are shown to be incomplete and unfulfilled unless related to the universal. I have been inspired by the studies of Zeus Salazar (1999) and Rainier Ibaña (2009) who focus on the interconnections between basic concepts within the Kartilya. Salazar focused on defining Jacinto’s understanding of foundational concepts such as *katuwiran* (reason); Ibaña showed how Tagalog itself highlights interpersonal relationals via the prefix “ka-”, which denotes an intimate fellowship. In my case, my interest is in showing how these heroes make an abstract universal (the nation) relevant by relating it to the concrete particular (the kin).

The Philippines as a Motherland (*Patria*) was uppermost in Emilio Jacinto’s mind. In 1897, in the heat of battle, he wrote a long poem in Spanish with the title of “*A la Patria***.” But how did he vivify this abstract concept? In Turo (Teaching) 11, he asks for respect for women by reminding the hearers that they too have a mother.

Do not look at a woman as merely a source of pleasure, but rather as a companion and co-participant in the hardships of this life. Deal with her weakness with reverence. Remember the mother who bore and nursed you as an infant. (*Ang babae ay huwag mong tingnang isang bagay na libangan lamang, kundi isang katuwang*...*)
at karamay sa mga kahirapan nitong buhay; gamitin mo nang buong pagpipitagan ang kanyang kahinaan, at alalahanin ang inang pinagbuhatan at nag-iwi sa iyong kasanggulan). (Santos 1935, 61–63)

In Turo 12, he reminds his audience that they too have a wife, sister, and daughter. Thus, they should not do to other women what they would not wish to happen to the women in their life. (*Ang di mo ibig gawin [ng iba] sa asawa mo, anak at kapatid, ay huwag mong gagawin sa asawa, anak at kapatid ng iba*) (ibid.).

In the Confucian Analects, the five basic relationships occur between men: the obligation of subject to ruler, son to father, younger brother to elder brother, wife to husband, friend to friend. In contrast, the relationship between the son to the mother seems foundational in Jacinto. This is apt. While descent in traditional Chinese society is patrilineal—only the sons inherit property and pass on the family name—descent in the Philippines is bilateral wherein both sons and daughters inherit and transmit both property and the family name. In the Philippines, the mother has more power and recognized authority.

Both localization and universalization are at work in Gregoria de Jesus’s teachings. Her first *Aral* (Teaching) asks the hearer to respect their parents because they are “the second God on earth” (*ang pangalawang Dios sa lupa*) (Alzona 1964, 163). However, in *Aral* 2 and 6, she refers her listeners to figures outside the family: the martyred heroes whose teachings should be remembered and one’s teachers in school. While parents give their child “their existence” (*pagiging tao*), teachers impart to their students their “personhood” (*pagkatao*) (ibid.), which is a deeper form of being. The self therefore has a moral debt (*utang*) even to those outside the circle of kin. In *Aral* 8, Gregoria warns her listeners never to imagine that they can commit a crime in secret. History discovers all. (*Matakot sa kasaysayan pagka’t walang tibim na di nahahayag*) (ibid.). Hence, her listeners must keep in mind that they are under the scrutiny of a wider public. The very common value of hiya (embarrassment at losing face) is felt most readily when one is in a small group of familiars—family, neighbors, friends, fellow-students, co-workers. De Jesus locates hiya on a wider plane—vis-à-vis the “anonymous public,” the bayan itself where there are individuals who will seek the truth. She makes the *Inang Bayan* (Motherland) easier to visualize by focusing on concrete figures—the parents, the heroes, the teachers. At the same time, there is a progression from the particular to the universal—from parents to
martyred heroes to schoolteachers and finally to history itself, which becomes a metaphor for the bayan.

In Mabini, the process of “lifting” the particular onto the plane of the universal is explicit. He emphasizes that the family’s welfare cannot be fully realized without seeking the nation as welfare. In Commandments 4, 5, and 6 he emphasizes the importance of the “Motherland.” Mabini (1960, 31–32) urges that his listeners love the Motherland “after God and your honor” (después de Dios y de tu honor) but “more than you yourself” (más que a tí mismo) because this “paradise . . . is the only legacy of your ancestors and the only future of your descendants” (paraiso . . . (es) la única herencia de tus antepasados; y el único porvenir de tu descendencia). In a few phrases he connects the past and the future, the particular (familial lineage) and universal (the Motherland). I am connected to my ancestors via the country in which I was born. At the same time, the future of my descendants for whom I feel compelled to provide will be actualized in this country. If reason, justice, and work are active in the Motherland, if she is happy, “then you and your family will also be happy” (felices también habéis de ser tu y tu familia) (ibid.). No matter how much we may love our family and wish it to prosper, its destiny is bound up with that of the wider society, the Motherland. Love for the family is both abolished, retained, and transcended by love for the Motherland because it is within the latter rather than outside it that a family can attain its goals; hence the duty to regard even strangers who are compatriots—brothers with whom we share the same fate. Mabini (1960) requests his readers to

always regard your compatriot as more than just a neighbor. See him rather as a friend, brother, companion with whom you are tied by the same destiny, by the same joys and sadness, and by similar aspirations and interests. (Mirarás siempre a tu compatriota algo más que a tu prójimo: verás en él al amigo, al hermano y cuando menos al compañero con quien estás ligado por una sola suerte, por las mismas alegrías y tristezas, y por iguales aspiraciones e intereses).

Mabini warns about choosing a monarchy rather than a republic (ibid.).

Make sure that the nation is a Republic and never a Monarchy. The latter benefits either one or several families
and founds a dynasty. In contrast the former creates a nation that is noble and dignified because of reason, great because of freedom, and prosperous and brilliant because of work. (Procura para tu pueblo la República y jamás la Monarquía: ésta enoblece una o varias familias y funda una dinastía; aquella constituye un pueblo noble y digno por la razón, grande por la libertad y próspero y brillante por el trabajo).

Like the Tagalog word “bayan,” the Spanish word “pueblo” can mean “people,” “city,” “nation.” Here is a contrast between the particular (dynastic families) and the universal (the pueblo). Let us note, however, that Mabini was aware of the “ultimate universal”—humankind as a whole. He expresses the hope that someday people will transcend their nationalism, really another form of vanity, and be concerned about the welfare of humankind as a whole.

Mabini “lifted up” concern for the kin by suggesting that such concern should naturally lead to concern even for the non-kin because the kin cannot realize its ambitions outside society. Unfortunately, this remains a suggestion, or a hint, rather than a fully articulated discussion. In conducting seminars on various forms of the common good—like honesty in governance, fairness to all, protection of the environment—we could consciously articulate the kin’s location in a social space vis-à-vis other kin. What is obvious to us in social science may not be so obvious to many whose attention focuses on the immediate good of their kin, imagined in isolation from the rest. Such articulation enables people to particularize and concretize necessary abstractions. Self-interest can grow into a passion for the common good. Let us now discuss the explicit study of particular Filipino values by Frank Lynch, SJ who conceived of values as open-ended.

VALUE AS BOTH ENDS AND MEANS

Frank Lynch (2004, 91) made it clear that the goal of his study of Filipino values was neither to exalt nor to critique but to elucidate. Moreover, pakikisama can be used as a means to other ends.

By my estimate, the introduction of the question of their function is an important step toward resolution of a specter that haunts many Filipino students: the fear
that pakikisama may be a sign of weakness. It may be, of course, but it should now be clearer than ever that it need not be. Due respect for others is never a weakness, and now we are reminded (certainly we knew it) that gentle dealing may be a route to power. Neutral in itself, pakikisama can be used in many ways for quite different purposes.

Unfortunately, this last point was ignored by critics. Lynch died in 1978 before he could flesh out the casual observation that a value, being neutral, can also be a means-to-an-end. I would now like to articulate the implications of this statement. If a value can be a means to another value, it can therefore be “lifted up” (aufgehoben as Hegel would put it).

The People Power Revolt of February 1986 vividly illustrates how people can lift a very local and particularistic value, such as pakikisama, to serve a universal one—the defense of democracy. By February 1986, many Filipinos were outraged over how the Marcoses had clung on to power for years even though the nation was sinking into debt because of their profligate borrowing. Businessmen had lost confidence in the government because of its takeover of legitimate businesses. Its human rights abuses worsened. In the snap presidential elections in January 1986, Corazon Aquino, widow of the martyred Senator Benigno Aquino Sr., ran against the incumbent. Massive cheating took place to keep her from winning. Sensing popular outrage, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Vice Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and Juan Ponce Enrile, Marcos's Defense Secretary, staged a coup in Camp Aguinaldo. Cardinal Jaime Sin called on the people to surround the camp with their bodies. In response, thousands of civilians (both men and women) from social strata ranging from low to high came with their families and friends to form a vast human barricade across Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) thereby sealing off the mutineers from February 22 to 25. Marcos sent tanks down the avenue to shatter this barricade. But the people invited the soldiers to defect (Mercado 1986; Quijano de Manila/Joaquin 1986; Elwood 1989; Leogardo, Leogardo, and Jacobo 1990).

Pakikisama was present in two ways. Based on interviews with colleagues in BANDILA, the coalition brought a wide range of sectoral groups to EDSA 1986 as well as my own friends and relatives who went there. Many came for two reasons: 1) anger at the abuses of the dictatorship and 2) companionship with their family or even just
close friends who could lose their lives. *Nakisama*: They came along and gave their emotional support. Here, pakikisama became a bridge to the lipunan-oriented but abstract universal values that Clemente et al. cited: it strengthened pakikibaka (active involvement) and the resolve (lakas ng loob) to struggle for abstract universals, kalayaan (freedom) and katarungan (justice). It became a bridge to the very abstract maka-Diyos, for many came in response to Cardinal Sin’s appeal. Together with the nuns and priests who also manned the barricades, they prayed, locked arms, and sang religious hymns even as tanks rolled down EDSA to disperse them.

Pakikisama was present in another way: the civilians showed concern and respect for the soldiers. They did not confront them with abusive insults. Knowing that the soldiers were merely following orders as employees, they showed sympathy for the latter. They expressed their pakikisama to the soldiers by inviting them to join their ranks. “*Sumama na kayo!*” (Please join us!) where the word “sama” occurs as in pakikisama. Within this respect for their very identity as fellow human beings, the soldiers may have glimpsed that what the protestors were fighting for—kalayaan and katarungan—were no mere clichés but ideas to sacrifice for. Standing and kneeling before them were young and old, men and women, rich and poor, clerics and lay people. Lynch’s observation about pakikisama was prescient and is worth repeating: “Due respect for others is never a weakness . . . gentle dealing may be a route to power” (2004, 91). Within a focused group discussion, the discussant could show that pakikisama can be a prelude to other deeper values like *pakikiramay* (empathetic sharing). It can be used to show that pakikiramay in the struggles of fellow citizens, through self-giving, is more satisfying because of its broader reach. On the other hand, it can be shown that corrupt politicians do not practice pakikisama because they do not really want to share in the lot of ordinary people.

We examined values using a closed loop as a framework. In the case of the writings of the heroes, we looked into how a universal value, the nation, had become relevant through local examples, as was done by Emilio Jacinto and Gregoria de Jesus, and into how a local value is universalized by being lifted up, as was done by Mabini. But our examination took place within the realm of the theoretical and the potential. This framework must be filled in with empirical data drawn from dialogues such as those initiated by Alejo to conscienticize participants. Ultimately, by reframing the discourse, we want to see how institutions can change. In the case of pakikisama as interpreted by Lynch, the loop is not complete. The People Power Revolution
of February 1986 showed that this value can be used as a means to a more universal end; however, we do not as yet have an example of how the national interest can be localized using pakikisama. This could be the topic of future research. On the other hand, the ability of this value to lead to a wider universal value can be said to have been proven empirically in an actual event.

A NECESSARY TENSION

Why should it matter that a value can be an end-in-itself but also a means to another value? A major reason for studying Filipino values has been their potential use in nation-building. Understandably, thoughtful Filipinos are upset that the values most vivid to many are particularistic ones—maka-pamilya and pakikisama. Acknowledging the importance of both seems to lead to a cul-de-sac. Hence the quest for deeper and nobler values. However, a cul-de-sac is not inevitable if we consider that a value can be “lifted up” to more universal values. Values that served our ancestors well when they lived in small, kin-based societies could still serve as a framework for us who live in a nation-state with millions from diverse backgrounds—if we re-orient them.

But toward what universal values? In this essay, I proposed orienting them to those values students identified in a study by Clemente et al. ([2008] 2017): such as kalayaan, katarungan, bayan. Salazar (2009) identifies values in Emilio Jacinto with a universal scope: namely equality of all (pagkakapantay) and reason (katuwiran) for ordering a society. Today we need to articulate and popularize other equally relevant values, such as social justice, gender rights, protection of the environment. Perhaps the values we described in this essay as bridging values could make such values more understandable and easier to internalize. This is a task that philosophers and social scientists working together could do. A dialogue between philosophy and social sciences would be one way of creating a Filipino philosophy (Zialcita 1983; 1972).

In everyday life, we could remind ourselves that while we should indeed strive for our family’s welfare, our family is not an island unto itself. Its peace and prosperity depend on how peaceful and prosperous the rest of society is. Simultaneously, we should remember that the small, primary group has value in itself. It is in the small group of kin and friends that we are recognized in our totality as individuals rather than in society as a whole. How to promote
the interests of both the small group and of society whether city or nation? I have emphasized the need to escape reductionist thinking that prioritizes only one pole at the expense of the other. In our discussions on values, we need both poles. To paraphrase Heraclitus, it is the tension between the string and the bow, between opposites, that produces a harmonious sound.

NOTES

1 This article is a compound of two essays originally written last 2017 for a conference at Cagayan de Oro of UGAT (the national association of anthropologists of the Philippines) and for a conference on 100 years of anthropology in the Philippines, at the University of the Philippines in Quezon City.

2 See for instance Shahani (1993) and Villalon et al. (2019).

3 The NCCA study on Filipino values (Shahani 1993; Villalon et al. 2019) involved a theologian, a philosopher, and a statistician. It had no social scientists—whether psychologist, sociologist, or anthropologist! Despite explanations that they wanted to merely document what informants stated as their values, one gets the sense that the organizers wanted to study values from a purely moral angle, what should be, instead of being open to the possibility of values that may not be moral at all.

4 As an example, Levi-Strauss (1958, 54–55) critiques the commonsense notion that the relations within the nuclear family (wife to husband; father to son) form the basic structural unit of kinship. He points to the importance of the sister to brother, nephew to maternal uncle relations in matrilineal societies. While in a bilateral descent system, both son and daughter inherit assets; in patrilineal descent, only the sons inherit; in matrilineal descent, the situation is more complex. The daughter inherits the assets, but because it is her brother who administers the assets, as the maternal uncle, he exerts more influence upon the son than does the biological father. The deep structure that Lévi-Strauss proposes would include the binary relationship between sister and brother, along with the binary relationship between wife and husband. Where the relationship between sister and brother is recognized as more important, the relationship between wife and husband is less important, and vice-versa. On the other hand, the relationship between father and son likewise varies inversely vis-à-vis the relationship between maternal uncle and nephew.

5 We shall refer to this henceforth as Clemente et al.

6 The program called for conscientizing all the various sectors of society, government officials, businessmen, non-governmental organizations, and schools once the document was submitted to Congress. Unfortunately, nothing has been heard since. My interest is in re-locating the family, which Licuanan (2016) identifies as both the problem and the solution in a discourse.
7 During fieldwork in the Ilocos in the late 1970s down to the 1980s, I would hear accusations of sorcery thrown against those coming from a distant barangay even within the same municipality. Sometimes there were suspicions against those coming from another purok or sitio (neighborhood) even within the same barangay. William and Corinne Nydegger (1966) give the example of children at an elementary school preferring to cluster together with those from the same sitio (neighborhood), while ignoring a child from another sitio even within the same barangay. Raul Pertierra (1988, 26, 32) notes the conflicts between neighboring barangays. Perhaps such accusations may have died down now in our days. Still, the fact that such suspicions between communities within the same municipality existed until fairly recently shows how difficult it has been to generate a sense of a shared universal common good.

8 Gelia Castillo (1981, 452) arrives at a similar conclusion after comparing practices among farmers all over the archipelago.

9 Filipino students of Chinese origin and upbringing tell me of parents scolding them for getting only a B+ rather than an A in their schoolwork. Would this be the case among non-Chinese Filipinos? My sense is that, despite the parents' annoyance and disappointment, they would continue to care for their adult children.

10 Over the past two decades, at Ateneo de Manila, we have been receiving students from France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Spain. The attitude of these students is echoed by Katrin de Guia a German scholar married to a Filipino living in the Cordilleras. An outstanding quality she admires in Filipinos in their face-to-face encounters is their sense of being kapwa—a sensitivity to the other that manifests itself in hospitality even to the unexpected guest. See Katrin de Guia, “Calidad Humana and the Kapwa Orientation.” In Roberto Mayorga (2015, 24–49), I find her praise significant because Germany has a thriving welfare state that generously provides for a wide range of health benefits that free the ordinary citizen from worrying about health. On the level of the nation-state, the German system extends institutionalized compassion—which we do not currently have in the Philippines. Yet compassion in everyday face-to-face encounters—as occurs here—also matters.

11 Roberto Mayorga, former Chilean ambassador to the Philippines, has been so impressed with what he terms the Filipino's calidad humana (humaneness, sensitivity and kindness) that he convened a group to elaborate on its different manifestations in a book Calidad Humana: Sharing the Filipino Spirit. As a newly arrived envoy in 2010, he was impressed with how readily the presidents of the University of Sto. Tomas and the University of the Philippines spontaneously offered more help than he expected to his novel way of celebrating Chile's national day. Visiting a slum colony, he was surprised at the reception by the poor: adults with sincere smiles, children pressing his hand to their brows. He could not imagine these happening in other countries that he knew well. In that same book, Mark Calano recalls a four-day pilgrimage he took as a former Franciscan. He was asked to walk from Tagaytay to Manaoag in Pangasinan without provisions and sans religious habit. As a sign of faith in God, he was to beg for his needs. He was rebuffed several times. It took a poor old man living in a shanty with his grandson to welcome
him by sharing half of their meager food at dinner and breakfast. The old man explained that since he had nothing to give, he could at least offer love. “Hindi pinaghhirapan ang pag-ibig, ito ay ibinigay.” We are kind and caring toward those whose gaze has met ours. They enter, as it were, into our small circle of intimates.

For example: Nestor Garcia Cancilini, (1995). I prefer “localization” because “hybridity” in English cannot quite shake off the connotation of being “unnatural.” It has been used to denote offspring of parents from differing species, therefore “mongrels.”


For instance, Hegel’s “Aufhebung der Vorstellung” has been translated as the “abolition” of religion (defined as a symbolic representation) in favor of theoretical knowledge (absolute Wissenschaft). However, what Hegel meant is that all forms of knowledge, including the religious, tend toward increasing reflexivity. Our consciousness seeks to understand every being it encounters as a simultaneous relationship to itself and to others, as a unity of diverse characteristics and as a differentiation from other beings. The climax of self-awareness is theoretical knowledge, for it explicitly reflects on the very process by which it thinks and passes judgments on things. No doubt, when the religious person prays, he is more reflective than a person working at an office task. He purposely quests for meaning and is certain that there is meaning in his relationship to a Creator. But what is the basis for this optimism? He must step back and reflect on the basis of his belief. To do so is to enter another moment of consciousness, the theoretical, where the spirit articulates the basis for thinking that reality can be understood and therefore be meaningful. As St. Anselm, a medieval philosopher, put it, “fides quarens intellectum.” Faith seeks the rational basis for its act of believing. However, the theoretical moment does not negate the importance of other less self-conscious, less reflective moments in the human experience. For Hegel, difference is as important as identity. The human spirit expresses itself in diverse ways even as it seeks to see the unity of all things. Sympathizing with Hegel’s efforts to make Christianity more relevant to a world where “reason” is dominant, the theologian Hans Kung (1987, 224, 238, 350-351, 359, 374-375) agrees that the believer, as a rational human being, should reflect on his/her basis for belief. This misunderstanding extends to other themes in Hegel, like his analysis of art. Theoretical knowledge “lifts up” art because the lover of art seeks to know the basis of the aesthetic experience. Hence the proliferation of studies on literary theory and the never-ending quest for systematizing the relationship between art forms (see Ladha Hassanaly 2012, 16). Shlomo Avineri (1968) calls attention to how the Aufhebung of the State in Marx should be read and translated. It does not mean the plain and simple abolition of the State but posits rather a situation where once the working class assumes political power, it can transform the once bourgeois-dominated State to reflect its true interests. From all of these, what is relevant for our purposes is that
“lifting up” permits differentiation between two or more domains of experience while positing an identity shared by all the domains.

15 In his seminar on values, Alejo tackles as well concern for the family. He suggests that if a person steals for the sake of his family, then that person is not really concerned for his family. “Ang pinapakain sa anak ay nanggaling sa pagnanakaw” (The children are being fed stolen money).

16 BANDILA was a coalition of different interest groups: business groups, labor unions, urban poor, farmers, professionals, youth, clergy organized to reflect Centrist perspectives, Liberal Democrat, and Social Democrat. Since I was away in Honolulu during the last years of the Dictatorship, I decided to contribute my bit after my return home in 1987 by doing volunteer work for BANDILA.

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