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This article traces the provenance and the multiple layers of meaning, as well as the contradictions encoded, in the word *filibustero* from its origins among pirates in the Caribbean in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to the American military adventurers in the nineteenth century, whose complex politics intersected with proindependence Cuban exiles. This history illumines the word’s specific meaning as it entered the Philippines before 1872. At the same time, filibustero can be linked to the Manilamen, natives of the Spanish Philippines who worked as international seafarers, who became involved in mercenary activities, especially in Shanghai. This seaborne genealogy contextualizes the analysis of the filibustero in José Rizal’s second novel.

**KEYWORDS**: Cavite Mutiny · Revolution · Filibuster · Migrant Workers · Cuba
The title of José Rizal’s second novel, which appeared in 1891, has not been easy to translate to English. Filibusterismo is an intriguing word, especially because the present-day meaning of the American English filibuster seems totally unconnected to what Rizal must have meant. In March 1887, as he read Rizal’s first novel, Noli me tángere, Blumentritt asked Rizal what the word filibustero meant in the Philippines for it “must have a certain meaning” that Blumentritt said he could not find in the Spanish of both Spain and the Americas (Rizal 1961a, 63). Looking back to the time of the Cavite Mutiny, Rizal replied:

The word Filibustero is still very little known in the Philippines; the common people as yet do not know it. I heard it for the first time in 1872 [he was then 11 years old] when the tragic executions took place. I still remember the terror it aroused. Our father forbade us ever to utter it, as well as the words Cavite, Burgos (one of the executed priests) etc. The Manila newspapers and the Spaniards apply this word to one whom they want to render suspect of revolutionary activities. The educated [natives] fear the reach of the word. It does not have the meaning of freebooter; it rather means a dangerous patriot who will soon be hanged, or a presumptuous fellow.3

Rizal’s reply suggested that by 1872 the word filibustero was dreadfully circulating among members of the native elite, including Rizal’s family. Curiously, by the time of this letter a decade and a half had passed since the Cavite Mutiny, yet Rizal asserted that “the common people” had not known the word.4 If this observation was accurate, it would mean that filibustero was essentially a term deployed by the civil authorities in the Spanish Philippines, appearing in newspapers but evidently not used by the clergy in the pulpit during Sunday mass, the best medium by which a word could reach the masses. The clergy, particularly the friar orders, probably stuck to old terms of opprobrium such as “Mason.”5 In Rizal’s account, filibustero would appear to have been deployed for the first time in January 1872 by state officials who uttered it in reference to specific members of the secular clergy—who had been engaged in a bitter struggle with the friar orders over the control of parishes, conventionally known in Philippine historiography as the secularization controversy (Schumacher 1999, 2006; Blanco Andrés 2010). The colonial state’s maneuver of implicating members of the secular clergy as leading a separatist uprising and executing Mariano Gómez, José Burgos, and Jacinto Zamora made filibustero a terror-filled word. But the terror had less to do with complicity than with the fact that—as Rizal recalls in dedicating El filibusterismo to the three martyred priests—there was no evidence to link them to the revolt (Schumacher 2011; Schumacher 1999, 26–30). The native elite feared its arbitrary application. Indeed, several priests and laymen, including lawyers and businessmen who had agitated for liberal reforms, were arrested during the revolt and presumed guilty of plotting to overthrow the colonial government even prior to the gathering of evidence (Schumacher 2011, 63). In such a context, any “presumptuous fellow” could be labeled a filibustero.

The members of the native elite who actually planned the failed revolution—Máximo Inocencio, Crisanto de los Reyes, and Enrique Paraíso—were condemned to death, but Gov.-Gen. Rafael de Izquierdo y Gutiérrez discreetly commuted their sentence to banishment overseas because, as Schumacher (ibid., 72–73) argues, they were his fellow Masons. Were these instigators labeled filibusteros even if they were spared the garroting? Perhaps. But definitely the secular priests were regarded as the quintessential filibusteros—a Caribbean slang that Izquierdo (1872, 1999) did not use in his official reports—because the colonial authorities believed that their plot had intended to kill all Spaniards and install Burgos as the head of a provisional government, which would eventuate in a permanent government independent of Spain (Schumacher 1999, 26). Anyone pursuing the idea of bringing down Spanish rule through an armed uprising, the mass murder of Spaniards, and the establishment of an independent government was undoubtedly “dangerous” to the colonial state but a “patriot” to the homeland. However, the revolt failed because the native troops that Francisco Zaldúa and Sergeant Lamadrid had convinced to participate defected to the colonial government’s side.

From 1872 onward the term filibustero, which made an impression on Rizal even as a lad, remained in circulation among the native elites. Rizal (1961a, 69) told Blumentritt that he mocked the word in his novel, Noli me tángere (1887). It is used in the title of chapter 4, “Hereje y Filibustero,” which describes the injustices suffered by Don Rafael, Crisóstomo Ibarra’s father, a just man who was accused of being a filibustero and presumed guilty with neither evidence nor trial. The unreasonable charge against
Don Rafael—Ibarra would later say he would be the verdadero (genuine) filibustero⁶—instantiated what Rizal had written a few years earlier in an article for El Progreso, which appeared on 4 August 1884, titled “El filibusterismo en Filipinas” (cf. Schumacher 1966, 101, n. 21). In this piece Rizal argued that there were no filibusteros in the Philippines, but the word was employed recklessly and anyone who sought a modern and enlightened world was immediately labeled as such. Derisively Rizal wrote that those who did not take off their hats on meeting a Spaniard or who refused to kiss the “sweaty hand” of the friar were labeled filibusteros, just as those who subscribed to “some periodical of Spain or of Europe, even if it treat of literature, the sciences, or the fine arts; those who read books other than the novenas and fairy-stories of miracles of the girdle, the cord, or the scapular” were also put in the same camp, deemed “enemies of order, and like lightning rods, attract on stormy days wrath and calamities” (ibid., 102).⁷

This small intervention in a Spanish newspaper did not lift the obscurity of the word as it was understood in the Philippines. In fact, only much later would this meaning enter the official Spanish lexicon. In 1890 Wenceslao Retana, blaming reformism as breeding filibusteros, “offered” to the Real Academia Española the specific meaning of the word filibustero or filibustera. Describing the word as an adjective,⁸ Retana (1890, 47) defined it as, “In the Philippines it is applied to one who, eager for the independence of the country, resorts to various extralegal proceedings in order to reach the objective that he pursues” (En Filipinas, se aplica al que, ávido de la independencia del país, pone en practica cuantos procedimientos no legales están á su alcance para conseguir el logro del fin que persigue).⁹ In September 1891 El filibusterismo came off the press in Ghent, and the recourse to extralegal strategies stressed by Retana was overshadowed by the recourse to violence, a distinct possibility raised in the novel. But only in 1899 did the specific meaning of filibustero as someone who “works for the separation of our overseas provinces” (El que trabaja por la separación de nuestras provincias ultramarinas) —and the related word filibusterismo as referring to the political party of filibusteros—finally appear in the Real Academia’s Diccionario de la lengua castellana (Cano 2011a, b). This definition, formulated in the present tense and referring only to “our overseas possessions,” became a post facto recognition because by then Spain had lost the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico to the United States, in a cession formalized in the Treaty of Paris.¹⁰

Anderson (2005, 59, 60 n. 11) has proposed that the word filibustero “drifted” from Cuba to Spain and “across the Indian Ocean to Manila”: “Most likely the word traveled to Manila in the baggage of high-ranking military officers who had served in the Caribbean before being assigned to the Philippines.” This would have been the case even if the usually dilatory official dictionary in Spain referred only to pirates and military adventurers. However, the governors Anderson mentions as coming to the Philippines with a stint in the Caribbean did so after 1872. In particular, Valeriano Weyler, who served in the Ten Years’ War (1868–1878) in Santo Domingo and Cuba, did not become captain general of the Philippines until 1888. We need to date the word’s entry to Spanish Manila to at least the time of Izquierdo’s assumption of office on 4 April 1871, Izquierdo being a likely bearer of the word because nine years earlier he had been, in his early 40s, the acting governor of Puerto Rico from March to April 1862.¹¹ As will be shown later, in the Caribbean the word had acquired the meaning of separatist by the time of Izquierdo’s brief assignment there. In Manila Izquierdo overturned the liberal policies of his predecessor Carlos María de la Torre and, opposing secularization, showed “resolve to annihilate all opposition to the politically necessary friars” (Schumacher 2006, 214). During the Cavite Mutiny, when the ‘Ten Years’ War, the first large-scale war for Cuban independence, had raged for over three years, the word filibustero that Izquierdo had learned in the Caribbean reverberated in his mind and he used it to comprehend the events of 1872.¹² As Izquierdo had written in June 1871, “What I observed and learned in Cuba serves me in very good stead” (Tormo Sanz 1988, 30).

However, there is a longer history to the word—as hinted by Rizal’s reference to freebooters in the letter to Blumenritt that concomitantly sought to divest the word of its association with piracy. But this piratical imprint cannot be totally eradicated from the word as used by Rizal and as deployed by the Spanish colonial state in the Philippines. In pursuit of the word’s broader history, this article makes a preliminary attempt to trace the provenance and the multiple layers of meaning of the word filibustero from its origins in the world of piracy in the Caribbean in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to the military adventurism in the Americas in the nineteenth century. It analyzes how the word changed its meaning and political significance, its various appropriations, and the contradictions the word encoded. This article also shows that even prior to 1872 the word filibustero could be associated with some natives of the Spanish Philippines who in the nineteenth century worked as international seafarers, then known
in the Anglophone world as Manilamen, whose history is adumbrated here. This seaborne genealogy as a maritime optic\textsuperscript{17} provides the framework and context for understanding Rizal and filibusterismo in the late nineteenth century, particularly as refracted in Rizal’s second novel.

**Filibustero: Piracy in the Caribbean**

Our story begins with piracy in the Caribbean and the complex figure of the pirate. By the 1520s Spain’s colonization of the Americas and the domination of its riches were already being challenged by corsairs, initially French, subsequently English and Dutch, who raided Spanish vessels at sea and plundered Spanish settlements in the Caribbean. Spain had established colonies in the islands of Hispaniola, Cuba, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico, which comprised the Greater Antilles, but the small islands in the Lesser Antilles served as convenient bases for the pirates’ attacks, offering them hideaways and eventual room for settlement and colonization. Tortuga, located off the northern coast of what is now Haiti, was the pirates’ capital of the Caribbean whence some of the most violent piratical attacks during the seventeenth century were launched. Around 1640 Tortuga’s pirates formulated a code of conduct and formed a powerful organization called the Brotherhood of the Coast (Lipski 1982, 221).

“By the end of the sixteenth century, pirates had become Spain’s most feared commercial and political enemies and would remain a menace to the Spanish colonies throughout the eighteenth century” (Gerassi-Navarro 1999, 13). What made piracy political was its pursuit as state policy, especially by England—emblemated by its recognition of Francis Drake as a patriot, but whose reputation in Spain not surprisingly was that of a pirate. Piracy became an important means by which England, France, and the Netherlands sought to grab Spanish riches and undermine Spain’s empire in order to build or buttress their own empires. In the Caribbean, as John Anderson (1995, 176) puts it succinctly, “piracy originated in and was fueled by Old World rivalries.” However, as Benedict Anderson (2011) emphasizes, this form of piracy was an unofficial means of going to war, which would have been costly and dangerous. Another group was comprised of “true pirates” who were not tools of any state, but “enemies of all states and were not confined to one place of origin” (ibid.).

In the Anglo-American maritime world in the early eighteenth century, “true” pirates, most of whom were former merchant seamen of captured vessels while some had been Royal Navy sailors or privateersmen, constructed a world that inverted the dictatorial system of authority and privilege to which earlier they had been subjected (Rediker 1987, 254–87; Carse 1957). Onboard a pirate ship they cherished freedom and institutionalized democratic egalitarianism with authority in the collective hands of the crew, who drew up a set of rules before a voyage to govern individual conduct, the allocation of authority, and the distribution of plunder. Elected and discharged by the crew, the ship’s dual executive was comprised of the captain and the quartermaster, the latter a kind of civil magistrate. Marcus Rediker (1987, 269) observes that pirates, except for not being peasants, approximated Eric Hobsbawm’s (1965) social bandits, who bore a special “cry for vengeance” against cruel and abusive ship commanders.\textsuperscript{18}

In about the same period of world history maritime predations existed in other parts of the world: in the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{15} In Philippine history, the famous corsairs that challenged Spanish rule were Limahong in the 1570s and Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) in the 1660s, the latter pursuing a course of action to prop up the dying Ming Dynasty from his base in Formosa by seeking to extract tribute and homage from Spanish Manila (Bernal 1966; Guerrero 1966; Callanta 1989).\textsuperscript{16} Koxinga was rather analogous to Drake in being both pirate and patriot, depending on which side of the political fence one was in. Moreover, given his dominance, the social world of his expedition would not have fitted the model of maritime egalitarianism practiced by pirates in the Anglo-American maritime world.

Two new words—bucanero and filibustero—emerged from the world of pirates in the late-sixteenth-century Caribbean but appeared in written documents starting only in the early seventeenth century, the time lag, as John Lipski (1982, 222) theorizes, “reflecting the passage from criminal argot to common parlance of land-based literate individuals.” The history of bucanero is straightforward,\textsuperscript{17} but that of filibustero is not. In his lexicographic analysis, Lipski underscores that, whether in English, Spanish, or French, “the history of this word [filibustero] is revealed to be confusing, tortuous, and contradictory, and all but impossible to establish with certainty” (ibid., 214). This “curious word, which had been used in French and English since the early seventeenth century, does not appear in any Spanish language dictionary until the first edition of the dictionary of the Cuban Esteban Pichardo, in 1836” (ibid.).

But the word had already appeared in some Spanish-language documents in Santo Domingo in 1783 in a manner that did not need explaining, suggesting
the word was already part of the spoken languages in the Caribbean (ibid., 224). However, Lipski points out that, from the end of the 1600s to even past the 1750s, in the Caribbean areas where pirates were active, filibustero did not make an appearance in official documents; instead pirata (pirate) or ladrón (thief) was usually employed (ibid., 225). Lipski believes that “for a considerable period of time, filibustero belonged only to the slang of the seafaring pirates themselves and the Spanish soldiers and sailors that combated them, and that even when the word became definitively implanted on the shore, it remained a regionalism not able to displace the universal and time-honored words already in use” (ibid., 226). The word belonged to pirates and the naval and military actors the state sent to pursue them. The latter became responsible for the word’s circulation in official state discourse.

It has been generally supposed that the Spanish filibustero was derived from French filibuster, with its original source presumed to be Dutch vrijbuiter (corsair), which also gave rise to English freebooter (Gerassi-Navarro 1999, 16; Lipski 1982, 214–15; Sluiter 1944, 683 n. 2). If the origin was Dutch vrijbuiter or English freebooter, Lipski (1982, 217) argues that the insertion of the syllable-final s in filibuster and filibustero raises a problem. As a solution, Lipski proposes that filibuster and filibustero could have been influenced by flibotero (flyboat pilot), which was derived from English flyboat that gave rise to French filbot and Spanish flibote. In turn, filbot referred to the “class of ships, or perhaps to a style of vessel, of Dutch manufacture or origin” that pirates used in the West Indies during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (ibid., 218–19).

Regardless of the word’s precise origin, what is clear is that Spaniards resisted the term, not wishing “to legitimize the pirates’ activities by adopting a slang term,” preferring instead the traditional words pirata, ladrón, and enemigo (enemy)—hence the late appearance of filibustero in Spanish texts (ibid., 237). But the French in Europe, who “read with curiosity and amusement the accounts and autobiographies of pirates who pillaged their trade in the Spanish Main and who attacked the little-loved Spaniards” were at ease in adopting filibustero and rendering it in French as filbustier, which thus “made an early appearance in the seventeenth-century accounts of French piracy” (ibid., 237–38). In the 1770s Guillaume-Thomas Raynal and Denis Diderot, in chapter 52 (“Les flibustiers désolent les mers d’Amérique. Origine, mœurs, expéditions, décadence de ces corsaires”) of their Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements & du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes gave the word an overt political meaning: “Without glossing over the buccaneers’ ruthlessness, the authors nonetheless wrote admiringly of their love of liberty and their self-created code of honor” (Anderson 2005, 59 n. 11).

Filibustero finally made it to Pichardo’s dictionary in 1836, with the note that it was a corruption of filiboto (Lipski 1982, 215). Filibustero would not enter the Real Academia Española’s Diccionario de la lengua castellana until 1869, when it could be stated safely as “the name of certain pirates who, during the 17th century, infested the Antilles seas” (nombre de ciertos piratas que por el siglo XVII infestaron el mar de las Antillas) (Cano 2011a, b). At the start of the nineteenth century, piracy was no longer the threat to the Spanish settlers that it used to be, for by the mid-1700s the principal nuclei of piracy in the Caribbean “had already been dismantled by the combined efforts of Spanish, French, and British authorities” (Lipski 1982, 223; Gerassi-Navarro 1999, 37). The various words for pirates also began to lose currency.

At the same time, as Nina Gerassi-Navarro (1999, 5) demonstrates, the pirate figured in historical novels (two of which were titled El Filibustero) and her study focuses specifically on those written between 1843 and 1886 by accomplished authors from Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico—Vicente Fidel López, Justo Sierra O’Reilly, Eligio Ancona, and Soledad Acosta de Samper—who, except for the last, “were recognized as important actors in the political and cultural events of their countries.” At a time when most Spanish American colonies had won their independence from Spain but with many undergoing civil wars and the national project needing to be consolidated, Spanish American writers sought to define their heritage and formulate a unified vision of the past. During this period a number of pirate novels were published, but rather than presenting an idealized vision, they cast the pirate simultaneously in two distinct and contrasting images: a fearless daredevil seeking adventure on the high seas and a dangerous and cruel plunderer moved by greed. Far from evoking escapist ideals of heroism and grandeur, when Spanish American writers looked back into their past to inscribe their national heritage, the pirate—with his provocative images of both terror and freedom—came to embody the difficulties many nations experienced in their quest for national formation. (ibid., 4)
Because the emancipation of their own nations rested on revolutionary violence, the writers may have felt an affinity for pirates who savored freedom only through violence: “the pirate seemed to captivate their attention as a medium for the violence embedded in nationhood” (ibid., 7). As Gerassi-Navarro’s reading of these pirate novels indicates, “An emblematic figure of independence and boldness, the pirate captures the spirit behind the desire for political autonomy” (ibid., 7–8). However, the pirate as emblem of independence of a nation with definite spatial coordinates runs against the pirates’ seaborne rootlessness.

Filibustering: America’s Manifest Destiny

The complex images of terror and freedom reverberated not only in pirate novels but in the lives of adventurers mainly from the United States, who in the first half of the nineteenth century, as Robert May (1991, 857) puts it, “raised or participated in private military forces that either invaded or planned to invade foreign countries with which the United States was formally at peace.” May makes no distinction between land-based and sea-based invasions, and considers all such men as filibusters or filibusteros. May (2002, 4) thus contends that filibustering dates back to the 1790s, when the “pioneering filibusters including [US Senator William] Blount [of Tennessee] chose as their destinations neighboring Spanish colonies in North America—especially New Spain’s provinces of East and West Florida, Texas, and Louisiana” (ibid., 4). Among such expeditions, in 1806 Francisco de Miranda “led some two hundred recruits on an expedition from New York port to his native Venezuela” (ibid.). Nevertheless, it would not be until the Venezuela-born Narciso López’s attempts to overthrow Spanish control of Cuba in May 1850 and again in August 1851 that the word filibuster—evoking sea-based piracy—would enter circulation in the American English press. It made its appearance “so suddenly that in September 1851 a religious journal in Boston . . . [cautioned] to no effect that this ‘vulgarism’ might become accepted language if the press kept utilizing it” (May 2002, 5–4). As Lipski (1982, 214) recounts, “When Central Americans of the mid-nineteenth century applied filibustero to [the American William] Walker and other soldiers of fortune, they were reactivating a word which had previously enjoyed currency in the Caribbean region as a result of the extensive activities of pirates during earlier centuries.”

Why these forces targeted Spain’s North American provinces is easy to comprehend. Long-standing American grievances against Spain included trade barriers and tariff impositions, unresolved land claims in the borderlands, and suspicion that Spanish authorities instigated Indian attacks against them; at the same time, these holdings seemed to lack adequate defense (May 2002, 4–5). The remainder of Spanish America, except for Cuba and Puerto Rico, experienced a series of nationalist revolutions from 1810 to 1824. Across the Atlantic, Spain was suffering from years of turmoil. “Capitalizing on this opportunity, U.S. filibusters converged on Spanish domains, frequently as affiliates of Latin American revolutionaries” (ibid., 5). While the official US position was against private military invasions, not a few officials who were avid territorial expansionists supported filibuster plots, particularly in the invasion of East Florida and Texas (ibid., 6–9). The hundreds of men who joined these expeditionary forces, however, were not necessarily motivated by political ideas. “Recruiters realized that it took promises of land, good pay, pensions, political appointment, and other rewards to convince men to serve in such dangerous affairs. Then, too, some filibusters hoped to strike it rich from privateering or smuggling operations connected to their expeditions” (ibid., 6).

Filibustering, which persisted through the 1840s and the 1850s, converged with American dreams of expansionism—the age of Manifest Destiny—with many filibusters hoping to annex to the United States the colonies they would “liberate.” May (1991, 859) argues that filibustering was a US cultural phenomenon that “contributed to the rhythm of antebellum life,” reaching its apex before the Civil War. A number of young American males “relished the adventure and opportunity to become a hero that filibustering seemed to promise” (ibid., 863). At the same time, they “assumed that the superiority of their race and governmental institutions gave them the moral right to filibuster abroad” (ibid., 862). In the age of Manifest Destiny, even US military officers were supportive of, or at least receptive to, filibustering. As May (ibid., 857) asserts, “Although peoples of other countries occasionally filibustered, only the United States gained repute as a filibustering nation.”

In Cuba’s case, the Creole sugar planters feared that Spain would capitulate to the British campaign to end slavery, which they believed would cause the ruin of the sugar industry. The goal to preserve slavery led the planters to favor Cuba’s incorporation to the United States, where slavery continued to thrive. In the 1840s “the members of the club de la Habana began negotiations with leading slave interests of the South in the United States, with a view to bringing about the goal of annexation” (Allahar
They began to enlist possible filibusters who would help them overthrow Spanish rule (May 2002, 14). New York was another center of annexationist activity where “a group of exiled Cubans under the leadership of Gaspar Betancourt Cisneros formed the consejo cubano” (Allahar 1994, 292). There was a third “more militant center of annexationist activity, with roots in the districts of Trinidad, Sancti Spiritus, and Cienfuegos, and in its later years (1849) also in New York: the junta promovedora de los intereses políticos de Cuba,” whose undisputed leader was Narciso López (ibid.). Despite the overriding concern to keep slavery, the move to have Cuba joined to the United States contained the contradictory idea that “annexation also promised the possibility of sharing in, and maybe even transferring to Cuba, some of the democratic institutions” of the United States (ibid., 295). Thus the filibuster as a mid-nineteenth century figure “embodied contradictions inherent in the U.S. mission to spread American, in the broader sense, republicanism throughout the hemisphere” (Lazo 2005, 18).

Marshalling hundreds of American recruits, López’s filibusters in Cuba ended in failure. Col. William Crittenden, a nephew of the US attorney general at that time, and fifty of his men were executed by firing squad on 17 August 1851, and on 1 September 1851 López was garroted in a public square on the western shore of Havana’s harbor entrance (May 2002, 1–2). American newspapers reported that “huge audiences of onlookers cheered during the executions of the invaders” (ibid., 2). López’s expeditions captivated the American public’s imagination: “Although these expeditions occurred during a national crisis over slavery in California and other issues that threatened to destroy the Union, Americans found their attention drawn to López’s daring endeavors. In rapt, often horrified fascination, Americans waited impatiently for reliable accounts of his fate” (ibid., 2).

López’s filibustering expeditions to Cuba set the context for the word to be employed to connote legislative obstruction on the floor of the US Congress, the word first used in this sense on 3 January 1853 (Fisk and Chemerinsky 1997, 192). In a debate on Cuba, a Democrat, Abraham Venable of North Carolina, denounced filibusters as freebooters who were transforming the United States into “a nation of buccaneers” and the “brigands of the world” (Lazo 2005, 21). Venable crossed party lines to endorse the Whig position of nonintervention, although he argued that should Spain relinquish Cuba the US could acquire it “but the acquisition should not be achieved through filibustering” (Fisk and Chemerinsky 1997, 193). Albert Gallatin Brown of Mississippi, an annexationist Democrat, surprised that another Democrat went over to the “other side,” responded by characterizing Venable’s act as “filibustering, as I thought, against the United States,” accusing his colleague of resorting to inappropriate means and inverting the charges of filibustering leveled at annexationists (Lazo 2005, 25). By 1863 filibustering had become the standard name for the practice of using extended debate to block legislation (Fisk and Chemerinsky 1997, 193).

The most notorious of the American adventurers was William Walker, the so-called King of Filibusters who was a former part-owner and coeditor of the New Orleans Daily Crescent (Smith 1978, 27; May 2002, 40). Using hired vessels for his expeditions after the initial forays into northwestern Mexico, Walker disclaimed the “ill-regulated desire” associated with piracy by asserting that the racial ideology of Manifest Destiny animated his endeavors (Lazo 2005, 25). Walker led a private mercenary army in invading Mexican Lower California and Sonora in 1853–1854, where he set up a short-lived republic. Later in 1855 he was contracted by one of the factions in a Nicaraguan civil war, and in October that year emerged commander-in-chief of the army in a fourteen-month coalition government; in a rigged election he rose to become president of Nicaragua in July 1856. He attempted to take control of the rest of Central America, but was defeated by the four other Central American countries, with British support, that he tried to invade, surrendering to a US naval officer on 1 May 1857 (May 2002, 40–42, 47–52). In 1860 he published a history book, The War in Nicaragua (Walker 1860), to raise funds for another expedition (Lazo 2005, 24), but in September of that year he was captured and executed in Honduras.

Filibustering touched Canada, Cuba, Nicaragua, Mexico, Ecuador, Honduras, and all the way to Hawaii (May 1991, 857). It is generally supposed that filibustering came to an end during the US Civil War (1861–1865), but by 1860 a strand of military adventurism had crossed the Pacific and involved seafarers from the Spanish Philippines. Before we go to that part of the story, it may be noted that, after filibuster entered the US lexicon in 1851, the word filibuster finally made it to the Real Academia Española’s Diccionario de la lengua castellana in 1869. After recounting piracy in earlier centuries, the dictionary states, “Today it is applied to the armed adventurers, who without the authorization or mandate of any government, invade foreign territories” ( Hoy se aplica à los aventureros
Manilamen and Global Seafaring

The last galleon sailed from Manila for Acapulco, Mexico, in 1811, returning to the Philippines in 1815. However, from the inception of this transpacific trade in 1572, galleons were manned by Peninsular Spanish and Mexican creole sailors as well as indio seamen; the latter sometimes comprised two-thirds of the crew (Taylor 1922, 651). Many indios deserted and remained in California or Mexico, eventually establishing settlements such as in Louisiana (Espina 1988; Mercene 2007, 1–42). A number of indios were also on board American vessels that went to Alaska for the fur trade in the 1780s and 1790s (Buchholdt 1996, 3–11).

These early seafarers, as well as those who came after them in the course of the nineteenth century, were known in the English-speaking world as Manilamen. Because the Philippines as a nation-state did not exist, and although not every migrant was Tagalog or a native of Manila, most of these workers identified the colonial capital as their origin, deploying it in conversations with foreigners. Manila was a place name that, unlike Las Islas Filipinas, was recognizable in colonial ports and in the world’s metropolises. Manila was a global brand name, attached to tobacco from the Ilocos, hence “Manila cigar,” and abaca from Bicol, hence “Manila hemp” and “Manila paper.” In English-language texts, both governmental and private, seafarers and other labor migrants from the Philippines were thus often known and recorded as “Manilla men” or “Manilamen,” on rare occasions as “Philippine Islanders.”

By the 1840s Manilamen sailors were involved in the whaling industry, both in the Arctic and in the Pacific. Centered in Massachusetts, the American whaling industry saw its golden age commence in 1835, lasting for about two decades until the onset of the industry’s decline in the 1857 depression (Tower 1907, 50, 67). Whaling off the coast of Alaska began in 1848, but in the Pacific it began earlier in 1818; between 1820 and 1821 whaling vessels had gone all the way to the Japanese coast (ibid., 58–59). Thus, apart from the whaling grounds along the South American coast, whaling was done off several Pacific islands, the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, “Java, Malacca Straits, and into the Pacific about Australia, Tasmania and New Zealand” (ibid., 92). Although Americans were the officers, the crews—an average ship would have a crew composed of thirty-two men—were composed of different ethnicities.

Manilamen “were usually the steersmen, or quartermasters, on American sailing ships in the Pacific,” noted Austin Craig (1940, 158). Amid their transpacific voyages, some Manilamen had also settled in Hawaii by the 1850s (Ng 1995, 429). Herman Melville’s *Moby Dick*, first published in 1851 and based on the author’s own sailing experiences, gave recognition to Manilamen in the whaling industry, at least as oarsmen, who were part of a multiethnic force. Chapter 100, near the end, reads: “In a moment [Ahab, the captain of the *Pequod*] was standing in the boat’s stern, and the Manilla men were springing to their oars” (Melville 1926, 439).

At the Philippine National Archives (PNA) one set of documents in 1852 reveals that nine men worked as auxiliaries on an American whaling ship, the *Aussell Gibbs*; eight hailed from Zamboanga and a ninth man who, although originally from Cavite, had become a resident of the port town. Their names suggest they were probably not Muslims. Their remuneration was supposed to have been based on a share of the oil produced: for three of the men, it was a barrel for every 160 barrels of whale oil; for the remaining six, the pay was one barrel for every 170 barrels. In the argot of whaling, these “lays” (the share in the proceeds of a voyage) were at the lowest end, just a slight notch above what an inexperienced foremast hand would earn at one barrel for every 175 barrels, while at the highest end a captain could earn one barrel for every twelve (Tower 1907, 91). The employment of these men was supposed to have lasted for a year, and the captain was to bring them back to Zamboanga at the end of the contract period. Apparently not everything went well and the men lodged a complaint with the US consulate in Singapore, charging that they were shortchanged.

This case reveals that, by mid-century, inhabitants of Philippine port towns, especially in the Visayas and Mindanao, were being recruited for work in the Pacific and, as we shall see, in the Atlantic. Interestingly the documents were dated 1852, but it was only in 1855 that three provincial ports (Iloilo, Zamboanga, and Sual in Pangasinan) were opened to world trade for the first time (cf. Aguilar 1994). In other words, foreign-owned ships could actually go to a provincial port like Zamboanga and Iloilo to recruit workers onboard these vessels even before it was legal to export commodities from those same ports.
Morton Netzorg’s annotation of Robert MacMicking’s *Recollections of Manilla and the Philippines* included a note concerning the widespread reputation of Manilamen as “highly capable crewmen” of merchant vessels (MacMicking 1967, 31–32). Writing in 1850, MacMicking himself reported that the literacy of “the Manilla men serving on board of ships and composing their crews” was very impressive, admitting that “This fact startled me at first; but it has been frequently remarked upon by people very strongly prejudiced in favor of white men, and who despise the black skins of Manilla men . . .” (ibid., 31).

Much later, Graciano López Jaena, in a speech delivered at the Ateneo Barcelonés on 25 February 1889 and published in *La Solidaridad* in its issue of 28 February 1889, provided a transatlantic view of these seafarers.

*En un pueblo inmediato á Barcelona viven filipinos marineros, cuyo número es muy respetable; y tengo entendido que en todos ó casi todos los puertos ingleses, franceses, americanos, sobre todo en New York y Filadelfia ofrecen los filipinos un contingente de población cuya suma se hace subir de 15 á 20 mil personas; ¡pobres marineros! jente [sic] sencilla, franca, sumisa, han salido de nuestras islas, de sus hogares sin rudimentos de alguna civilización . . . . No sabiendo algunos leer y escribir, aprendieron á leer y escribir. (López Jaena 1889/1996, 30)*

*In a town near Barcelona live a very respectable number of Filipino sailors. And I am aware that in all or almost all the ports of England, France, and America, particularly in New York and Philadelphia, there are Filipinos whose population numbers come up to from 15 to 20 thousand. Poor sailors! Simple people, frank, and meek. They have left our islands, their homes, without the rudiments of any civilization . . . . Some, not knowing how to read and write, learned to do so. (López Jaena 1889/1996, 30)*

Untold numbers of seafarers from the Spanish Philippines opted to settle down in various foreign locations rather than return to the Spanish Philippines. Netzorg’s annotation of MacMicking (1967, 31), citing Brady (1950, 21), stated that “a member of the crew of the Confederate raider Alabama visited Cape Town in 1863” and decided to stay there permanently and live as a “fisherman” at Kalk Bay. When Manilamen, who were “among the crews of other vessels touching” at the southern tip of Africa, reportedly saw his pioneering success, they too decided to jump ship to live and work in Kalk Bay (MacMicking 1967, 32). Starting in 1869 there was also a sizeable community of Manilamen, settlers as well as transients, who were engaged in the pearl-shell industry on Thursday Island off the northernmost tip of Queensland, Australia (Aguilar 2000, 180–90). The available evidence suggests that a sizeable number of men—in the range of thousands—from the Philippines were widely engaged as mariners and seagoing migrant workers in the course of the nineteenth century. They probably formed multiple but only tangentially linked transcontinental networks. Like those employed on American whaling ships, the seafarers from the Philippines became part of multiethnic and multiracial maritime crews, which had been the case in the eighteenth-century Atlantic (Linebaugh and Rediker 1990; 2000) and on British and other vessels that plied the Europe-Asia route (Scammell 2000, 530).

Their immersion in the global maritime world would have differentiated them from other inhabitants of the Philippines who did not have these experiences in ports and open sea. Seafaring by its very nature was highly specialized, “an occupation with significant psychological and social ramifications for its workers” (Bolster 1990, 1174). Because of the distinctive maritime culture of sailors, “it is quite appropriate to regard men socialized in those shipboard usages as at least bicultural, as having available simultaneously two or more distinct yet intertwined cultural systems or resources, based on their origins and on their international occupation” (ibid., 1179). Unlike the fluidities in Spanish colonial society and the social negotiations it engendered (cf. Aguilar 1998), the vessels where Manilamen worked were a type of “total institution” that emphasized roles and positions, hierarchy, and order:

*Boundary maintenance—between officers and men, between larboard and starboard watches, between idlers and watch standers, between skilled and greenhands [sic]—was the essence of life aboard ship, for boundaries delineated privileges, perquisites, and punishments. . . . and essentially defined the social combinations and conflicts at the heart of seafaring life. Racial boundaries certainly existed, but they were often secondary to those established by the institution of the ship. (Bolster 1990, 1180)*
It was against the harshness of this total institution in the eighteenth century that pirates rebelled. Drawing on pirates’ quest for freedom, Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker (1990, 2000) stress that the maritime world had a liberating aspect to it. They argue that the “motley” crew of workers in the eighteenth-century Atlantic was an incubator of revolutionary ideas and practices, inventing the strike (1768) and helping to instigate the American Revolution (1776). Among nineteenth-century Manilamen the liberating dimension of the maritime world can be glimpsed in the readiness of seafarers to assert the terms of their contract, as did the nine men from Zamoanga on the whaling vessel Russel Gibbs, as well as Manilamen in Australia who in the 1890s supported the revolution against Spain, as discussed later in this article.

**Manilamen as Filibusters-for-Hire**

In the course of the nineteenth century, a few hundreds of Manilamen engaged in military adventurism and mercenary activities. The first known engagement of this nature occurred in November 1818 when Hypolite Bouchard, a Frenchman who had taken on Argentine citizenship, led two ships in a siege of Monterey, California, for thirty days with the goal of liberating California, then a relatively isolated colony of Spain ruled through Mexico. One of the two privateers, the Santa Rosa, commanded by the American Peter Corney, had a crew of about a hundred men: thirty were Sandwich Islanders (Hawaiians), with the rest made up of Americans, Spaniards, Portuguese, Creoles (Mexicans), Manilamen, Malays, and a few Englishmen (Mercene 2007, 52). Anchored near the shore, the Santa Rosa was fired at and abandoned the following morning, the men fleeing to the Argentina commanded by Bouchard, which remained in the middle of the bay. The force eventually captured and sacked Monterey, but reinforcements from San Francisco and Santa Barbara forced the pirates to flee (ibid., 53). What eventually happened to the Manilamen is unknown. However, Floro Mercene (ibid., 54) conjectures that the Manilamen were recruited in San Blas, Mexico, where the Santa Rosa had originated—San Blas being an alternate port to Acapulco during the galleon trade and where several indios had settled.

Solid evidence of Manilamen’s engagement as filibusters-for-hire is found in their involvement in Frederick Townsend Ward’s militia that he put at the service of the Qing government to defend the key treaty port city of Shanghai and quell the Taiping rebellion (1850–1864)—a private army initially known as the Foreign-Arms Corps, which in February 1862 the governor of Kiangsu christened as the Changsheng jun, the Ever-Victorious Army, out of enthusiasm for its performance (Smith 1978, 52). Born in 1831 in Salem, Massachusetts, Ward came from a family of ship owners and sailors. In 1847 he sailed from New York to China, “where he got his first intoxicating taste of treaty port life” (ibid., 26). On his return to the US he stayed briefly in a military academy in Vermont, but by 1849 he was sailing in a vessel commanded by his father, arriving in San Francisco in May 1850. By late 1851 he was in China again, but lack of gainful employment led him to sign on as first officer on a ship bound for Mexico, where he joined Walker’s contingent for about a year and learned filibustering (ibid., 27). From Mexico Ward joined the French army to participate in the Crimean War (1854–1856), although he left before the war’s end after quarreling with his superior officer (ibid., 27–28). In 1857 he was again in China as first mate on a coastal steamer, but a year or two later he was with his father’s ship brokerage firm in New York. In 1860 Ward was in China together with his younger brother Henry, who went into commission business trading, while Ward was employed on the American “Admiral” Gough’s pirate-suppression steamer Confucius (ibid., 28). As the Taiping rebels pushed into Shanghai and Chinese officials sought some form of foreign military assistance, Ward’s acquaintance with a local businessman named Charles B. Hill and Gough’s endorsement were instrumental in his introduction to Yang Fang, a banker and former comprador of Jardine Matheson and Company. Yang, who would become Ward’s father-in-law and business partner, was a close associate of Wu Hsiu, who in turn was the right-hand man of Hsüeh Huan, governor of Kiangsu in 1860 who controlled Shanghai’s foreign affairs from 1857 to 1862 (ibid., 13). Forming the well-funded Foreign-Arms Corps, “Ward found himself in an ideal position to engage in a little filibustering” (ibid., 28). A mercenary, Ward was rewarded with a regular and substantial salary, and promised large bonuses for the capture of rebel-held towns; although in his deathbed he claimed that Wu Hsiu owed him 110,000 taels, he had been able to acquire two vessels as well as property in the foreign settlement in Shanghai and near Sung-chiang (ibid., 56–57).

In Shanghai in 1860, Ward initially hired a bunch of American and European adventurers from among discharged seamen, deserters, and other drifters, but they proved to be undisciplined. In searching for better men, Ward “took to the waterfront once again” and there made the acquaintance of
of someone who immediately became his aide-de-camp: “Vincente [sic] Macanaya was twenty-three in 1860 and one of Shanghai’s large population of ‘Manilamen’—Filipinos who were handy on board ships and more than a little troublesome on land,” as Caleb Carr (1992, 91) journalistically puts it. At midcentury a considerable number of Manilamen were found in this part of China. In the words of Richard Smith (1978, 29), Manilamen were “Reputed to be brave and fierce fighters” and “were plentiful in Shanghai and always eager for action.” That there was a sizeable number of Manilamen in Shanghai is also attested to by reports that appeared in 1862 in the *Daily Shipping and Commercial News* of “stabbings and murders in the run-down rooming houses where the derelicts congregate, such as those run for the ‘Manilamen’ in Bamboo Town” as well as in the European quarters (Spence 1996, 310, 370 n. 59). In the siege of Huzhou, which ended in August 1864, along with the Qing army was “a strong force known as the Ever-Triumphant Army, a mixed band of Chinese and Filipino mercenaries, commanded by French officers” (ibid., 328).

Working for the Taiping side were, according to the British governor of Hong Kong, “a host of filibustering cutthroats and deserters (subjects of the Queen) who, under the pretense of joining the patriots, are committing every species of robbery and outrage” (ibid., 238). In addition to British and other European deserters were “at least five ‘Manilamen,’ longhaired and dressed in Chinese style, and worshipping God the Taiping way, also stationed in Zhenjiang. They serve as executioners for their Taiping masters, one of them being assigned to kill women found guilty of breaking the Taiping laws” (ibid.).

Archival evidence indicates that, at least from August to December 1860, Vicente Macanaya was one of a six-man Cuerpo de Policía of the Spanish Consulate in Shanghai with a monthly salary of $30. Whether Macanaya was simultaneously a police officer of the consulate and Ward’s aide-de-camp cannot be ascertained. However, there are reasons to believe that the Spanish authorities in Manila were aware of the filibustering activities of Manilamen on the southern Chinese coast. Despite the neutrality agreement, the Spanish consulate in Shanghai allowed Manilamen during the 1850s and early 1860s “to accept random mercenary employment with virtual impunity” (Smith 1978, 25). In fact, “One consul, Señor Infante de Murroz [Muñoz?], not only refused to block the employment of Spanish subjects, but actually encouraged mercenaries to enter the Chinese military service” (ibid.).

Extant accounts of the building of Ward’s Foreign-Arms Corps indicate that Macanaya recruited other Manilamen, some of whom were probably already on the crew of the *Confucius* captained by Gough. Recall that Ward had worked for Gough on the *Confucius*, which had a crew of Chinese, Manilamen, and Americans. During the late 1850s Gough’s mercenary enterprise “operated under semi-official auspices,” given that he was employed by an organization known as the Pirate Suppression Bureau, which seemed acceptable to Beijing and the American authorities until well into 1860 (ibid.). Earlier in 1853–1855 during the Small Sword Uprising, when secret-society militia-gangs mounted a coup and took over Shanghai for seventeen months (Goodman 1995, 72–83), Manilamen—and not only French, British, and American sailors—had fought “as mercenaries on both sides without appreciable consular interference” (Smith 1978, 29). In July 1860 Ward’s force of “somewhere between one and two hundred Manilamen” successfully assaulted Sung-chiang (Carr 1992, 107). Subsequently, however, many “deserted in a dispute over pay, but replacements were quickly and easily found” (Smith 1978, 29).

In later months, Ward employed greater numbers of Western mercenaries to officer his “Manilamen,” offering them thirty to fifty dollars per month and “the promise of large but indefinite emoluments on the recapture of any towns or strong positions occupied by the rebels.” In spite of unfavorable publicity and the risk of imprisonment for violating neutrality, recruits flocked to Ward’s standard. (ibid.)

Ward’s Foreign-Arms Corps included Manilamen, Americans, and Europeans, but because of rigid discipline (which included capital punishment) there were many desertions (ibid., 30). Called by the Chinese as *Lüsung Yiyong* (foreign militia from Luzon), Manilamen remained a major part of Ward’s army, even after the recruitment and training of Chinese fighters (cf. ibid., 31). Several dozens of them under Macanaya comprised Ward’s corps of personal bodyguards until Ward died in battle in September 1862 (ibid., 85). The command of the Ever-Victorious Army shifted to the British officer Charles Gordon, but the army remained disorderly, suffering mutinies and desertions, with a running dispute with the Chinese over finances, until, with the final destruction of the Taiping forces close at hand,
Gordon ordered its disbandment in May 1864 in anticipation of such an order from London (ibid., 132, 155–57).

Ward’s militia, it should be stressed, was qualitatively different from, although breathing the same spirit as, the expeditions of filibusteros in the Americas to the extent that local state actors had contracted Ward, giving his army a limited measure of state legitimacy. Not motivated by any contradictory ideas of liberation and annexation as the American filibusteros were, Ward was a mercenary-adventurer trying to defend the Qing dynasty from what was “the largest uprising in human history” (cf. Spence 1996). No such mercenary force defended Spanish rule in the Caribbean.

Because of the neutrality agreements, Ward’s presence in China—like the filibusteros’ invasion of a friendly country—was deemed illicit by Western powers; apprehended by the British in late April 1861, Ward’s excuse was his claim to be a Chinese subject, and indeed he styled himself a “transformed barbarian,” albeit not successfully from Beijing’s perspective (Smith 1978, 35, 51–54). Although his ties with Yang gave him “a stake in the order he was defending” (ibid., 56), Ward, and by implication his men from Manila and elsewhere, could claim (and feign) patriotism in a backhanded sort of way, in a trajectory dissimilar from the political goals blended with self-interest of filibusters in the Americas.

At about the same time across the Pacific, during the US Civil War, for evident economic gain as in the case of Ward’s army in Shanghai, foreign-born immigrants and mercenaries enlisted primarily with the troops of the Union, although some joined the Confederate army. Most were of European extraction, but a few thousands were of Asian descent, including Chinese, Indonesians, and Indians. Floro Mercene (2007, 43–47) lists some twenty-nine names of what could be Manilamen: except for two, all would seem to have volunteered with the Union. Apparently becoming land-based cannon fodder, they were mostly former seamen in their 20s, with Manila recorded as their place of birth, in all likelihood, a code that stood for the Philippines.

**Shanghai, Cuba, and Manila**

Given this many-sided history, it is likely that the word filibustero, in all its ambiguity, must have reached the shores of Manila prior to the Cavite Mutiny, but not much earlier. One possible channel could have come from the Spanish consulate in Shanghai, which would have sent confidential reports to both Manila and Madrid of indios involved in filibustering, if indeed such word was used. If any such reports were made, they are yet to be unearthed. But what we learn from Shanghai in the 1850s and 1860s is that filibustering and the filibustero are not strangers to some natives of the Philippines who pursued a radically different kind of life from that found in the Spanish colony.

A more likely channel would have been through the Caribbean. But the route traversed the United States, specifically via exiles from Cuba, who kept alive the spirit of filibustering by Narciso López. Rodrigo Lazo (2005, 6) points out that, in part to seize debates over López, a segment of exiled Cubans in the US appropriated filibustero as a political badge of honor and a symbol of their determination to win freedom from Spanish rule:

> many Cubans identified themselves as *filibusteros* and presented their expeditions as examples of republican efforts to bring democracy and egalitarianism to the island. “El Filibustero” was the title of a poem and the name of a newspaper that attempted to dredge up support for filibustering expeditions to Cuba. Cuban writers believed that filibustering had both a textual and a military component; it was both a metaphor for the writer as activist and a historical movement.

*El Filibustero*, published out of lower Manhattan with three or four issues a month between April 1853 and February 1854, circulated in the US, and smuggled into Cuba, described itself as the “organ of Cuban independence” (ibid., 32–33). It opposed the US purchase of Cuba but skirted the question of annexation by advocating “that Cubans (both on and off the island) should gain control of its government and then decide whether they wanted to join the Union” (ibid., 33). Although at odds with the designs of US annexationists, *El Filibustero* called for a native uprising as the only way by which filibustering from the outside would succeed (ibid., 35). However, newspapers put out by other Cuban exiles took an overtly annexationist position, suggesting discordant voices of expansionists, proslavery forces, and patriots who supported filibustering.

Nevertheless, the spirit that animated *El Filibustero* was not extinguished. About two-and-a-half decades after the periodical folded up, in 1880 José Martí was in New York engaging in political journalism, opposing US annexationist plans (even after Spain had abolished slavery in Cuba in 1886), and mobilizing Cuban exiles in a revolutionary committee, eventuating in
the founding of the Partido Revolucionario Cubano in Florida in 1892. With a handful of fellow exiles, Martí attempted to make his way back to Cuba to start a revolution, but the plot was inadvertently exposed. Responding to a Spanish complaint concerning the planned filibustering expedition, in January 1895 US authorities sequestered the three vessels loaded with weapons at Fernandina Beach in Florida, compelling Martí to escape back to New York (Sterngass 2007, 75–80). Martí, the filibustero, just eight years older than Rizal, would continue to lead the war of independence that commenced a month later in Cuba; he died in battle against Spanish troops on 19 May 1895.

Regardless of the contradictory politics of the filibusteros, especially in the 1850s and 1860s, for the Spanish colonial military rulers in the Caribbean the feared outcome would have been the same: the wrenching of a territory from one’s possession. It was the negative connotation of filibustero as a separatist, a revolutionary, a scoundrel, indeed a pirate who pilfered and attempted to take away an entire Spanish territory, that formed the basis of the jargon among state actors in Cuba—much as naval and military officers used the word filibustero to call their freebooting enemies in an earlier period. From Cuba the word hopped to Puerto Rico33 on Izquierdo’s own baggage, and, with an awareness of the “similarities” that bound the Philippines to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo (Tormo Sanz 1988, 30), he introduced the Caribbean colonial army slang in Manila to apprehend the events of 1872. Imprinted with the colonial state’s deployment of the word and its strategy of terror to ferret out its enemies, the negative sense of filibustero was what dominated Rizal’s explanation to Blumentritt, which (akin to Walker) also sought to erase the word’s connection to pirates. The sense of freedom and adventure was lost in its linguistic transit to the Philippines.

Rizal’s El filibusterismo
Unlike Graciano López Jaena, who lived in Barcelona often in penury and who probably interacted regularly with the marineros from the Philippines, Rizal did not mention Manilamen seafarers in any of his major writings. Nevertheless he would have been aware of their existence through López Jaena and through his own experiences, including the times he spent on board vessels during his transcontinental travels. Rizal might not have seen them as possessing political potential, as López Jaena did in interpreting their emigration and unwillingness to return to the Philippines as acts of resistance against friar dominance, and he might not have realized that mariners were immersed in a strictly hierarchical social order but one that concomitantly had a revolutionary and liberating side. Would Rizal have known that some of these seafarers in some parts of the world were guns-for-hire? There is no evidence that he did. But, in all likelihood, he must at least have been aware that they were known as Manilamen in the Anglophone world, but was at a loss on how to appropriate them into his nationalist writing. When he met Suehiro Tetchō onboard a ship from Yokohama to San Francisco in 1888, Rizal apparently introduced himself as someone from Manila (Maniria); in his writings Suehiro referred to Rizal as the “gentleman from Manila,” that is, a Manilaman (Hau and Shiraishi 2009, 342, 347, 350). Rizal had no recourse but to state his origins in terms of the globally known toponym that Manila had become. Rizal, too, was a Manilaman.

By the time Rizal was writing El filibusterismo (1889–1891) he had abandoned the campaign for assimilation that Marcelo del Pilar continued to pursue in Spain. (Del Pilar went to Spain to preempt his deportation for being “filibustero y anti-español” [Schumacher 1997, 122].) Although still vacillating about the means to achieve independence, he had by then seriously considered revolution. The plan of establishing an agricultural colony in British North Borneo, where from Hong Kong he made a visit in March 1892, was avowedly intended to relocate Rizal’s relatives and friends who had lost their lands in Calamba. However, as Schumacher (ibid., 273) points out, it raised the question of “whether he saw the colony as a possible base of action for future revolutionary activity in the Philippines.” In the same month of his visit to Borneo, Rizal did write Weyler’s successor, Gov.-Gen. Eulogio Despujol y Dusay, avowing his trust in the “just and honest government” of Despujol, Rizal offered to leave the Philippines and requested permission to change nationality, dispose of their few possessions, and allow him and his relatives and friends who “are prejudicial to the tranquility” of the country to emigrate to North Borneo, where Rizal admitted there were already many Filipinos (muchos filipinos) (Kalaw 1933, 305–7). Despujol did not reply to the letter but, through the Spanish consul in Hong Kong, relayed his opinion of the plan as unpatriotic given the need to develop agriculture in the Philippines (Schumacher 1997, 273).

Just as the governor-general could not trust Rizal’s intentions, so could we not fully fathom what Rizal truly had intended. Incredible were his superlative praise of Despujol’s approach and portrayal of the native population as easy...
to govern—“with a little love they quickly forget past grievances,” with no need to “augment the peninsular armed contingent” (Kalaw 1933, 305). Those were strange words penned after the Fili’s publication and his family’s misfortunes in Calamba, and given his resolve to return to the Philippines evidently to establish La Liga Filipina. Rizal’s letter sounded rather like Simoun in the Fili brushing aside the fear of an uprising, even if in the past there had been disturbances: “Those days are far away . . . These islands will not rise again, no matter what conscription or taxation is imposed on them” (Aquellos tiempos están lejos . . . estas islas no volverán á sublevarse por más trabajos é impuestos que tengan) (Rizal 1911, 16; 2009, 7).

A couple of months earlier, as part of Rizal’s correspondence with several proindependence ilustrados, Antonio Luna, writing from Madrid in January 1892, raised the tantalizing prospect that North Borneo could be the “new refuge” and become for Filipinos what Florida’s Key West (a mistranslation of Cayo Hueso) was for the Cubans (ibid., 294). (In a letter to Marcelo del Pilar in May 1892 Rizal did refer to his project as “preparing a place of freedom and refuge for Filipinos” [Del Pilar 1955, 258]). Although there is no record of Rizal’s response to Luna, Rizal’s concept of North Borneo had elicited an enthusiasm for a revolutionary base from where the liberation of the Philippines from Spanish rule could be launched. Regardless of whether Rizal or Luna was aware of it, this social fantasy had affinities with the project of exiled Cubans who called themselves filibusteros and dreamed of their country’s independence. More pointedly, the planned colony in Borneo replicated the move of Antonio Maceo, a brigadier general in the Ten Years’ War, who in 1891 moved to Costa Rica “to start an agricultural colony of Cuban exiles on the Pacific coast” (Sterngass 2007, 78).

In the Fili Rizal’s preface, Al Pueblo Filipino y su Gobierno, portrays filibusterismo as a “phantom” (fantasma) that the state has used to frighten the colonized, a specter that has acquired a real body. Instead of accepting the myth and fleeing in fear, Rizal explains his novel as looking at the dreaded disorder and foment people to rise to free themselves from their debasement under the control of this phantom. But the filibustero also haunts the state the result of which is its creation of the phantom of filibusterismo—echoed by Blumentritt in an epigraph to the Fili in terms of imagining the filibustero as “bewitching” state actors who unwittingly spread filibusterismo until every Filipino would find no solution but independence from the Mother Country. At the very outset, however, the filibustero as phantom is the state’s own creation (the misfortunes that compel Ibarra of the Noli to become Simoun of the Fili). In the circularity of this haunting, what emerges most vividly in the novel is the ability of the filibustero to corrupt colonial authorities, compelling them to commit more acts of injustice that would deepen social disorder and foment people to rise to free themselves from their debasement and this circular haunting.

In the Fili the filibustero as phantom is exemplified by the character of Simoun, whose career as a merchant in Cuba is described in the last chapter:

Tomó parte en la guerra de Cuba, ayudando ya á un partido ya á otro, pero ganando siempre. Allí conoció al General, entonces comandante, cuya voluntad se captó primero por medio de adelantos de dinero y haciéndose su amigo después gracias á crímenes cuyo secreto el joyero poseía. El, á fuerza de dinero le consiguió el destino, y una vez en Filipinas se sirvió de él como de ciego instrumento y le impulsó á cometer toda clase de injusticias valiéndose de su inextinguible sed de oro. (Rizal 1911, 210)

He had taken part in the [war in Cuba], helping now one side, now the other, but always to his profit. There he had met the General, at that time only a major, and had won his confidence in the beginning by lending him money. Later they became close friends because of certain crimes whose secrets were known to the jeweler. By dint of bribes Simoun had secured for him the assignment to the Philippines and once in the country Simoun has used the General as his blind tool, compelling him through his insatiable greed [for gold] to commit all manner of injustice. (Rizal 2009, 319)

We have a picture of Simoun as a mercenary of sorts, not really committed to any side of the Ten Years’ War in Cuba, and therefore not a filibustero for
Cuba, but a filibustoero nonetheless, for Simoun was there to pursue a long-term plan for the Philippines—strategically amassing resources that would allow him to secure through bribery the General’s—Weyler’s—assignment to the Philippines, in order to worsen the injustice, which would create the conditions for a mass uprising. Continuing to manipulate the General in the Philippines, Simoun was the wealthy jeweler who was reputed to be “the adviser and inspirer (el consultor y el inspirador) of all the acts of His Excellency the Captain General” (Rizal 1911, 10).

Traces of the author’s approval for Simoun’s stratagem can be found in Rizal’s letters. In April 1889 while in Madrid he learned that arrests had been made in Manila in the wake of the discovery that José Maria Basa’s brother had been instrumental in the distribution of antifriar propaganda. Instead of trying to help free the prisoners, Rizal did nothing. Rather he enjoined his compatriots in La Solidaridad, “All these arrests, abuses, etc. are a necessary evil in a corrupted society” (Todas estas prisiones, abusos, etc. son el mal necesario en una sociedad corrompida) (Kalaw 1931, 157). Ultimately he said such persecutions did not outrage him, in fact he took a certain relish in them because they served to open the eyes of those who slumbered (ibid.). Thus, instead of avoiding the inconvenience of imprisonment, Rizal said if “Filipinos” should match these cruelties with “fortitude and courage” in facing a “cruel and unequal fight,” they would be “worthy of liberty” and it would be possible to proclaim, dumating na ang tadhana (destiny has arrived) (ibid., 157–158). In the oft-cited letter Rizal wrote to Mariano Ponce and colleagues in La Solidaridad from Paris during this period, in which he maintained that if not for 1872 he would have become a Jesuit and would not have written the Noli but the contrary, Rizal shared his dream of avenging all the “injustices and cruelties” he had witnessed even as a child—unaware he said such persecutions did not outrage him, in fact he took a certain relish in them. Thus, instead of avoiding the inconvenience of imprisonment, Rizal said if “Filipinos” should match these cruelties with “fortitude and courage” facing a “cruel and unequal fight,” they would be “worthy of liberty” and it would be possible to proclaim, dumating na ang tadhana (destiny has arrived) (Kalaw 1931, 157). Ultimately he said such persecutions did not outrage him, in fact he took a certain relish in them because they served to open the eyes of those who slumbered (ibid.).

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Uncannily resonating with the discourse of some anarchist bombers in Europe (Anderson 2005, 116–118), Rizal’s hearty endorsement of violence, injustice, and corruption is echoed in his portrayal of Simoun’s nihilist plan of vengeance in the Fili. Like the pirate, the military adventurer, and the mercenary, Simoun as an embodiment of the figure of the filibustoero is suitably contradictory. Sailing back to Manila after building his scheme overseas, Simoun had entered the country as “a sort of spectro mundial come to haunt the Philippines” (ibid., 121)—in much the same way that Rizal had intended his second homecoming from Europe to be. With his strange appearance (huge dark glasses that covered his eyes and the upper half of his face), unusual accent (a mixture of English and South American), English fashion, time spent across the Pacific, and shocking proposal (dredging a canal that would directly link Laguna de Bay to Manila using conscript labor), Simoun, the disguised Crisóstomo Ibarra of the Noli, the mestizo son of a creole father and a native woman, is widely perceived as an American, a Yankee (yanqui), also a mulatto. Although never directly referred to as a filibustoero in the novel, this sinister, apparently foreign, figure has set out to deepen corruption and colonial injustice. At this stratagem we could almost sense Rizal’s excitement: the people get impassioned like the martyrs—almost sense Rizal’s excitement: the people get impassioned like the martyrs—almost sense Rizal’s excitement: the people get impassioned like the martyrs

Great! Let them commit abuses, let there be arrests, exiles, executions, good! Let Destiny be fulfilled! The day they lay their hand on us, the day they make martyrs out of our innocent families for our offence, goodbye, friar-dominated government, and perhaps, goodbye, Spanish government!

Matter-of-factly he reminded his readers that in any fight there would always be victims, and the bigger the battle the bloodier it would be. What was needed, he said, was for those imprisoned and exiled to show courage and firmness in order to provide an example to the people, and “they get impassioned (lo entusiasme) like the ancient Christian martyrs, like the [Russian] nihilists” (ibid., 167).
nitroglycerine bomb, concealed in a lamp, amid a wedding festivity. As the lamp is about to explode, the student Isagani seizes it and jumps into the Pasig River with it, foiling the plan. At the end of the novel, as Anderson (ibid., 121) has emphasized, Isagani gives an enigmatic smile and regrets that he wrecked Simoun’s scheme. On the kind of conspiracy that Simoun mounted, Anderson (ibid., 31) states, “Nothing in ‘real’ Philippine history remotely corresponds to Simoun and his outré scheme. One could perhaps think . . . that the novel was proleptic fiction, set in a time yet to come . . .”

Even in relation to Europe, the bomb plot “precedes rather than follows the spectacular wave of bomb outrages that rocked Spain and France in 1892–94” (ibid., 113). Nevertheless, the goal of the bomb plot, it can be argued, corresponded to something “real” in Philippine history. Not only were some Manilamen “real” filibusteros, of the mercenary variety in earlier times as well as of the liberationist kind in the revolutionary period as we shall see momentarily, but the decimation of the Spanish ruling clique was foreshadowed in Rizal’s dedication of the book to Gomez, Burgos, and Zamora and what the regime accused them of intending to accomplish: freedom through the killing of all Spaniards. It matters not that no evidence linked the priests to the conspiracy or whether the Cavite Mutiny really planned mass murder, but that this was the official view of events. In an analeptic move, Rizal, writing revenge, appropriated the official state discourse from 1872—when he first heard the word filibustero—and rekindled it in 1891 in his dedication and in the novel’s very title. The plot may have failed on the pages of the Fili, but the Simoun who was misrecognized in the novel was understood by readers as a Filipino who had the audacity to plan a revolution, a thought that in itself was revolutionary, for it raised the specter of 1872 and served as a foreboding of events to come.

In 1896 Bonifacio’s Katipunan would make Rizal’s prolepsis come to pass. Leaving Manila to return to the Peninsula, José del Castillo (1897) hurriedly published his book in Madrid and in its title declared that the Katipunan was El filibusterismo en filipinas. Despite his lack of reliable information about the latest developments due to his banishment to Dapitan in Zamboanga, Rizal was deemed by the judge who sentenced him to execution by firing squad—the fate of a filibustero—as holding the Katipunan’s moral leadership, calling him el verbo del filibusterismo (cf. Matibag 1995, 250), a phrase with religious overtones. By writing revolution, Rizal had become the revolution incarnate.

In January 1898 the Spanish consulate in Hong Kong was making an intelligence report that three of the leading Manilamen on Thursday Island (M. Evangelista, G. Evangelista, and Mariano Reyes) had formed the extension of the “revolutionary junta” based in Hong Kong under lawyer and exiled former member of the Comité de Propaganda Doroteo Cortés, and were collecting financial contributions from among the Filipinos there. Support for the revolution among ordinary Manilamen in Australia found sterling demonstration in Candido Iban and Francisco Castillo who returned to the Philippines in 1894 or 1895, joined the Katipunan, and “donated 400 pesos of their 1000 pesos Australian lottery prize” for the printing of Kalayaan, the Katipunan’s organ, and the movement’s cartilla (primer) (Ileto 1993, 30; Manuel and Manuel 1995, 227–28). Iban was born to a peasant family in Capiz in 1863, worked as a laborer on sugar farms in Negros, took a boat to Manila with Castillo, the two ending up as migrant workers in Australia. On his return to Capiz, Iban joined the local Katipunan. In an assault on Kalibo, Aklan, Iban was caught, and executed by Spanish authorities in March 1897, along with several others who today are remembered collectively as the “nineteen martyrs” of Capiz/Aklan (Manuel and Manuel 1995, 227–29). What the confidential report from Hong Kong failed to mention was the existence of another network that by late 1897 linked Basa in Hong Kong with Heriberto Zarcal in Australia (Ileto 1993, 30–34). Originally from a prosperous family in Santa Cruz, Zarcal arrived on Thursday Island in 1892; he became one of only five men licensed to deal in pearls, and rose to the rank of a trader and capitalist in the pearl-shell industry (ibid., 30–34). As part of mobilizing its various overseas networks, Aguinaldo later in August 1898 designated Zarcal as one of eight men in the Revolutionary Committee, an international elite tasked with the revolution’s overseas diplomatic offensive (ibid., 38–39).

On 1 May 1898, however, before the Philippine revolution could bear fruit the United States sent an expedition to Manila Bay and, this time officially, proved itself a filibustering nation par excellence.

Conclusion

Hesitating to appropriate the term filibustero as a badge of honor, Rizal, as writer in exile, nonetheless used the image of the filibustero to conjure a possibly explosive end of Spanish rule in the Philippines. Despite his minimal knowledge of political theory, and despite his distancing of filibustero from...
piracy (a tie that could not be fully severed) and the complex politics of the Caribbean and the American filibusters, by associating Simoun with Cuba—the birthing ground as it were of a revolution that was at the same time homegrown—Rizal uncannily called upon the imagery of American filibusters, from Narciso López to José Martí and the Cuban exiles who longed for the island’s independence, but with a twist. Simoun worked alone, clandestinely and quietly, a phantom of the phantom in the Fili’s preface, unlike American filibusters, Cuban exiles, and even Rizal himself who did not always shroud their activities in total secrecy. Despite this variance, the figure of the filibustero in the Fili connected with, spilled over into, and bore traces of the author’s real life and nonfictional texts. I share Rafael’s (2005, 54–55) uneasy sentiment that “it is tempting to see Rizal approximating the situation of the filibustero,” as understood in the narrow sense in which the word entered the Philippine Philippines from the Caribbean. However, in making Simoun’s appearance that of a foreigner’s, Rizal could have but did not model this spectro mundial on the Manilamen who had roamed the seas, and certainly not on their sense of adventure and revolutionary potential, either of the mercenary or the liberationist type, suggesting ultimately Rizal’s in comprehension of this multivalent and slippery figure from the nineteenth-century Philippines and the limits of a certain kind of nationalist imagination.

Notes
This is a revised version of a paper presented at the conference “Rizal in the 21st Century: Local and Global Perspectives,” organized by the University of the Philippines Diliman, 22–24 June 2011. My thanks go to the many colleagues who attended the conference panel where this paper was presented for their comments, questions, and cheerful feedback, and to a referee for a most encouraging report. I owe much to Caroline Sy Hau who has blessed me with her friendship, strong encouragement to write this paper despite my initial hesitation, trenchant comments and valuable suggestions, and crucial materials that were sent through both e-mail and the post. My other collaborators in this paper include Glória Cano, Xavier Huetz de Lemps, and Clark Alejandro to whom I am grateful for their warm support, for sending me research materials and crucial information I needed, and for providing generous feedback on and corrections to earlier versions of this paper. In a conversation in Barcelona in February 2010 Paul Kramer set me off to consider the revolutionary aspect of Manilamen. I am deeply indebted to Ben Anderson, ever the mentor, for detailed comments on an earlier version, which saved me from countless errors of fact and interpretation, and for the gentle pressure to work harder on my argument. Yr John N. Schumacher, SJ, very kindly lent me his copy of Izquierdo’s unpublished report of 1872 to the Ministro de Ultramar. Thanks are also due to Rose Mendicazú for assistance in searching through materials at the Philippine National Archives, but especially in the hunt for something on Vicente Macanaya. Deficiences remain in this essay and I am solely responsible for them.

1. El Filibusterismo has been translated to English variously as Charles Derbyshire’s Reign of Greed (Rizal 1912) and León Ma. Guerrero’s The Subversive (Rizal 1961b); some use the original title but with a subtitle that says the work is a translation of a novel from Spanish to English, as in the case of Camilo Osias (Rizal 1957).
2. Anderson (2005, 59) interjects this point in his rendition of this passage.
3. This English translation of the original German is a composite of the translations found in Rizal (1961a, 69), Anderson (2005, 59), and Guerrero (1979, 346). The italicized words are those underlined in the original, as reproduced on the fourth and fifth unnumbered pages after page 66 in Rizal 1961a.
4. Rizal (1961a, 69) added, “Ispichoso (sospechoso, suspicious) is better known, though less feared. The ispichoso of the poor and lower class is banished or temporarily jailed; but the pilibastro, as my cousins say it, is not yet known; but it will be!”
5. On the use of these terms to denounce foreign merchants, and specifically in relation to the 1820 cholera epidemic, see Aguilar 1998, 15–22. Anderson (2005, 59 n. 11) quotes in French and translates to English Fernando Tárrega de Mármo’s 1897 statement concerning the enemies of Madrid: “The methods of these modern Inquisitors are always the same: torture, executions, slanders. If the wretched person whom they mean to destroy lives in Cuba, he is called a filibuster; if he lives in the Peninsula, an anarchist; if in the Philippines, a freemason.”
6. For a discussion of the instability of political terms in Noli me tangere, see the quantitative analysis in Anderson 2003. The word filibustero, however, is not part of the analysis.
7. With his letter explaining the meaning of filibustero, Rizal enclosed a copy of this article to Blumentritt (Rizal 1961a, 69).
8. For example, Castillo (1897, 23) used the term as an adjective in describing Lo Solidaridad as a periódico filibustero. However, he also used it as a noun as in the phrase los filibusteros (ibid., 61).
9. Glória Cano (2011c) emphasized to me the distinction between nonlegal (no ilegal) and illegal (ilegal); Retana could have used the latter but instead opted for the former.
10. According to Cano (2011d), the Real Academia’s current practice is to wait for a word to be in circulation for four years before it is formally accepted in the dictionary. In the present case, the gap between Retana’s 1890 “offer” of a definition and the 1899 definition is inexplicably long nine years.
11. El Boricua (2011) provides a useful list of all the governors of Puerto Rico under Spanish and American rule. There might well have been less senior military officers in the Philippines than Izquierdo who had spent time in the Caribbean and had picked up this slang, and who introduced it to the Philippines, but for this article I could not track down their possible routes to the Pacific via the Caribbean.
12. I thank Ben Anderson (2011) for suggesting an examination of Izquierdo’s background. In this connection, this article may be regarded as a long footnote to the issue of the word’s entry to the Philippines that Anderson (2005, 59) raised in Under Three Flags.
13. Cf. Bentley 1999 for a discussion of sea and ocean basins as frameworks for the analysis of some historical processes. Although this article pays particular attention to the Caribbean and transpacific exchanges, there is no attempt to follow a strict framework delineated by sea and ocean basins. It is the larger maritime world in which the Spanish Philippines was embedded in the nineteenth century that is the essay’s main focus.
into the Manner of the Commander’s Behaviour to their Men, and those, against whom Complaint was made‘ were ‘whipp’d and pickled.’” “Many captured captains were ‘barbarously used,’ and some were summarily executed.”

For a useful overview of the literature on piracy in different parts of the world until the late 1990s, see Pennell 1998. I have no access to the vast majority of the materials surveyed by Pennell.


On Tortuga the settlers adopted the Indian “process of curing wild cattle meat under a slow-burning flame to give the meat an excellent flavor,” with the strips of meat smoked over a drying hearth the Carib Indians called boukan (Gerassi-Navarro 1999, 31). From the Indian name for the hearth evolved the term for the dried meat, viande boucanée, and for the hunter, boucanier, from which were derived the Spanish bucanero and the English buccaneer (Lipski 1982, 221; Gerassi-Navarro 1999, 31). When the Spanish and French governments tried to tax and regulate the meat-curing operation, the bucaniers “resisted, and it was perhaps this ambience of defiance that attracted the seafaring pirates that eventually made the island infamous and who appropriated boucanier, buccaneer, and buconoero for themselves” (Lipski 1982, 221).

Based on an extended discussion on the role of the syllable-final s in French linguistic practices, the settlers on Hog Island adopted the pronunciation of the intended word was filibustero or filibustero, following the “phonotactic/morphological paradigm already provided by forastero, embustero, etc., all of which contain the common sequence VSt” (ibid., 236). “The hypercorrected *filibustero or *filibostero could have made its way back to the pirates, either by the same soldiers and slaves who by force of correction had themselves adopted the hypercorrected form, or by direct contact between the pirates and wider segments of the colonial population” (ibid., 236–37). Hewing to a rather common pattern, a derogatory term applied by a hostile group was appropriated by the targeted group as an emblem of pride. John Lipski’s theory emphasizes the role of pirates as agents in crafting their designation as filibusters.

During the 1850s an estimated 5,000 or so Americans filibustered abroad (May 2005, 50).

Although the concept is much older, the term “Manifest Destiny” was coined in 1845 by John L. O’Sullivan, editor of the Democratic Review and the New York Morning News (Pratt 1927, 797; McMillan 1946, 180–81).

For the relationship between filibustering and Masonry, see De la Cova 1997.

May (2005, 38) asserts that “Americans still committed private aggression abroad in the 1870s–1890s, especially against Cuba, Mexico, and Central America.”

In the late twentieth century, given the vicissitudes of Spanish nationalism, dictionaries in Spain have again vacillated on the meaning of filibustero. In 1984 the new dictionary of the Real Academia called the Diccionario manual e ilustrado de la lengua española (third rev. ed.) introduced a new dimension to the word, defining it as “Nombre de ciertos piratas que por el siglo XVII infestaron el mar de las Antillas y saquearon las colonias españolas de América y los navíos que realizaban el tráfico entre estas y las metrópolis.” The latter addition emphasizes the sacking of Spanish colonies in the Americas and of the ships that connected the colonies to the metropolis, suggesting Spanish victimhood. In the 1989 edition of the dictionary, this latter addition is removed. In both editions the reference to American filibustering that appeared in 1869 is absent. The 1984 edition also contained the meaning, in a strange mix of present and past tenses, “El que trabaja por la emancipación de las que fueron provincias ultramarinas españolas.” The important dictionary of María Moliner, published in 1986, includes the meaning “Instigador de la sublevación durante la guerra de independencia de Cuba” (instigator of the revolt during the war of independence in Cuba), a definition that renders the wars of independence in the singular and labels the leaders of these wars as filibusteros—precisely the meaning that was brought to the Philippines. I am very grateful to Glória Cano (2011d, e) for information on these dictionary entries.

Inquiry regarding seamen, natives of Zamboanga . . . serving on board the American whaler “Ausel Gibbs,” US Consulate, Singapore, 10 Nov. 1852. Philippine National Archives (PNA), Consulados Estados 1792–1896, Bundle 1, Spanish Documents Section (SDS) 2404, 5810; D. Miguel de Mortola, Ministro Ynterventor y Subdelegado de Haciencia y Gobernador Política interinahmente por enfermedad del Sor. propietario de esta plaza de Zamboanga . . . Concejo libre y seguro paso para Ventura Rojas, Agustín Alarcon, Dionicio Cedillo Jorge, Marcelino Rojas, Hermogenes Francisco, Higinio Ferrer, Matias Torres, Jose Javier y Marcos Carrion. PNA Consulados Estados 1792–1896, Bundle 1, SDS 2404, folios 8818–81B.

Da cuenta con testimonio sobre la medida adoptada para el modo de prestar los auxilios de gente a la tripulaciones de buques extranjeros . . . Manila, 1 June 1853. PNA Consulados Estados 1792–1896, Bundle 1, SDS 2404, folios 5849–850.

The Ever-Victorious Army was named deliberately in emulation of and rivalry to the Ever-Victorious Army.

Resumen de las cantidades comprendidas en las cinco nóminas que se unen, presentadas por el Sor. Dn. Ildefonso Pulido y Espinosa, apoderado en esta Capital del Dn. Gumersindo Ogea y Porras, Cónsul de España en Shang-hay, procedentes dichas cantidades de los sueldos devengados en los cinco últimos meses de 1860, por los seis individuos que forman el Cuerpo de Policía creado para el servicio de aquel Consulado en virtud de Real orden de 28 de Abril del propio año, y decreto del Exmo. Sor. Gobernador General de estas Islas de 13 de Julio siguiente . . . Contaduria General de Ejército y Hacienda de Filipinas, Manila. 5 Feb. 1861. PNA Consulados Estados 1804–1898, Bundle 4, SDS 2407, folios 5676–5681, 5781.

Strangely Macanaya’s salary in the Spanish consulate was about the same at $30 per month.

Smith (1978, 31) does not provide the Chinese characters for this phrase, but renders Lúṣóng yìyǒng as “Manila barbarian braves,” substituting Manila for Luzon in his English translation. Carol Hau (2011c) has verified from Chinese scholarly sources that the characters 勇義 were used, but with “yi yong” meaning something like a ‘foreign legion’ . . . yiyong as foreign legion is used as contrast to huayong, ‘native legion’ (legion manned by Chinese).” Clark Alejandrino (2011a) explains that “Independently formed Chinese and Western armies/militias that fought the Taipings were referred to as 志勇 volunteer ‘braves.’ Braves is a crude translation” of yong, which is here rendered as militia. Based on the advice of Hau (2011c) and Alejandrino (2011b), “yi” may or may not have referred to “barbarian,” and is thus translated here as “foreign.” The entire phrase is thus rendered here as “foreign militia from Luzon.”

The employment of foreign mercenaries to drive back the Taiping rebels was initiated by local officials in Shanghai rather than centrally from Beijing, particularly because formal treaties with Western powers affirmed neutrality and forbade foreigners from assisting either side of the conflict “by taking military service, recruiting men, or furnishing arms or other supplies” (Smith 1978, 24). Beijing was also apprehensive that direct foreign intervention could provide a pretext for Western imperialist encroachments (ibid., 41–42). Only in February 1862, after “the
thrones had agreed to accept limited foreign military assistance against the rebels, and Ward’s
campaign had gained a series of noteworthy victories in the vicinity of Sung-chiang without
Allied military support, did the Kiangsu governor perceive that the time was ripe for bringing
Ward and his force to Peking’s attention” (ibid., 50–51).
31 The “Moro raiders” of Catholic seaside settlements in Luzon and the Visayas—first by the
Magindanao from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century as an extension of jihad, and
by the Sulu (Taosug) from the late eighteenth century to the nineteenth century in the context of
European trade and state formation (Warren 1885)—were referred to by the Spanish as pirates,
but never as filibusteros.
32 Spanish fears of losing Cuba would deepen at the start of the Ten Year’s War in October 1868.
It is from this period in Cuban history that a 1966 dictionary in Spain draws its definition of
filibuster as an instigator of an uprising (see note 23).
33 Puerto Rico experienced its own short-lived Lares uprising in September 1868, erupting and
ending just before the commencement of the Ten Year’s War. The seeds of separatism were
germinating in Cuba and Puerto Rico at the same time, but it did not have a fertile ground in the
latter.
34 In Vietnam, as Xavier Huetz de Lemps (2011) has alerted me, “the French systematically called
‘pirates’ the Vietnamese (and Chinese) resistance fighters, rebels, and bandits who were
‘opposed to the conquest of Annam and Tonkin (1883–1897), thus disconnecting entirely the
word from its ‘maritime’ origin.” Amid the Can Vuong resistance to French colonialism, David
Marr (1971, 72) has pointed out that armed bands in the midlands and highlands of northern
Vietnam “have come down in French history books as pirates and rebelles.”
35 “¡pobres marineros! . . . huyendo desesperados de las trabas y de las opresiones de que eran
víctimas; venidos á esta parte del mundo donde la libertad impera, ó á aquella otra parte del
Atlántico, donde el progreso y la democracia asientan con base firme sus dominios!” (Poor sailors!
. . . they fled desperately from the restraints and oppressions of which they were victims! They
came to this part of the world where freedom reigns, or gone to that other part of the Atlantic
province where progress and democracy are well-established) (López Jaena 1889/1996, 30–31).
36 In writing to the governor-general, Rizal would not have employed the term Manilamen, but he
used the nationalizing term “filipinos.”
37 Joining José Martí and Máximo Gómez in a planned invasion of Cuba, Maceo landed on the eastern
shores of the island on 30 March 1895 for the revolution whose cry was raised on 24 February 1895.
Stuck in Santo Domingo, Martí and Gómez arrived back in Cuba only on 11 April. A military planner
and political strategist, Maceo was second-in-command of the Cuban Army of Independence. He
died in battle on 7 December 1896, about three weeks before Rizal’s execution.
As Anderson (2005, 2) has pointed out, “Natives of the last important remnants of the
fabled Spanish global empire, Cubans (as well as Puerto Ricans and Dominicans) and Filipinos
did not merely read about each other, but had crucial personal connections and, up to a point, co-ordinated their actions—the first time in world history that such transglobal coordination
came to pass.”
38 “Tantas veces se nos ha amedrentado con el fantasma del filibusterismo que, de mero recurso
de aya, ha llegado á ser un ente positivo y real, cuyo solo nombre nos hace olvidar los mayores
desaciertos. Dejando, pues, á un lado el viejo sistema de respetar los mitos por no encontrarse
con la temida realidad, en vez de huir, le miraremos frente á frente y, con mano decidida
aunque inexperto, levantaremos el sudario para descubrir ante la multitud el mecanismo de su
esqueleto.”


———. 2011b. Email to author, 16 Sept.

———. 2011c. Email to author, 17 Sept.

———. 2011d. Email to author, 29 Sept.

———. 2011e. Email to author, 1 Oct.


Hau, Caroline S. 2011a. E-mail to author, 22 Sept.

———. 2011b. E-mail to author, 6 Oct., 1940 hrs.

———. 2011c. E-mail to author, 6 Oct., 2020 hrs.


Huetz de Lemps, Xavier. 2011. E-mail to author, 13 Oct.


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